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The Bomber Who Calls Ahead: Terrorism, Insurgency, and the Politics of Pre-Attack Warnings
Joseph M. Brown
Terrorist and insurgent groups sometimes give pre-attack warnings, informing governments of the
time and place of attacks before they occur. This dissertation explains why militant groups give
these warnings. It also explains why governments believe these warnings and respond to them,
mobilizing emergency resources and carrying out economically disruptive evacuations. Based on
interviews and other historical research on the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
(ETA), the Tamil Tigers, Shining Path, and Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), this
dissertation argues that pre-attack warnings serve a casualty-limiting function. Militant groups
give warnings when civilian casualties are politically costly for the group. Civilian casualties are
especially costly for groups that depend on local populations for shelter, funding and other critical
resources. These conclusions are confirmed by logit analyses of a new database of more than
3,000 bombing events. A game theoretic signaling model also predicts when governments will
believe and respond to warnings. Governments respond to warnings when militants are known
to warn only when attacking and the frequency of prank warnings is low. The model’s predictions
are confirmed by interviews of police in Northern Ireland and Spain. A novel finding is that a
high frequency of pranks (false warnings emanating from individuals outside the militant group)
may force militants to warn truthfully. Militants may also work with governments to create clear
channels for communication, using third party intermediaries, codes, and redundant messages
to set militants’ warnings apart from the “noise” of pranks. This finding substantiates a game
theoretic prediction that experimental methods have so far failed to validate: that increased noise
may induce separating equilibria, increasing rather than decreasing the information in a signal.
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Thousands of shoppers visit the stores in the commercial center of Manchester, England on any
given Saturday. The morning of June 15, 1996 was typical in that regard. Between 75,000 and
80,000 people packed the department stores, restaurants, and other businesses in the city center,
unaware of the 3,300 lb ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel bomb hidden in a red and white freight
truck nearby. Elite members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) had driven the truck
into Manchester shortly after nine o’clock that morning, parking it outside the glass display win-
dows of Marks and Spencer, one of the largest department stores in the city. The stage was set for
an extraordinary bloodbath.
Then, shortly after 9:40AM, the situation changed dramatically. Police rushed to the area around
Marks and Spencer and began examining vehicles. They quickly identified the truck contain-
ing the bomb, noting the suspicious wiring running from its cabin into the cargo compartment.
The police rapidly evacuated the surrounding area, creating a protective no-go zone stretching a
quarter mile from the truck in every direction. Police also notified the British Army’s elite bomb
disposal team, which arrived on the scene at 10:45AM with a remote controlled robot specifically
designed to approach and defuse IRA bombs.
Despite the best efforts of the army bomb experts, the IRA truck bomb exploded at 11:17 AM.
It was the largest peacetime explosion in the history of the United Kingdom. A blinding fireball
and shock wave pulverized store fronts, news stands, and cars. The commercial center of Manch-
ester was raked by flying rubble, glass, and hot metal. A black mushroom cloud rose over the
city. Remarkably, however, the explosion did not kill anyone. Manchester police had worked
efficiently, evacuating thousands of people from the city center, and when the bomb went off, it
tore through a ghost town. Fire and ambulance crews combing the scene afterward encountered a
scene of utter devastation – roughly £1 billion in physical damage. But the only bodies they found
were those of the unfortunate bomb disposal robot and a number of shop mannequins that had
been blown out of store windows and into the streets (BBC 2006; Harnden 1999: 248-251).
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IRA attacks throughout the thirty-year Northern Ireland conflict often followed this pattern. The
IRA’s April 24, 1993 bombing of the Bishopsgate area of London’s financial district utilized a sim-
ilar bomb – 2,200 lb of explosives packed into the back of a dump truck and attached to a timer.
Two IRA agents parked the truck and fled the scene undetected. But police rushed to the area
within the hour, identifying the suspicious truck and commencing a massive evacuation of the
Bishopsgate area. When the bomb exploded it shattered several blocks of expensive real estate –
banks and office towers, primarily – causing £500 million in damage. But thanks to the intrepid
work of London’s Metropolitan Police, that shattered real estate was empty of people. The one
fatality was an inquisitive news reporter who rushed toward the scene of the evacuation rather
than away from it (Harnden 1999: 244).
In each of these cases, what could have been a massive humanitarian catastrophe was averted
by police who found the bombs planted by the IRA and evacuated people before the bombs went
off. But how was this possible? Why were police able to locate the devices hidden by the IRA,
with enough time to move bystanders to safety?
Because the IRA told police where to look.
Immediately after parking the truck bomb in front of Marks and Spencer in downtown Manch-
ester, members of the IRA placed phone calls to emergency hotlines and media organizations in
the Manchester area. The phone calls warned of an attack underway, giving the location of the
bomb, a description of the truck carrying the device, and the approximate time at which the bomb
would explode. The emergency hotlines and media organizations relayed the warnings to Manch-
ester police. With roughly ninety minutes notice, Manchester police were able to find the bomb
truck, clear the surrounding area, and cordon it off so that no one would be caught in the blast.
The story at Bishopsgate was similar: After parking the truck, the IRA placed nine separate phone
calls, informing London police of the bomb’s location and approximately when it would explode.
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Police had forty-five minutes to evacuate nearby buildings and move people to safe areas (Harn-
den 1999: 244). Why did the IRA do this? Why, after expending the effort to build a bomb and
secretly transport it into the heart of an English city, would the IRA spoil the surprise by telling
police about the plot?
In this dissertation, I explain why some militant groups engage in such behavior and others do
not. I also answer related questions regarding the state’s reaction to warning messages. First,
what convinces a government to believe a warning, rather than assuming it to be a cynical hoax
by militants trying to create chaos? Second, what can warnings and government responses tell
us about cooperation and communication among adversaries? Militants and governments spend
most of their days trying to kill or apprehend one another. How does an apparently cooperative
interaction emerge, whereby militants signal their attacks ahead of time and governments use that
information to save lives?
My research design incorporates formal theory, field interviews, archival research, and large-N
quantitative analyses. Chapter 1 presents a review of relevant literature. Chapter 2 presents a the-
ory to explain militants’ decisions to send or not to send warnings of imminent attacks. I express
this theory formally, although I save a full discussion of the formal model for a later chapter. The
essence of the theory is as follows: Militants give pre-attack warnings to avoid causing civilian ca-
sualties, when those casualties are likely to be politically costly for the group. Militants also give
warnings because the government’s expected response – dispatching police, evacuating buildings,
shutting down infrastructure, etc. – is costly to the state. Warnings serve a dual purpose, avoiding
the political costs associated with excessive killing and imposing added costs on the government.
When deciding whether to give warnings, a militant group weighs these benefits against the op-
erational drawbacks of warning: an increased likelihood of the government thwarting the attack
and a lower expected level of damage compared to that of a no-warning attack.
Chapter 3 presents a detailed case study of the IRA during the thirty year conflict known as “the
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Troubles.” I base this case study on extensive fieldwork and first-person interviews conducted
in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. I pose direct questions to IRA members about why they
gave warnings to the British government. I also pose questions to police and intelligence special-
ists who worked to defeat the IRA – and who often found themselves on the receiving end of the
IRA’s pre-attack warnings. These interviews support my theory that militant organizations warn
to avoid politically costly civilian casualties and to impose additional costs on the government.
Chapter 4 presents paired case studies as additional tests of the theory. Using data collected from
fieldwork in Sri Lanka, Peru, and Spain, I analyze militant groups that engaged in different warn-
ing behavior. I pair groups that were similar in major factors such as their fundamental grievances
and their political goals. I then look for divergences in the variables identified as causally signifi-
cant in my theory. If my theory is well specified, the differences in these groups’ warning behavior
should be traceable to differences in their political costs for harming civilians and their ability to
impose additional costs on the government. The first case pair comprises the Basque secessionist
group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE – colloquially,
the Tamil Tigers). Both groups were motivated by ethnic grievances and sought secession, but
only ETA gave pre-attack warnings. The second case pair comprises el Movimiento Revolucionario
Túpac Amaru (MRTA – the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) and Sendero Luminoso (the
Shining Path). Both groups were motivated by revolutionary Marxism and sought the overthrow
of the Peruvian government, but only the MRTA gave pre-attack warnings. Like the IRA case
study, these paired, contrasting case studies show that militant groups warn to avoid politically
costly casualties and to impose additional costs on the government.
Chapter 5 presents a quantitative analysis of more than 3,800 bombing incidents carried out by
37 militant groups worldwide. I identify a case universe of bombing incidents in the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)’s Global Terrorism
Database (START 2015). I use Lexis Nexis searches and other historical research to determine
whether the perpetrator group gave a warning before each incident. I also incorporate informa-
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tion on the characteristics of militant groups and the states they fight, based on data from the Big
Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) dataset and the Political Terror Scale dataset (Asal and Rethemeyer
2008b; Gibney 2015). My IRA, ETA, Tamil Tigers, Shining Path, and MRTA case studies suggest
that militant groups’ relative dependence on local support determines the political cost of harm-
ing civilians. I use the BAAD dataset’s indicators of militant territorial control and foreign state
support to measure each group’s dependence on local support. I use logit regressions at the level
of the individual attack to determine whether these factors predict warning behavior by the per-
petrator group in each of my database’s incidents. The results are consistent with the expectation
that groups will give warnings when they face high costs for targeting for civilians, as determined
by their lack of territorial control and their lack of foreign state patronage.
Chapter 6 turns to the analysis of communication and cooperation between militants and gov-
ernments. Here I present the full version of my game theoretic model, a signaling game played by
a Militant and a Government. As mentioned earlier, the model predicts pre-attack warnings when
militants face high political costs for killing civilians, governments face high costs for responding
to warnings, and militants sacrifice little damage by giving warnings of their attacks. The model
also predicts that militants will give false warnings if they place an especially low premium on
their reputation for honesty. Additionally, the model makes predictions about when governments
will respond to warnings they receive. The militant group’s equilibrium warning behavior is a
critical determinant, as is the probability of prank warnings that cannot be distinguished from
militants’ messages. My model predicts that if militants warn falsely or the frequency of pranks is
very high, the government will not respond – an outcome that may be suboptimal for the militant
group. Governments may also fail to respond if there is low political accountability for ignor-
ing warnings that prove to be true. I test the model’s predictions using data from my IRA and
ETA interviews; interviews of Irish, British, and Spanish police; and interviews of journalists who
served as neutral intermediaries for communication between militants and governments. The
case study evidence confirms my model’s hypotheses and offers other intriguing insights about
militant-government interaction. When facing a government that may not respond to warnings, a
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militant group may involve the news media, passing warning messages through journalists and
ensuring that the warning is “on the record” in case the government fails to respond. Militants
may also work with governments, developing elaborate procedures to set their warnings apart
from pranks. By making it very difficult for pranksters to fake a warning, militants assist the gov-
ernment in responding to credible warnings. Militants will also optimize their own false warning
behavior, keeping their use of hoaxes below the threshold at which the government would no
longer respond. A sufficiently high frequency of pranks (from those outside the militant group)
may cause the militant group to adopt a strict policy of truthful warning.
Chapter 7 presents an extension of my research to the analysis of state behavior. Militant groups
are not the only actors that give pre-attack warnings. States engage in this behavior as well, and
sometimes on a grand scale. In the extensions chapter I apply my theoretical framework to ex-
plain state behavior in three cases: China’s shelling of the Taiwan Straits islands from 1958-1979,
the United States’ atomic bombing of Japan in 1945, and Israel’s bomb and artillery strikes on
Hamas-controlled Gaza in “Operation Cast Lead” (2008-2009) and “Operation Protective Edge”
(2014). My theory explains the warning and non-warning behavior of states well in these cases.
Based on my analysis I am able to make forward-looking predictions for when we are likely to see
warning behavior by other states. These predictions may be tested in future research.
I summarize my conclusions in Chapter 8, discussing the broader implications of my findings
for our understanding of terrorism, insurgency, interstate conflict, and cooperation among adver-
saries. Although pre-attack warnings are a very specific phenomenon, examining them yields
general insights about violence and the politics thereof.
First, pre-attack warnings offer a window into how militants think about tactics and targeting.
The bomb, by itself, is a clumsy weapon. States possess technology to make bombs “smart,” but
non-state belligerents generally do not. Instead, they incorporate a particular speech act into the
operational planning for their attacks. By engaging the government’s security response – essen-
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tially co-opting police for militants’ own purposes – warnings allow a non-state group to destroy
physical property, hollow out the state’s economy, and cause widespread psychological effects
while killing very few people. These warnings can reduce so-called “collateral damage” to very
low levels – often lower than what states cause using advanced weapons.1 The effect of warnings
is so dramatic, it should cause scholars of terrorism and insurgency to reconsider their strictly “ki-
netic” notion of the attack. For some militant groups, the speech act of warning is just as important
as the physical building, planting, and explosion of a bomb. At the planning and execution stages,
the attack is not just a physical action, but action matched with warnings and a government re-
sponse – all of which combine to produce the pattern of damage and humanitarian effects.
Second, my investigation reveals how militant groups navigate their political environments. Within
the academic terrorism literature, there is a striking discontinuity between research arguing that
terrorists want “a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins 1975) and and ac-
counts arguing that terrorists want a lot of people dead. Scholars such as Hoffman (1997) explain
this discontinuity as the difference between studying the “old terrorism” of groups like the IRA
and the “new terrorism” by Islamist groups like Al Qa’ida. Contrary to this account, I show that
the new Islamist terrorists give warnings in certain situations where they seek to limit casualties.
For instance, media reports on a 2011 Boko Haram attack on a beer hall in Borno, Nigeria quoted
this eyewitness recollection:
Around 6pm we saw some leaflets warning residents about impending attack in the
area and people quickly closed their shops for fear of the attack. So around 8pm the
attackers came and opened fire on the beer parlour before they fled (Ibrahim 2011).
A similar report from 2013 noted that prior to a bomb and gun attack on a prison facility, “Boko
Haram sent message that they will raid the prison and free their members” and residents should
1My IRA interviewees touted the fact that their bombings caused fewer civilian casualties, bomb-for-
bomb, than the United States’ drone strikes against Islamist militants. Data from the Global Terrorism
Database show that the IRA killed 247 people in 589 bombings of civilian targets, an average of 0.42 people
killed per attack. Including the IRA’s bomb attacks on military and police targets brings the total dead
(civilian or otherwise) to 737 in 1,148 attacks, an average of 0.64 people killed per attack. The United States’
421 drone strikes, from 2004 through June 2015, killed between 418 and 964 civilians, an average of 0.99-2.3
civilians killed per attack (Serle and Fielding-Smith 2014; Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2014; Serle
2015).
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“steer clear of the area” (Tukur 2013). My research identifies specific conditions that raise or lower
militants’ costs for targeting civilians, causing a group to adopt low casualty tactics or high ca-
sualty tactics. When militants lack foreign state sponsorship or a territorial stronghold, they face
high political costs for killing civilians. I show that the meaningful difference is not between old
terrorism and new, religious or secular, but between politically constrained groups and relatively
unconstrained groups. The former must reduce civilian casualties to meet the moral standards
of local audiences. The latter are relatively unaccountable. This logic of political constraint ap-
plies equally well to “terrorist” groups like the IRA and ETA and larger groups more frequently
described as “guerrillas” or “insurgents.” When explaining their tactical choices to me, IRA and
ETA interviewees cited the canonical guerrilla warfare theories of Mao Zedong. My study of pre-
attack warnings shows that these groups have the same moral legitimacy concerns as larger rebel
groups. By demonstrating that “terrorist” and “insurgent” groups follow the same moral and
political logic, I help to correct an unhelpful compartmentalization of the terrorism and guerrilla
warfare literatures.
Third, my dissertation makes a unique contribution to the political science literature on coop-
eration among adversaries. My research shows that, despite their ongoing conflict, militants and
governments may agree on the specific issue of sparing civilians from harm. If civilian deaths
are politically costly for both sides, militants and governments have an incentive to cooperate to-
ward harm reduction. My interview subjects bristle at the suggestion that they ever cooperated
at all, making their behavior all the more interesting. Despite their deadly rivalry and inability
to communicate directly, militants and governments built institutions together. They established
elaborate procedures to ensure the credibility of warning communication. This remarkable story
should encourage further research on communication and cooperation in very difficult cases, in-
cluding cases where one side, as a non-state actor, lacks access to existing institutions and must
build them in loose collaboration with the government it hopes to unseat.
Fourth, my discussion of false warnings makes an innovative contribution to the signaling lit-
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erature. My formal model and case studies show that militants use false warnings to impose eco-
nomic costs on the state. However, issuing too many false warnings may degrade the credibility of
warning signal to the point where the state is no longer willing to respond. The same problem may
arise if the state faces a high frequency of prank warnings emanating from individuals outside of
the militant group. One may think of this situation in terms of the “signal-to-noise ratio” discussed
in information theory. As in Shannon (1948)’s classic formulation, where a signal is transmitted
via a “channel” subject to probabilistic noise, a higher degree of noise actually increases the poten-
tial information content of the signal. Game theoretic analyses suggest that such patterns should
be observable in situations of strategic interaction, based on the incentives of signaling players.
However, the authors have so far failed to validate these predictions in experiments (Haan and
Sloof 2011). I show, theoretically and empirically, that a sufficiently high frequency of “noisy”
prank warnings can induce truth-telling by militant groups that wish to avail themselves of the
government’s emergency response. Beyond that, my IRA and ETA case studies show that militant
groups will actually help the state to construct a channel that is as noise-free as possible. They
develop institutions – phone chains, intermediaries, code words and maps – which hoax artists
cannot easily access or replicate. This institutionalization is a unique finding and a much deeper
form of cooperation than is anticipated in the existing literature.
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1 Scope and Relation to Existing Literature
My study draws upon and contributes to several sub-literatures within the academic writing on
armed conflict. Most obviously, my research relates to the literature on terrorism and insurgency.
These forms of violence have never been adequately distinguished, and I will not distinguish them
here. I am concerned with bombings of non-military targets by non-state actors (and in my exten-
sions chapter, state actors). I refer to the non-state perpetrators of the attacks only as “militants,”
because my specific subject, the pre-attack warning, stakes out a gray area where terrorism and
insurgency, terrorists and insurgents, cannot be distinguished – at least not without making strong
normative assumptions I do not care to make.
The perpetrators of these attacks argue that warnings differentiate their actions from terrorism by
ensuring that civilians are not harmed. Governments argue that these attacks are terrorism be-
cause the targets are non-military – or because non-state conflict actors are by definition terrorist.
I examine these arguments and their foundations in this section, not because I can resolve the dis-
agreement, but because the disagreement itself highlights an important contribution of my study.
My analysis of warnings shows that terrorism and insurgency cannot be understood except by
combining insights from the often compartmentalized terrorism and insurgency literatures.
1.1 Scope
The IRA attacks described in the introduction helped to inspire my investigation. The investiga-
tion itself is concerned with bombings of civilian targets by non-state actors. This mode of violence
fits comfortably within the domain of “terrorism,” by most accounts. I seek to challenge those ac-
counts, but first it makes sense to survey them briefly.
Terrorism, in the classic understanding, is a form of communication. Hoffman (1998: 43-44) de-
scribes it as a violent act, “designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immedi-
ate victim or object.” As Jenkins (1974: 4) puts it: “Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not
at the actual victims. Terrorism is theater.” Although scholars and policymakers generally agree
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about terrorism’s communicative nature, they agree about little else. Schmid and Jongman (1988:
5-6) famously count 109 extant definitions of terrorism, each making slightly different claims.
One point of disagreement concerns the issue of targeting: Does terrorism necessarily involve
violence against civilians? The use of a special term, “terrorism” suggests that the action is dif-
ferent from narrowly military violence, which aims to destroy or degrade the state’s capabilities
for self-defense and internal policing. The US Department of State, for instance, defines terror-
ism as “politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (US State Department
2001). This definition is generally in line with the conventional wisdom that terrorism is politi-
cally “aimed” (Jenkins’s words) at someone other than the immediate victim. Nonetheless, a 2003
clarification by the State Department reinterprets the term “noncombatant” to include “military
personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty” and “military instal-
lations or ... armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site”
(US State Department 2003: xii).
The May 22, 2013 killing of British Army Fusilier Drummer Lee Rigby is one example of ter-
rorism committed against military targets: Two professed Muslims ran Rigby down with a car
on a London street, hacking him to death with cleavers and encouraging bystanders to film the
act with their camera phones. One of the men gave a statement to these cameras, asserting that
“Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers” like Rigby, and Britain should “leave our lands” if
its citizens want to “live in peace” (Daily Telegraph 2013). Incorporating attacks on military person-
nel allows us to recognize Rigby’s killing for the propaganda statement that it was. On the other
hand, including such attacks suggests a more general equivalency between targeting civilians and
targeting military personnel not on combat duty, if some psychological or symbolic aspect of such
an action can be identified.
Another controversy is more fundamental: Does terrorism require the targeting of people at all?
For instance, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines terrorism as an act
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“committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages.” US law
is more general. 18 U.S.C. §2331 specifies first and foremost that terrorism involves “acts danger-
ous to human life,” although various amendments, including USA PATRIOT Act provisions, ex-
pand the definition to encompass property destruction and computer crime, among other offenses
(AZDEMA n.d.). Such a definition produces peculiar results. Within the US, for instance, law en-
forcement officials recognize a special category of “ecoterrorism,” which includes non-injurious
“sabotage and property destruction against industries.” According to the US Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, ecoterrorism includes “tree spiking (insertion of metal or ceramic spikes in trees in an
effort to damage saws) . . . arson, sabotage of logging or construction equipment, and other types
of property destruction” (Jarboe 2002). The destruction of property may be psychologically dis-
tressing to the owner and may serve a coercive purpose, but should the definition of terrorism be
broadened so far? Should terrorism be defined to include acts that are deliberately non-injurious?
This question is fundamental to my study of pre-attack warnings. If terrorism must involve “the
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury,” as in the UN definition cited above, then pre-attack
warnings exempt non-injurious bombings from the category of terrorism. This is the view of my
IRA and ETA interviewees, who argue that their violence should be viewed as economic coercion
by destruction of the state’s resources – insurgency perhaps, but not terrorism. Adopting an ex-
pansive definition that includes property destruction, bombings with warnings are still terrorism,
regardless of whether the attack was intended to cause injury. Attacks with warning occupy a
typological gray area. Their inclusion or exclusion from terrorism study depends on one’s view of
property. Either we admit deliberately non-injurious property destruction (including “ecoterror-
ism”) or we accept that a terrorist attack becomes insurgency based on a ten second warning call
to police.
Analysts and policymakers may seek clarity by defining terrorism according to the type of actor
involved. Hoffman (2006: 35-36) distinguishes “terrorists” as actors who “do not function in the
open as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid engag-
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ing enemy military forces in combat, [and] are constrained both numerically and logistically from
undertaking concerted mass political mobilization efforts.” “Guerrilla” actors are “numerically
larger,” capable of attacking the state’s military forces and at times governing territory. “Insur-
gent” actors are even larger, and capable of matching their violence with “informational ... and
psychological warfare efforts designed to mobilize popular support.” Hoffman acknowledges,
however, that “guerrillas and insurgents often employ the same tactics” (such as bombing pub-
lic places) “to intimidate or coerce, thereby affecting behavior through the arousal of fear.” The
difference between a terrorist and an insurgent is not that one carries out symbolic, frightening
violence and the other does not. The terrorist just belongs to a smaller, more primitive group.
Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009: 32) make a similar argument, defining terrorism as “vi-
olence carried out by underground organizations that are not powerful enough to take de facto
control of part of the state’s territory.” Any violence by such a group qualifies as terrorism, even
banal actions such as bank robbery. The authors adopt this position because defining terrorism in
the “action-sense” is not especially useful:
[T]he distinction between the target of violence and the audience target is not specific
to terrorism. This is, in fact, a generic element of all forms of coercion and can be found
in many instances of warfare behavior that are not usually regarded as terrorism ...
For instance, the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a pure case of
coercion against the Japanese government: the civilians attacked were not the audience
target (Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009: 33).
Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle reference the atomic bombings, which I also discuss in Chapter
7, Extensions to State Behavior. The bombings are discussed by Schelling (1966: 17) as well. He
describes them as “weapons of terror and shock. ... The political target of the bomb was not the
dead of Hiroshima or the factories they worked in, but the survivors in Tokyo.”
State terrorism is an important subject that is difficult to discuss because of how we define terms.
US government definitions (for instance that of the State Department) describe terrorism as the ac-
tion of “subnational groups or clandestine agents.” Despite the well-known disagreements over
the meaning of terrorism, influential studies revert to government definitions as a default (Hoff-
13
man 2006) and use the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations to define the
universe of cases for study (Abrahms 2006, 2008). There is nothing inherently wrong with using
government definitions, but it is important to consider where they came from.
Terrorism, in the original sense, was a state practice: the public execution of those perceived
as hostile to the French Revolution. Writing in 1793, Maximilien Robspierre argued: “Terror is
nothing more than speedy, severe and inflexible justice ... a consequence of the general princi-
ple of democracy” (Robespierre 1794).2 Foucault would argue that justice in established states is
not that different. The incarceration or torture of law breakers is an intentionally symbolic act,
“affirming the dissymmetry of forces” between state and citizens who might otherwise defy it
(Foucault 1995: 55). States also “affirm the dissymmetry of forces” in wartime attacks on civilians.
According to Schelling (1966: 15), the “terror and shock” embodied in the atomic bombings was
not unusual: “The two bombs were in the tradition of Sheridan against the Comanches and Sher-
man in Georgia.”
Although my primary focus is non-state actors’ behavior, the issue of state terror is important
to my study in two ways. First, it is an independent variable. My interview subjects identify
state abuses – political incarceration, torture, extrajudicial killing, and legal execution – as key fac-
tors defining the domestic political climate. When the government terrorizes civilians for political
purposes, anti-government militants find it easier to justify their own targeting of civilians. Local
populations conditioned by government terror may accept a higher level of abuse by non-state
groups claiming to represent a better alternative. The political cost for inhumanity is lower, and
the frequency of pre-attack warnings is lower, when the state is engaged in terror at home.
Second, state terrorism is the analog of non-state terrorism in Chapter 7, where I extend my the-
ory to the analysis of government behavior. “Terror” comes up in two cases, the atomic bombing
2Original French: La terreur n’est autre chose que la justice prompte, sévère, inflexible; elle est donc une éma-
nation de la vertu; elle est moins un principe particulier qu’une conséquence du principe général de la démocratie
appliqué aux plus pressants besoins de la patrie.
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of Japan and Israel’s bombings in Hamas-controlled Gaza. In these cases, a state actor confronts
the choice that non-state militant groups face when deciding whether to give warnings. Should
they attack with surprise, destroying a target but also killing civilians? Or is the political cost of
indiscriminate violence so high that the state should give a warning before dropping bombs? In
the case of Israel, the stigma of “terror” was especially damaging because the opposing side in
the conflict was Hamas and Israel’s international appeals (primarily to American supporters) are
based on the notion that Israel’s enemies use terrorism and Israel does not.
Because terror is employed by a diversity of actors, it makes sense to reject “actor-sense” defi-
nitions of terrorism. Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009) make their best case for actor-sense
definitions on the grounds of clarity and parsimony: all violence by an “underground” actor is
terrorism. Assuming we can determine a group’s size and capacity for territorial control, we need
not debate the defining qualities of terrorist violence. However, the same parsimonious logic un-
dercuts the rationale for defining terrorism as a unique term. In Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle’s
construction, “underground organizations” are synonymous with “terrorist organizations,” so a
new term is unnecessary and confusing. It suggests that there is something unique and terrifying
about underground organizations’ violence, even though the “actor-sense” definition subsumes
such mundane acts as robbing a cashier. It also makes it more difficult to discuss tactical and po-
litical commonalities between the violence of underground groups and violence by insurgent and
state actors.
If anything, a definition of terrorism should operate in the “action-sense,” allowing for the di-
vision of terrorism into state- and non-state varieties as a scope condition. It should incorporate
the broadly accepted notion that some violence is symbolic in nature, intended to influence a third
party audience. It should also specify that terrorism is intended to produce psychological terror.
It is not merely “propaganda by the deed,” in the words of 19th Century anarchists (Pisacane
2005; Brousse 2005) but propaganda by intimidation. Attacks on military personnel or physical
property may produce terror, and should not be excluded. A more challenging question is how
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to treat non-injurious acts. Taylor (1998) and Asal and Rethemeyer (2008a) debate this in an en-
lightening disagreement over ecoterrorism. This debate is relevant to my study, because of the
casualty-reducing power of pre-attack warnings. Compared to an environmentalist’s tree spiking,
bombings are more likely to cause injury and terror, and this may be the actor’s intent. But my
IRA and ETA interviewees argue that they gave warnings specifically to prevent injuries. Giving
warnings, despite the risk of spoiling an attack, may demonstrate the intent not to injure. Warn-
ings are, in the words of one former Northern Ireland police officer, a “risk-management” strategy
to avoid “collateral damage” during “economic bombings.” Viewed this way, “terrorist” attacks
with warning are qualitatively similar to the wartime practices of states. Again, we need to revert
to problematic actor-sense definitions to define a subject and universe of cases for study.
Considering attacks with warning, defining terrorism is a circular exercise. In defining my case
universe, I specify only that I am interested in violence by non-state actors against non-military
targets. (I consider state violence as an extension, in Chapter 7.) I am particularly interested in vio-
lence using bombs, because this is the primary mode of violence in which we see perpetrators give
pre-attack warnings. This case universe includes many acts that fit canonical definitions of terror-
ism. It also contains attacks that might be construed as insurgency, and attacks by organizations
that might be called guerrillas, rebels, or terrorists, depending on which actor-sense definition one
chooses. I use the generic term “militants” to describe my actors of interest because the term is
both general, and clear in identifying the actors as non-state.
Eschewing classifications allows me to consider non-state actors’ bomb attacks from two per-
spectives. By bringing theories of terrorism and theories of insurgency to bear simultaneously,
I increase the explanatory power of my study. I show that theories of terrorism as signaling and
theories of insurgency as military-style violence do not adequately explain the behavior of the ac-
tors in my study. Jointly, however, these theories produce a great deal of insight. Taking a broad
stance also increases my scholarly contribution, delivering new insights to both the terrorism and
insurgency literatures.
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1.2 Contributions to the Terrorism Literature
I draw most extensively from the literature conceptualizing terrorism as communication: “the-
ater” according to Jenkins (1974: 4); violence committed for its “psychological effects,” according
to Hoffman (1998: 43-44). I also draw upon the literature conceiving terrorism as rational political
behavior (Crenshaw 1998) rather than psychologically disordered behavior (Post 1998). The two
are not mutually exclusive, but my study, and particularly my game theoretic framework, begin
with the assumption of basic cost-benefit logic and deductive rationality on the part of the actors.
Scholars operating within this rationalist framework identify various strategies by which terrorists
seek to achieve their political goals. Kydd and Walter (2006) describe terrorist actions as “costly
signaling” – the demonstration of resolve and capability to do harm and risk government retal-
iation. Terrorists may use violence to pursue five political strategies: “attrition” of the state’s
resources; “intimidation” of the population; “provocation” of state overreaction; “spoiling” peace
processes; and “outbidding” rival groups for public support. Formal theorists have modeled some
of these strategies. Lapan and Sandler (1993) elaborate on how terrorism signals the perpetrator’s
resources and capabilities. Overgaard (1994) discusses how the signaling of capabilities influences
the government’s level of retaliation. Arce and Sandler (2007) discuss how signaling the group’s
level of militancy influences the government’s decision on which targets to protect. Ginkel and
Smith (1999) discuss how signaling the group’s willingness to suffer government retaliation in-
fluences the public’s willingness to support the group. Using qualitative methods, Hoffman and
McCormick (2004) argue that terrorists communicate resolve by selecting suicide attack as a tactic.
Most relevant to my investigation, however, is Arce and Sandler (2009)’s work showing how the
use of indiscriminate violence may decrease terrorists’ support among their own constituency.
My formal model considers the choice of tactics within regard to several cost and benefit param-
eters. Benefits consist of the physical and economic damage a group may inflict on the state with
surprise attacks versus attacks with warning. The militant group also considers the political cost
of engaging in indiscriminate attacks (the issue discussed by Arce and Sandler). By considering
17
a diverse profile of costs and benefits, my work offers a comprehensive treatment of militants’
decision-making, and a number of testable hypotheses.
My project also contributes to a growing literature on terrorism responsibility claims. Abrahms
(2006), Bloom (2004), Pape (2003), and Hoffman (2010) argue that ex post responsibility claims
amplify the signaling value of terrorist attacks by clearly associating the attack with its author.
Warnings, because they typically identify the organization or person responsible, may be seen as
responsibility claims issued in advance. In fact, warnings are the most credible type of responsi-
bility claim. Barring a catastrophic counterintelligence failure by the perpetrator group, it is very
unlikely that anyone outside the organization would know enough to claim the attack in advance.
Warnings allow the perpetrator to lay sole claim and derive the maximum signaling benefit from
the attack. I develop this insight in Chapter 6, through interviews of former counter-terrorism po-
lice in Northern Ireland. I show that the IRA used pre-attack warnings to prove its responsibility
for attacks, and also to show that the group’s central leadership had fully authorized each attack.
This was not the primary purpose of the IRA’s warnings, but these police accounts lend support
to the above authors’ arguments about ex post claims.
Abrahms (2006) also identifies a separate function of ex post claims. By offering the perpetra-
tor a chance to explain its demands, responsibility claims prevent the public from overestimating
the group’s demands based on its apparently extreme methods. My research suggests that ex
ante warnings may serve a similar function by making militants’ methods seem less extreme. By
reducing casualties, the perpetrator shows that it will not engage in butchery, that it respects civil-
ians, and (depending on how one classifies property destruction) that the group does not actually
engage in terror.
1.3 Contributions to the Insurgency Literature
My study of pre-attack warnings also makes important contributions to the literature on guerrilla
war and insurgency, two terms often used interchangeably. I argue that the casualty-reducing
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function of pre-attack warnings demonstrates the perpetrator group’s respect for the civilian pop-
ulation. By giving warnings, militants show that they are morally legitimate advocates for the
public they claim to represent.
A number of authors have noted the importance of discrimination in targeting, if militants are
to earn the support of local populations and the legitimacy to govern once they overthrow the
current regime. Lomperis (1996: 32-35) describes insurgency as a “war for the right to govern.”
Unable to overthrow the government immediately, insurgents must undermine the state’s appear-
ance of legitimacy. Insurgents face a difficult balancing act, needing to use force against the state
while simultaneously showing that the state’s use of force is not legitimate. Choosing the right
tactics is essential because insurgents are physically weaker than the state and cannot afford to
lose the battle for legitimacy.
The perception of legitimacy is critical for several reasons. It convinces people to join the insur-
gent group’s military forces, to donate money, to allow the group to use their homes and land, and
to provide the group with information. Especially in geographic areas they do not control, insur-
gents depend on the local population to identify government spies and other agents for execution.
Such “denunciation” may be obtained through bribery, the exploitation of community disputes,
intimidation, or by cultivating the local population’s political loyalty (Kalyvas 2006: 178). The
latter elicits spontaneous denunciations, community policing of sorts, by local people. Round-
the-clock citizen vigilance is an effective means of identifying state agents, but the militant group
must obtain it by demonstrating its legitimacy over that of the government.
The same challenge persists even for militant groups that control territory. Material support, re-
cruits, and denuncaition may be obtained by coercion, but there are limits to how much coercion
local people will tolerate. At any rate, loyal populations volunteer the same benefits willingly. It
may be cost effective for militants to rule with restraint, not an iron fist. As Mampilly (2011: 52)
argues, “Terror can stifle opposition but cannot engender loyalty and support from the civilian
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population.”
However, civilians’ loyalty may be less important for insurgent groups that have territory and
material resources of their own. Weinstein (2006) argues that rebels’ greater or lesser degree of
brutality toward civilians follows from their different access to material endowments such as di-
amonds or drugs. Groups with these endowments can recruit by bribery, rather than political
appeal. Their forces will be mercenaries rather than ideologues. They will be less restrained to-
ward civilians, and group leaders will have less reason to care about how this affects community
opinion. On the other hand, groups without material endowments must ask the public for sup-
port, ensuring that their use of force spares the innocent and does not alienate civilians.
The smaller groups I interviewed for this project, the IRA and ETA, behaved like resource-poor
rebels. These groups lacked access to diamonds, drugs, territory, or substantial support from for-
eign states. When asked directly, they explain their own tactical choices with references to theories
of guerrilla warfare typically applied in the analysis of insurgent groups. Nearly all IRA and ETA
interviewees referenced this specific passage from Mao Zedong’s On Guerrilla Warfare, explaining
the relationship between the population and the guerrilla:
The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. . . . It is
only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish
out of its native element, cannot live (Mao 1989).
The IRA and ETA also explain their pre-attack bomb warnings with reference to community social
norms. The larger, territorially endowed groups in my study behaved in a much less restrained
fashion, using indiscriminate violence for communicative (i.e. “terrorist”) purposes. This is the
reverse of what Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009) predict in their study of the same groups,
based on the assumption that “underground” groups are less accountable, owing to their smaller
size and lesser material needs.
In general, my findings defy expectations for how militant organizations will behave, based on
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the terrorism or guerrilla literature alone. This shows the importance of considering both stylized
types jointly. Canonical “terrorist” groups like the IRA and ETA cite guerrilla theory in explaining
their actions, and larger “insurgent” actors engage in more terroristic violence. To understand
these groups and test each literature’s assertions, we do best by pooling the cases and theories.
1.4 Contributions to the Signaling and Cooperation Literature
My study of warnings also contributes to the literature on signaling and cooperation. Warnings
only reduce casualties if governments believe the messages and respond by evacuating civilians.
Looking at the bombing incidents described earlier, IRA and British interactions can be retold as
a story of communication and cooperation between mortal adversaries.
Militants and their adversary states disagree over the most fundamental political question: Who
has the right to govern? Their interests may not be entirely opposed, however. Cooperation the-
orists argue that outside of pure deadlock or pure harmony situations, states can realize common
goals by adjusting their behavior to accommodate others’ preferences (Axelrod and Keohane 1985;
Oye 1985). In the London and Manchester bomb attacks, the IRA planted bombs to damage the
British economy. However, the group also sought to minimize civilian casualties, something it
could not do unilaterally. By giving warnings, the IRA enlisted police’s help in minimizing ca-
sualties (an issue on which they agreed) at the price of granting police some additional chance of
thwarting the attack.
Cooperation does not enact itself, however. Its feasibility varies with the structure of actors’ pref-
erences, and it is exceptionally difficult when actors’ payoffs resemble a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Mu-
tual cooperation is desirable, but each actor receives a better payoff by defecting unilaterally. The
sucker’s payoff in matters of war and peace is death, making cooperation exceptionally difficult
to achieve in this area (Grieco 1993). Pre-attack warnings take place in a similarly difficult set-
ting. The IRA and ETA sometimes took advantage of police, giving false warnings to draw police
into ambushes or to induce costly evacuations when no bomb had been planted. Police also had
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the ability to ignore warnings strategically, imposing political costs on the militants by allowing
civilians to die. Yet on many occasions, the two sides passed up the opportunity to impose the
sucker’s payoff on one another. My study contributes to previous work identifying conditions for
cooperation in situations of conflict and vulnerability.
Conflict scholars have analyzed the prospects for cooperation in difficult areas such as nuclear
arms control (Schelling and Halperin 1961; Jervis 1978, 1988). Several factors facilitate cooperative
outcomes. Repeated interaction may help. Defection is rational in a single encounter, but coop-
eration may yield a better payoff if actors expect to interact in the future (Axelrod 1984). Issue
linkage and reputation also matter. Defection on an agreement in one area is less profitable if do-
ing so prevents one from achieving desirable agreements in other areas (Keohane 1984). However,
reassurance may be the best remedy. In a single or repeated interaction scenario, the prospects for
cooperation are far better if payoffs resemble a Stag Hunt or Coordination game Snidal (1993). The
challenge, then, is assuring the other player about one’s payoffs and preference to cooperate.
Diplomacy is the traditional means of conveying such information and collecting information
about other states’ preferences (Bull 1977). The problem is that talk is cheap. Farrell and Rabin
(1996) show formally that “cheap talk” (communication where lying carries no cost) will only
convey information when states’ incentives are compatible, at least in part. If the point is to re-
assure the other actor about one’s preferences (or if the other fundamentally misperceives one’s
preferences) talk may not help (Jervis 1976). Bew and Gurruchaga (2009) undertake an empirical
investigation of governments’ attempts to negotiate with the Irish Republican Army and ETA.
(One of my interview subjects, Antton Etxebeste, was ETA’s lead negotiator during some of these
talks.) The authors find what cheap talk theory would predict: negotiations are not especially use-
ful, and long-term preference convergence explains the agreements that conflict actors do achieve.
There are alternatives to cheap talk, however. Scholars of international conflict have developed a
rich literature on signaling, the indirect communication of information through signs and symbols
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(Schelling 1966; Jervis 1970; Schultz 1998). Some signals take on meaning by repetition. Axelrod
(1984) describes the evolution of cooperation in the trenches of the First World War, where insub-
ordinate troops on both sides used off-target rifle shots to initiate unauthorized ceasefires. Other
signals carry a cost that will be paid if the sender fails to follow through on a promise. Reputation
costs are one example. If leaders care about the credibility of their promises and threats in the
future, they perceive a cost to breaking promises today and incurring a reputation for dishonesty
(Guisinger and Smith 2002; Sartori 2002). My research offers support for costly signaling theo-
ries that emphasize reputation. My interviews of the IRA and ETA show that these organizations
did care about the credibility of their warning messages. The IRA refrained from giving false
warnings much of the time (and ETA refrained always), because warning falsely decreased the
government’s trust and willingness to conduct evacuations later. The IRA also linked the credibil-
ity of its warning messages to the credibility of its peace overtures, using a single system of code
words to authenticate warnings and diplomatic communications to the British government.
My research also advances “audience cost” theories of signaling, albeit in an unexpected way.
Fearon (1994) argues that leaders can enhance the credibility of signals by sending them publicly.
Leaders leverage their accountability so that failing to fulfill promises carries domestic political
repercussions. Empirical scholars question audience cost theory, arguing that audiences may not
have the capacity or will to impose costs (Weeks 2008; Snyder and Borghard 2011) and that costs
can never be observed if leaders follow the theory’s predictions (Schultz 2001). My interviews of
ETA and the IRA show that these groups leveraged public accountability, but that of the receiving
party. The IRA and ETA made their warnings public, not to increase their own credibility, but to
ensure that police would suffer political costs if they ignored or failed to respond to warnings in
a timely fashion. My findings show that communicating publicly can facilitate cooperation, by
allowing the sender of a signal to impose costs on a receiver who fails to cooperate. Interpreting
the IRA and ETA cases more cynically, one may also view their public warnings as a type of coer-
cion. By shifting the blame for casualties onto the government, pre-attack warnings may force the
government to respond to warnings it would otherwise ignore.
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2 Theory and Research Design
By combining insights from several theoretical perspectives, I seek to explain why some militant
groups give warnings before their attacks. This behavior is perplexing because it defies our con-
ventional expectation that conflict actors will attack with surprise. Whether militants are carrying
out symbolic or military-style violence, what possible benefit is there in issuing a warning? Do-
ing so enhances the government’s ability to mitigate the damage from an attack and possibly to
thwart it by locating and defusing the bomb. To carry out a psychologically or militarily effective
campaign, a militant group must be able to carry out its attacks a high proportion of the time.
Why jeopardize the success of one’s own attacks? In crasser terms, isn’t the point of an attack to
break things and hurt people? Why go to the trouble of planning a clandestine action, only to tip
the government off as you are about to carry it out?
Turning this question around and looking at it from the state’s perspective, why would a gov-
ernment believe a pre-attack warning offered by a militant organization? It seems, prima facie, that
any group that issues an advance warning is not truly committed to carrying out the attack. A
group or individual interested in creating hoaxes might issue false warnings, hoping to induce
police mobilizations and cause economic disruption. But an organization with the means and in-
tent to carry out propaganda of the deed seems only to hurt its cause by sending warnings and
giving up the advantage of surprise. How then, can a warning ever be trusted?
2.1 The Logic of Advance Warnings
These puzzles notwithstanding, we do see some militants issue warnings before their attacks. Tar-
get states sometimes react to these warnings, mobilizing emergency resources and issuing public
alarms to their citizens. The results can be quite striking, as in the IRA attacks described above:
tremendous damage to property and economic productivity, but comparatively little harm to peo-
ple. IRA attacks like those at Manchester and Bishopsgate bear little resemblance to the mass
casualty attacks one associates with groups like Al Qa’ida. They look more like a strategic cam-
paign against economic targets, but with even less collateral damage than one expects from state
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tactics such as aerial bombing. The reduction of casualties stands out as the most distinctive ef-
fect of the IRA’s pre-attack warnings, and it stands to reason that this may be the purpose of the
warning tactic. There is a basis to suspect this, based on the guerrilla warfare literature referenced
earlier (Lomperis 1996; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2006) and even some of the terrorism literature
(Arce and Sandler 2009). If the perpetrator group hopes to present itself as a credible alternative
to the government, an advocate for its people and their rights, the group may prefer low-casualty
tactics. I base my theoretical model on an assumption that militants give pre-attack warnings to
mobilize a government response and achieve the dramatic casualty reduction seen in the IRA’s
Manchester and Bishopsgate bombings. I make several other assumptions based on a quick ex-
amination of those IRA attacks.
First, militants may use warnings to drain the treasury and economy of the target state. In the
Manchester and Bishopsgate examples, British police evacuated large areas of economically pro-
ductive cities. On a busy day, such interventions cost millions of pounds (or dollars) in lost pro-
ductivity. The interventions may also cost government security forces directly – as when the bomb
disposal team lost its high tech robot, or in cases where security personnel are themselves harmed
in the blast. Mobilizing is expensive, a fact known to both militants and their targets.
Second, warnings are expensive operationally for the attacking group. Considering the Manch-
ester example, police used the advance notice provided by the IRA’s warning to bring in the British
army’s bomb disposal team. The army and its robot had thirty minutes of time on scene to attempt
to defuse the bomb. It was not inconceivable that the army bomb squad would succeed. There
is also the obvious reduction in human damage, and to a lesser extent the reduction of physical
damage – by pre-positioning fire crews, moving cars away, etc. – that the government can accom-
plish with the advance notice afforded by the warning. Militants must weigh the operational cost
of warning against the benefits.
Third, I note that people may give warnings even when they are not attacking. As most people
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who attended large secondary schools or universities can attest, pranksters give false warnings
– for entertainment, to get the day off, or to antagonize people they dislike. Political groups like
the IRA can themselves give false warnings, hoping to sow fear or cause economic harm “on the
cheap.” Police rarely see the person making a threat, and must decide how to respond with-
out knowing whether or not the threat is real. I structure my model around an assumption that
governments form probabilistic beliefs upon receiving warning messages. They decide how to
respond to warnings based on those probabilistic beliefs, the cost of mobilizing, and the expected
damage they may avoid by responding to warnings that are true.
Based on these assumptions, I specify a game theoretic signaling model of warnings and re-
sponses, played by a Militant and a Government. As a signaling model, the game also features
a non-strategic player, Nature, which determines the Militant’s type to be “attacking” or “not at-
tacking” at the particular moment the game is played. The Militant, which may or may not be
carrying out an attack at that moment, decides whether to send a warning or give a default signal
of no warning. The Government observes the signal, but it cannot directly observe the Militant’s
type and must therefore attempt to infer whether an attack is underway. Based on the received
signal, the expected signaling behavior of attacking and non-attacking Militants, its prior belief
about the probability of attacks, and the probability of random prank warnings, the Government
decides whether to mobilize to reduce the damage from any attack currently underway.
I leave a full description and solution of the game until Chapter 6, in which I discuss the com-
municative interaction between militants and governments. In Chapters 2-5, I am primarily con-
cerned with the militant group’s incentive to give warnings in the first place. I present a summary
of the model’s assumptions and predictions about militant warning behavior here. The logic is
intuitive, but those who are interested in seeing the full equilibrium description may refer to it in
Chapter 6.
Fundamentally, the Militant group decides whether to warn based on its type and payoff structure,
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and the expected response of the Government to a warning or non-warning signal. For attacking
Militants facing a Government that would respond to warnings (and not to non-warnings), the
condition for warning is D2 +G > D1 −X , or equivalently:
X +G > D1 −D2
D1 and D2 are the expected damage from surprise attacks and attacks with warning, respectively
(with D1 > D2). X is the Militant’s political cost for causing excessive casualties in surprise at-
tacks, and G is the lost utility the Government incurs (and the Militant group gains) when the Gov-
ernment responds to a warning. Three basic insights follow from this condition, yielding testable
hypotheses of the model. First, the Militant has greater incentive to give a warning when it faces a
higher political cost (X) for causing excessive casualties. Second, the Militant has greater incentive
to give a warning when mobilizing carries a higher cost (G) for the Government. Note that either a
high value of X or a high value of G could justify a warning, so a Militant with no political costs
for causing excessive casualties or no ability to impose costs on the Government might still give a
warning. Third, the utility of giving a warning must be balanced against the reduction in expected
damage from an attack (D1 − D2) if the Militant gives a warning and the Government responds.
This reduction in damage can be thought of as the operational cost of giving a warning. At higher
levels, this cost will deter Militants from giving warnings. We can phrase these implications of the
model as testable hypotheses:
H1: Militants are more likely to give warnings when they pay a high political cost for causing excessive
civilian casualties.
H2: Militants are more likely to give warnings when responding to warnings carries a high cost for the
government.
H3: Militants are more likely to give warnings when doing so does not greatly reduce the expected damage
from an attack.
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The model also produces predictions related to the behavior of non-attacking Militants and the
Government. Those are explained fully in Chapter 6.
My strategy for testing the first three hypotheses is as follows. First, I present a detailed case study
of the IRA, based on my interviews of former IRA members and Northern Ireland police. My the-
ory is based on observations about two IRA bombings in England. The IRA carried out thousands
of bombings in Britain and Northern Ireland, however. As the first test of my theory, I investigate
the broader universe of cases from the Northern Ireland conflict. I interview former combatants
there, posing direct questions to former IRA members about why the organization gave pre-attack
warnings, whether it always gave them, and how the IRA would have fared politically had it not
given pre-attack warnings. In addition, I consider accounts offered by former police, the other
side of the conflict (and the recipients of the IRA’s pre-attack warnings). I augment this informa-
tion with interviews of former political figures, journalists, and civil society members in Northern
Ireland. Some of these people participated in the warning-and-response interaction themselves,
by serving as neutral intermediaries to convey warning messages from the IRA to police. I use
all of this information to determine whether the IRA’s behavior followed from the strategic logic
specified in my theory.
As the next test of my theory, I present two pairs of contrasting case studies based on additional
fieldwork I conducted in Sri Lanka, Peru, and Spain. There are hundreds of militant groups to con-
sider worldwide. To maximize inferential leverage, I pair case studies of apparently similar groups
that engaged in divergent warning behavior. This method, discussed in King, Keohane, and Verba
(1994) and Van Evera (1997), allows me to examine variation on my dependent variable (warning)
while controlling for major variables that would render comparisons invalid. For instance, to iden-
tify the cause of warning behavior, one gains little leverage by comparing a non-warning Maoist
insurgency to an ethnic secessionist group that gave warnings. With several important factors
varying across the cases, we cannot determine which factors cause the behavior of interest. By
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selecting cases to control for major factors such as a militant group’s fundamental grievance and
specific political goal, I narrow the list of potential explanations for divergent warning behavior
in each case pair. If my theory is well-specified, the difference in warning behavior will be trace-
able to variation in political incentives identified as theoretically significant in my model. My first
case pair comprises the Basque secessionist group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE - colloquially, the Tamil Tigers). Both groups were motivated by eth-
nic grievances and both sought secession from an existing state. Despite these broad similarities,
only ETA gave pre-attack warnings. The second case pair comprises el Movimiento Revolucionario
Túpac Amaru (MRTA - the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) and Sendero Luminoso (the
Shining Path). Both groups were motivated by revolutionary Marxism, and both sought to over-
throw the Peruvian government at roughly the same time. Despite these groups’ similarities, only
the MRTA gave pre-attack warnings.
Having tested my theory qualitatively in these cases, I move to quantitative tests. A quantita-
tive analysis allows me to examine many more groups than I can with case study methods alone.
The IRA, ETA, LTTE, MRTA, and Shining Path collectively accounted for 4,134 bombings of civil-
ian targets – roughly ten percent of the civilian target bombings listed in the Global Terrorism
Database during the years 1970-2012.3 This is a substantial cross section of violence, but there are
dozens more groups to consider, and my qualitative case studies cannot even consider the full
universe of bombings carried out by each group. A quantitative analysis allows me to consider si-
multaneously all of the attacks by these groups, allowing for the fact that there is no such thing as
a “warning group” or a “non-warning group.” There are only groups that warn some of the time,
depending on the specifics of the attack. A quantitative analysis at the attack level has the virtue






I focus my quantitative analysis on testing on Hypothesis 1, that militants are more likely to give
warnings when they pay a high political cost for causing excessive civilian casualties. I use in-
sights from my case study interviews to operationalize and measure the concept of political cost.
Based on the statements of conflict participants and observers, I identify three factors that con-
tributed to the political cost of targeting civilians: dependence on local populations for support,
the human rights behavior of the group’s state target, and the expansiveness of the group’s po-
litical goals. I also use the quantitative analysis to test alternative theories about the role of reli-
gion, geographic region, and the use of suicide bombing as a tactic. Finally, I use the quantitative
analysis to look for variation in the rate of pre-attack warnings depending on the type of target
(businesses, government officials, etc.)
In Chapter 6, I present the full version of my signaling model, which produces the following
additional hypotheses:
H4: In cases where the government cannot mobilize at all, militants who face any cost for harming civilians
will warn the government.
H5: Governments are more likely to mobilize when the damage saved will be high.
H6: Governments are less likely to mobilize when doing so is costly.
H7: Governments are more likely to mobilize if key audiences will impose political costs on the govern-
ment for ignoring truthful warnings.
H8: Militants are more likely to give false warnings if mobilizing is costly for the government.
H9: Militants are less likely to give false warnings if doing so carries a high political cost.
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H10: Militants are less likely to give false warnings if there is already a high probability of prank warnings.
My strategy for testing these is to ask direct questions of people who participated in the events. I
interview members of the IRA and ETA, as well as police and other security personnel in North-
ern Ireland, Great Britain, and Spain. I use these structured interviews to determine which costs
and benefits shaped the government decision to respond to warnings (or not to respond, in some
cases). I also use the interviews to determine why each militant group gave false warnings or ab-
stained from doing so. Additionally, I consult journalists and charity workers who received phone
warnings from the IRA and ETA and passed these warnings on to police. These intermediaries
played a crucial facilitating role in the phenomenon I study. They are also neutral parties (at least
in affiliation) and excellent checks on conflict participants’ recollections.
In Chapter 7, I apply my theory to historical cases of state behavior. This is not a full theory
test, in the same way as the previous empirical chapters. It serves as an extension, an exploration
of analogous conflict situations where my theory might generate insight about actors’ behavior.
The case selection is not rigorously controlled, as it was in my discussion of paired cases in Chap-
ter 4. Instead, I select notable cases with a range of behavior on the dependent variable, warnings.
My analysis of the cases – the US atomic bombings of Japan, China’s 1958 shelling of Taiwanese
Quemoy, and Israel’s 2009 and 2014 bombing campaigns in Gaza – shows that my theory predicts
state behavior well. It has the potential to explain an important aspect of interstate conflict, which
has substantial consequences for civilians in war zones.
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3 Pre-Attack Warnings by the Provisional IRA
We’re not all mad bastards. We’re just Irish. – Republican #1
In this chapter, I consider the pre-attack warning behavior of the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (IRA). The IRA was the primary non-state belligerent in the Northern Ireland conflict, col-
loquially known as the Troubles, which lasted roughly from 1969 to 1998. The Troubles were a
struggle for political control of Northern Ireland, the six northernmost counties of historic Ireland,
which remained part of the United Kingdom following the 1918 Irish revolution and the creation
of an independent state in the southernmost twenty-six counties. The partition of Ireland was
a compromise solution to a simmering conflict between Catholics (a majority in the south) and
Protestants (a majority in the north). Predominantly Catholic “nationalists” in the north were not
satisfied with an agreement that left part of historic Ireland under British control. Catholics also
suffered job and housing discrimination, and faced barriers to political participation in Protestant-
dominated institutions. “Unionists” in the north defended Northern Ireland’s inclusion in the UK.
In the late 1960’s, Catholic civil rights demonstrations sparked violent police responses and a cy-
cle of tit-for-tat sectarian attacks in cities such as Belfast and Londonderry (known by nationalists
as Derry). Northern Ireland’s parliament requested British military intervention in 1969 to keep
the rioting factions apart (English 2003). Remnants of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the rev-
olutionary force that successfully overthrew British rule in the south, initiated their own effort to
secure northern nationalist communities against sectarian attacks. A more radical faction calling
itself the Provisional IRA began an armed campaign against the government and security forces,
with the intention of seceding from the UK and creating a single all-Ireland republic.4
There were three discernible phases in the violence.5 From 1969-1974, the Provisional IRA sought
independence from British rule through direct, violent struggle. IRA forces carried out attacks on
4Although several republican groups carried out the “armed struggle,” the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (hereafter, simply “the IRA”) carried out most of the violence on the republican side.
5I leave post-1998 violence by Irish Republican rejectionists for future studies.
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British troops, local police and military reservists, pro-British “loyalist” paramilitary groups, and
commercial and political targets in Northern Ireland and England. The IRA gained international
notoriety for this last mode of violence, carrying out hundreds of bomb attacks (Harnden 1999:
64-65; Dillon 1994: 148-151).
From 1975-1993, the IRA pursued a “long war” of attrition. The IRA sought to impose costs
on the British state, while insisting that the UK government negotiate a peace settlement with the
IRA’s political wing, Sinn Féin. As part of this strategy, the IRA fought a public relations battle for
legitimacy in the eyes of Irish, British, and international publics. IRA members in military prisons
launched a series of protests and hunger strikes, demanding “political” rather than “criminal”
status. Ten hunger strikers died. The first of these, Bobby Sands, stood for and won a Westminster
parliament seat while on hunger strike. The spectacle of the strikes and Sands’ slow death by star-
vation brought international media attention to the IRA’s political demands. It pressured the UK
government to grant the prisoners de facto political status and solidified the IRA’s new strategy to
take power “with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this hand.”6
From 1994 to 1998, the IRA and Sinn Féin aggressively pursued a political settlement with the
UK government, while strategically manipulating the level of violence in the armed campaign
(Harnden 1999: 108). The Army Council, the IRA’s leadership body, declared a ceasefire in August
1994 to make way for Sinn Féin talks with the Conservative John Major government. When talks
broke down in 1996, the IRA carried out spectacular truck bomb attacks in London and Manch-
ester (including those referenced above) to bomb the British government back to the bargaining
table. With the election of Tony Blair’s Labour government and a fresh start to negotiations, the
IRA declared a new ceasefire in July 1997. With American diplomats acting as brokers, Blair, Sinn
Féin negotiator Gerry Adams, and Army Council representative Martin McGuinness reached the
so-called “Belfast” or “Good Friday” agreement in May 1998. The settlement left the territorial
6“Armalite” AR-15 and AR-180 assault rifles were favorite weapons of IRA gunmen. The “ballot paper”
quote is generally attributed to Sinn Féin activist Danny Morrison, speaking at Sinn Féin’s 1981 Ard Fheis
party conference.
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status quo in place, established a power-sharing agreement between Sinn Féin and unionist par-
ties, and laid out a process by which the IRA disarmed and abandoned hostilities.
Over the course of its nearly thirty year armed campaign, the Provisional IRA carried out at least
1,148 bombing attacks. One of the remarkable aspects of the IRA campaign is the relatively low
casualty total – 737 people killed and 3,016 wounded – despite the large number of explosions.7
As the Manchester and Bishopsgate examples show, pre-attack warnings dramatically reduced
the casualties in IRA attacks.8 To appreciate the life-sparing effect of these warnings, it is worth
considering what a no-warning bombing by the IRA could look like. The IRA did carry out such
attacks, sometimes intentionally and sometimes because of an operational failure to communicate
a warning. On February 17, 1978, the IRA planted a time bomb at the La Mon Hotel outside of
Belfast, while 450 hotel staff and patrons were inside. IRA bombers hung the device in the window
of a crowded dining room, left the scene, and attempted to give a warning, but the pay telephone
nearest to the hotel had been vandalized and the bombers could not immediately find another
phone. Their eventual warning gave police nine minutes notice, too little time for an evacuation.
Twelve people died and thirty were injured in one of the worst atrocities of the conflict. The casu-
alty tolls from the IRA’s massive truck bombs would have been far worse than those at La Mon,
had the IRA not given warnings beforehand.
To explain the IRA’s choice to give pre-attack warnings, I interviewed former IRA members, po-
lice, British army personnel, government officials, and a select group of journalists and charity
workers who served as intermediary links between IRA warning callers and local police.9 Many
7Incident statistics taken from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Ter-
rorism (START). (2015). The actual number of bombings is certainly higher, because incidents that did not
cause casualties tend to be under-reported in the journalistic sources consulted by GTD coders.
8Two of the IRA’s other bombings (both with warnings) reinforce this point: the April 10, 1992 bomb at
London’s Baltic Exchange (2,000 lb bomb, £800 million in damage, 3 killed, 91 injured) and the February 9,
1996 bomb at London’s Canary Wharf (1,100 lb bomb, £100 million in damage, 2 killed, 39 injured).
9The Coiste na nIarichimí Republican ex-prisoners support group made several former IRA prisoners
available for interviews. Other IRA members were approached individually. Police, journalists, and gov-
ernment sources were also approached individually. The Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Associa-
tion (NIRPOA) provided background information on policing during the Troubles. The Samaritans organi-
zation provided background information on its role in communicating IRA warnings.
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of those consulted preferred not to sit for formal interviews, and many interviewees preferred to
be left “on background.” Of those who agreed to be interviewed and acknowledged, the break-
down of sources was:
• Eight former IRA members
• Six former police or army officers who held command positions during the Troubles
• Seven journalists
• One high level Northern Ireland justice official
• One high level British peace negotiator from the staff of Prime Minister Tony Blair
I use interviewees’ statements to discern the IRA’s reasons for giving pre-attack warnings. My
analysis of police behavior and the process of communicating warnings is contained in Chapter
6. Where subjects requested anonymity, I refer to them using a general description (e.g. “former
police officer”) or a generic identifier and number (e.g. “Republican #2 ”).
3.1 IRA Targeting: Attacking People vs. Attacking Property
The IRA didn’t always give warnings of bombs. They gave warnings of bombs when the intent
was not to kill people. – Republican #1
The IRA’s pre-attack warnings transformed an essentially indiscriminate weapon, the bomb, into
a sophisticated strategic instrument. Explosions have the same physical effect on buildings and
other material targets regardless of whether the bomber gives a warning. But the same explosion
has dramatically different effects on people if the perpetrator gives a warning. By engaging the
state’s emergency response, warnings limit human casualties and confine a bomb’s damage pri-
marily to physical targets.
In addition to reducing casualties, a logic related to the X parameter in my model, the IRA’s
pre-attack warnings carried an operational cost (D1 − D2) because they reduced the chance of a
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bomb attack succeeding. Upon receiving a warning, police rushed to the scene of the purported
attack. An anonymous Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) “Special Branch” veteran described the
police response as “a triage-type approach . . . to evacuate, to clear and cordon, and to make an as-
sessment” of whether an actual threat existed at the scene. If a threat was deemed credible, police
notified the British army’s 321st Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) squadron, which evaluated
suspected bombs and defused or destroyed devices that appeared to be real. From 1969 through
1998, the RUC reported 15,066 bombing incidents involving actual devices, roughly 6,300 of which
were defused or detonated in a controlled fashion by ammunition technical officers (ATOs) from
the 321st EOD. From the defused devices alone, ATOs recovered roughly fifty tons of explosives
(RUC 1996, RUC 1998, Ryder 2005).
From the IRA’s perspective, these defusings were regrettable. After going to the trouble of training
volunteers, building bombs, and sending teams out to place them, the organization was heavily
invested in each bomb going off as planned. To deter army bomb disposal experts, or at least to
slow them down, the IRA rigged many bombs with “anti-handling” devices that detonated when
disturbed (Ryder 2005: 46). But whenever the IRA gave warnings, it assumed an increased risk
of operational failure, with a corresponding reduction in the expected damage from the attack.
This operational cost is anticipated in my model, where the reduction in expected damage is rep-
resented by the D1 and D2 parameters on the right side of the attacking Militant’s condition for
warning: X +G > D1 −D2.
IRA members are quick to point out that for many attacks, the group gave no warning. This
is important to note, because the theoretical model I have specified applies at the level of individ-
ual attacks. A group like the IRA can choose different warning strategies depending on the details
of a given attack and whether a warning makes tactical and political sense in that situation. As
IRA members stressed, it would be too simplistic to characterize the IRA as a warning group.
Throughout the conflict, the IRA carried out two very different types of operations: assassination-
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type attacks directed at specific individuals, and so-called “commercial” attacks directed at the
Northern Ireland and mainland British economies. In assassination attacks, the IRA fully intended
to kill people – specifically the security forces defending the political status quo. Over the course of
the Troubles, the IRA killed 286 people in 290 bomb attacks on military targets. The IRA also used
bombs to assassinate police, killing 145 people in 235 bomb attacks (GTD 2015). The IRA attacked
police outposts, planted “under car” devices on police vehicles, and placed booby trap bombs on
the bodies of police, army, and paramilitary personnel already assassinated with guns. Whether
bombs or guns were used, a warning about an assassination would have been self-defeating.
One may think of assassinations as cases where D2 approaches zero. If warned of a ticking time
bomb nearby, a person can simply leave the scene. D1−D2 is relatively high, making it difficult to
satisfy the militant’s condition for warning (X+G > D1−D2). As one would expect, the IRA gave
no warnings for assassination-type attacks. But when the primary target was something inanimate
and immobile, such as a shop or a piece of commercial infrastructure, the expected damage was
not reduced to such a low level, and the condition for warning was easier to satisfy. For those
commercial attacks alone, the IRA would consider giving a warning. As Republican #1 remarked:
“[T]he IRA didn’t always give warnings of bombs. They gave warnings of bombs when the intent
was not to kill people.” This pattern of behavior is consistent with H3, that militants will give
warnings when doing so does not greatly reduce the expected damage from an attack.
3.2 A Norm of Non-Combatant Immunity
[I]f you’re engaging in a war you have a responsibility that those who aren’t involved in the
war don’t become the casualties of it. – Republican #3
In most commercial bombing attacks, the IRA did give warnings. To understand why, one has to
consider the IRA’s strategic rationale for such attacks. Republican #2, an operative from one of
Northern Ireland’s border counties explained:
[Commercial bombings] meant the retail centers of towns, or administrative centers
in towns, government offices or offices of government departments, and public trans-
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port infrastructure. . . . Those targets were attacked for the purpose of disrupting
the economic life in Northern Ireland under the rule of the British government . . . to
demonstrate to the British government that Northern Ireland wasn’t a workable entity
and that the IRA would prevent it from being a viable economic entity.
The IRA sought to turn Northern Ireland into an enormous money sink for the British government.
However, its strategy of destroying commercial property and infrastructure did not necessarily
require the killing of people at those locations. In fact, the IRA sought to keep the casualty toll
among bystanders low. A former RUC Special Branch intelligence officer explained:
They didn’t send volunteers out to kill and maim indiscriminately. . . . [I]f you were
told to do a thing called a “commercial bombing,” which they did in the center of
town, which was against commercial targets, you didn’t want any collateral [damage].
Invariably somebody is going to get hurt somewhere along the line, but you try to
minimize that by giving some sort of a warning.
Pre-attack warnings provided discrimination, allowing the IRA to damage property without harm-
ing as many people as they might otherwise. This is the logic of the signaling model’s parameter,
X , which represents the political cost for causing excessive casualties in an attack. For that logic to
operate in reality, two basic conditions must obtain: First, the attack must pose a risk of harming
people, as commercial bombings certainly did. Second, there must be some audience whose sup-
port or acquiescence the militant group requires, who will judge the casualties of a no-warning
attack to be excessive and worthy of punishment. IRA members and police sources identified
three casualty-averse audiences who provided indispensable support for the IRA: local commu-
nities who provided operational support to the group, Irish Americans who provided funds and
weapons, and international political allies who provided leverage to influence the British govern-
ment.
The notion of “excessive” casualties related to a norm of non-combatant immunity, which would
be violated by no-warning commercial attacks. The norm of non-combatant immunity is well-
established in international laws of war, including the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. It is generally understood that members of
the armed forces engaging in conflict on behalf of a state are legitimate targets for an opposing
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state’s military forces. Civilians, those who do not serve in the state’s armed forces, are illegiti-
mate targets. The IRA made similar distinctions.
In general, the IRA viewed itself as engaging in a military conflict with the UK government and
the “British Crown Forces” who propped up Northern Ireland as a political entity. Anyone who
was not part of the government, British Crown Forces, or loyalist paramilitary forces, and who
did not support the activities of these groups, was a civilian and therefore not a legitimate target.
In practice, British Crown Forces included army troops such as the Special Air Services (SAS) and
Royal Irish Rangers (RIR), the military reservists of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), and the
police of the RUC, whether on or off-duty. Republican #3 explained the group’s justification for
this expansive definition of “military” targeting:
Any deployment by the British government in terms of propping up the state . . .
British army, RUC, locally recruited regiments the likes of the UDR, RIR, that sort of
thing . . . They’re all armed. They’re all put here for a specific reason. It was about
defeating Republicanism. . . . It was about upholding the state as it was. So they were
the enemy and considered as such. . . . They were considered military targets.
The IRA’s definition of “military” also extended to people who delivered materials, cleaned floors,
prepared food, and did other work at police or army facilities. The IRA did not give warnings be-
fore attacking these facilities, but the organization did make its targeting rules known in advance.
Republican #2 explained:
[P]eople working in a civilian capacity in military bases, the IRA would issue a warn-
ing that anybody cooperating with British crown forces would be considered a target
and that they should desist from carrying out any work . . . And as the IRA would
have termed it . . . “anyone who’s contributing to the British war machine” in such a
fashion would be considered a target, and . . . they wouldn’t guarantee their safety.
Although the civilian category was circumscribed, the IRA considered these people to be immune
from direct targeting and entitled to protection from accidental harm in commercial bombings.
The IRA considered itself to be fighting on behalf of these civilians, in its capacity as “the legal
and lawful government of the Irish Republic” (language taken from the IRA’s Green Book training
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manual).10 As Danny Morrison, a former Sinn Féin spokesman, remarked: “Why would the IRA
kill civilians? Civilians weren’t the enemy.”11 Republican #3 elaborated on the IRA’s moral logic:
You can’t on the one hand be saying you’ll be fighting on behalf of a people and about
removing some sort of tyranny and then at the same time being so very blasé about
human life. . . . [I]f you’re engaging in a war you have a responsibility that those who
aren’t involved in the war don’t become the casualties of it.
Notably, the IRA’s understanding of non-combatant immunity applied to civilians on the other
side of the conflict. Considering the Manchester and Bishopsgate bombings, for example, the IRA
took steps to ensure that English civilians would not be caught up in the IRA’s bombings. Immu-
nity for those civilians followed from a principle of proportionality in warfare. Danny Morrison
explained: “Had the IRA wanted to, it could have destroyed the London Underground, but there
would have been a high risk to civilians. . . . [Nationalists] weren’t that oppressed, to justify such
indiscriminate actions.”12 Accordingly, in its 1972 directive to commence bombing operations in
England, the supreme Army Council of the IRA instructed the “Overseas Unit” to avoid civilian
casualties, as the IRA did in Northern Ireland bombings (Anderson 2002: 267-268).
The imperative to protect civilians required the IRA to plan its operations carefully. The RUC Spe-
cial Branch intelligence expert likened the IRA Army Council to “early risk management strate-
gists.” There was an inherent tension between the goal of destroying civilian property and the
imperative to safeguard civilians in and around that property. The IRA could sometimes resolve
this tension by using different weapons: delayed-fuse incendiaries that could be hidden in shops
at the close of business hours, setting fire to them when no one was inside.13 But in cases where the
10A reproduction of the Green Book may be found in Coogan (1993).
11Although he previously served as a Sinn Féin spokesman and he admits being a member of the IRA
at some unspecified point in the past, Morrison spoke as a long-time observer within Belfast’s republican
communities, not as an observer of IRA activities.
12Morrison also stressed that, in his judgment and those of other nationalists, no level of oppression
would justify truly indiscriminate actions or actions directly targeting civilians.
13These so-called “French Letters” consisted of an incendiary charge packed into the shell of a VHS
cassette along with a sugar-coated, sulfuric acid-filled condom. Taking advantage of the fine manufacturing
tolerances for condoms, IRA bomb makers determined the length of time it took for the acid to eat through
the latex and react with the incendiary charge. French Letters could be hidden in shops immediately before
the close of business, igniting hours later and setting fire to the store when the building was empty.
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target could not be attacked with incendiaries or where the IRA’s plan called for the destruction
of buildings, protecting civilians meant ensuring their physical exit from the target area. Bomb
warnings accomplished this task – if everything went as planned. They also disrupted business
and traffic, tactical bonuses that advanced the IRA’s strategy of commercial disruption.
3.3 Political Incentives for Warning: Maintaining Local Support
Our community were our sea, and we swam amongst them. – Séanna Walsh
The theory I have laid out predicts that militant groups like the IRA will give warnings when
they expect to pay high political costs (X) for causing excessive casualties. Although the IRA’s
own stated aversion to civilian casualties goes some way toward explaining the group’s warn-
ing behavior, the model’s logic pertains specifically to political costs and benefits. IRA members’
statements show that such costs were a major determinant of the group’s behavior. The central
issue was that key supporting audiences espoused the same norm of non-combatant immunity
held by members of the group. IRA members might have found it unpalatable to attack civilian
targets without warning, but such tactics were politically harmful because critical support bases
would disapprove and withdraw their support from the IRA. The most critical audience, account-
ing for most of the IRA’s political costs for harming civilians, was the IRA’s support base among
Northern Ireland’s nationalist communities.
The IRA saw itself as the revolutionary vanguard of republicanism in Northern Ireland, but it
could not have continued its campaign without substantial support from local nationalist com-
munities. Nationalists provided material support to the IRA, including “call houses” where IRA
members could meet to plan operations, store weapons, and sleep. Community members who did
not offer up their homes as call houses would still allow IRA members to use their homes as get-
away routes and hiding places. Brendan Hughes, Operations Chief for the IRA’s Belfast Brigade
later explained: “[M]ost people cooperated with the IRA; they left their back doors open, or if they
saw you jumping over the yard wall, they’d open the back door if it was closed” (Moloney 2010:
66). For its very survival, the IRA needed local supporters to keep their doors open. National-
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ists shared an ideology with the IRA, but their support depended on the group upholding certain
standards of conduct, especially non-combatant immunity. Danny Morrison, himself a lifelong
resident of Belfast’s staunchly nationalist Andersonstown area, remarked: “Who’s going to sup-
port an organization that is seen to be killing civilians, without thought, or without any ethics at
all? . . . Why, I know people who were thrown out of houses after certain attacks!”
Rank-and file IRA members developed a politically sophisticated understanding of their rela-
tionship with the local population. Of particular importance were the theories of Mao Zedong,
as articulated in his 1937 text, On Guerrilla Warfare. Regarding the relationship between the local
community and a guerrilla force, Mao writes:
The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. . . . It is
only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish
out of its native element, cannot live (Mao 1989: 93).
Seven out of the eight on-the-record IRA interviewees made specific reference to the “fish and the
sea” analogy. Séanna Walsh, the last public spokesman for the IRA, gave a typical account:
The IRA operated here in the north with the support of the community that they came
from. It’s like Mao Zedong talked about the fish in the sea. Our community were our
sea, and we swam amongst them. Activities that killed civilians, or even hurt civilians,
could have a detrimental effect on IRA operations. People would tell you, if you went
to their house after something happened. They’d say “That’s disgraceful. Why did you
do that?” or “Why did they not get a warning?” And people would tell you “I don’t
want you coming back by the house,” or “I’m not prepared to mind those weapons in
my house if this is what you’re involved in.”14
Robert “Dinker” McClanahan, an IRA member who served 18 years in prison “for causing explo-
sions in Belfast,” offered a similar analysis:
You were the fish swimming in the sea. And you depended on the community to
give you food, to give you shelter, to give you transport . . . To give you help and
assistance. To look after our guns. To look after our explosives. And they could have
14Walsh delivered the Provisional IRA’s final public statement, distributed July 27, 2005, confirming the
group’s disarmament and the disbanding of its organizational structures for waging war. Walsh delivered
the statement without a mask, the only time after 1972 that an IRA spokesman did so (Chrisafis 2005).
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went to jail equally as ourselves. . . . If there was a really bad operation where civilians
were severely injured or killed, that would be like a sickening factor for them and they
would say, “No, I don’t want to support you anymore.”
In the vast majority of commercial bombings, the IRA adhered to the non-combatant immunity
norm by giving advance warnings. The worst bomb-related atrocities of the IRA’s campaign ap-
pear to have been mistakes – breakdowns in warning communication, failures to park a car bomb
in the proper location, or bombs that detonated prematurely. According to the RUC Special Branch
intelligence officer, the La Mon restaurant bombing and several other infamous attacks “looked
very different in the planning stage” and were not “planned to be bloodbaths.” But in the imme-
diate aftermath of such incidents, it was not always clear that the IRA had given warnings, or that
the warnings were given in good faith as genuine attempts to move people out of harm’s way.
The best the IRA could do in these cases was to claim that the warnings were ineffective, and the
civilian casualties unintended. The community reaction to such atrocities could be harsh.
As a methodological aside, unintended bloodbaths like La Mon allow us to observe political costs
that we would not be able to see or measure otherwise. When actors behave as formal models say
they should, their behavior on the equilibrium path avoids such disasters. But reality produces
informative tragedies. Technical failures and breakdowns of communication produce humanitar-
ian and political consequences that conflict actors otherwise mange to avoid.
The “Bloody Friday” incident of July 21, 1972 was one such tragedy. In this attack, the IRA deto-
nated nineteen bombs throughout Belfast in the space of eighty minutes. The IRA gave warnings
for most of the bombs (reports differ as to how many) but the number of simultaneous attacks
overwhelmed the ability of police to evacuate civilians. In practical terms, it was as if the IRA
had given no warnings at all. The Bloody Friday attacks killed nine people, including seven civil-
ians, and wounded 130.15 News stories and grisly television footage of the aftermath drove a
permanent wedge between moderate and militant nationalists, in both Northern Ireland and the
15In at least one case, the explosion of one IRA bomb physically blocked the path of first responders
racing to clear another area after receiving a bomb warning. Historical sources give the number of bombs
with confirmed warnings at between fourteen and nineteen. See McKittrick et al (2001: 229) and BBC (2002).
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Republic of Ireland. Those who favored constitutional solutions to Northern Ireland’s problems
would remain hostile to “armed force” republicanism for the duration of the Troubles (Moloney
2002: 117; Moloney 2010: 104). Even staunch republicans were disillusioned by the attacks. British
authorities capitalized on the new political situation immediately, accelerating planning and ex-
ecution of “Operation Motorman.” This July 31, 1972 operation used thousands of soldiers, ar-
mored vehicles, royal marines, and a warship to break up IRA “no-go” zones in Derry and search
houses there for IRA personnel and weapons. Sensing itself at a political nadir, the IRA leadership
instructed cadres not to resist these incursions, but to abandon the safe houses and retreat. The
group lacked the political standing even to protest what should have been a highly controver-
sial action: a massive military operation by a Protestant-dominated government against mostly
Catholic civilians in their own homes (Anderson 2002: 257-258; Moloney 2002: 117). This in-
cident shows the magnitude of the political costs the IRA would have suffered if it engaged in
no-warning bombings regularly. Based on the IRA’s vulnerability in local communities alone, the
political penalty for excessive killing (X) was very high.
3.4 Political Incentives for Warning: Securing American Guns and Money
[B]ad politics plays bad in the bars and in the clubs of New York and wherever, when you’re
asking for money. – Dinker McClanahan
Raising the political cost for excessive casualties further was the IRA’s dependence on a casualty-
averse Irish American diaspora, which provided much of the group’s financial support and weaponry.
When the Provisional IRA first formed in 1969, it possessed only a few outdated firearms to de-
fend nationalist communities against mob violence. Commencing an armed campaign against
British forces would have been impossible without substantial acquisitions of new weapons. Dur-
ing this phase and throughout the conflict, sympathetic Americans provided guns and funding
to the Provisional IRA. Lax American gun laws allowed IRA sympathizers to purchase military-
style firearms, such as the Armalite AR-15 and AR-180, which later came to symbolize the IRA’s
armed campaign. Americans sent disassembled guns by mail or inside the coffins of deceased rel-
atives who wished to be buried in Ireland (Bell 1997: 438-439). Dedicated gun-running operations
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brought more weapons, first in small shipments and later in large ones. Many of these weapons
were acquired and shipped by Irish Northern Aid (Noraid), a self-described “humanitarian re-
lief” organization established in coordination with IRA Belfast Brigade Commander Joe Cahill,
who traveled to the US repeatedly to raise funds and procure arms (Anderson 2002; Moloney
2002, 2010; Wilson 1995). Noraid raised money from Irish Americans in pubs, churches, and so-
cial clubs, via direct mail, and through fundraising events featuring speeches by Cahill and other
IRA members. Relatively radical Irish Americans were willing to support the IRA, but this sup-
port depended on the maintenance of a freedom fighter image. To that end, IRA speakers at
Noraid events emphasized their links to the original Irish revolution and the progress of Irish
self-determination. They eschewed direct references to bombs and the overtly socialist aspects of
the Provisional IRA’s platform. In public appeals to moderate Irish Americans, Noraid claimed
that the group’s “humanitarian relief” fund supported the families of imprisoned republicans –
not the purchase of weapons. This distinction was important not only for legal reasons, but also
to reassure moderate Americans who would not have donated money specifically to buy guns
(Wilson 1995: 42-46). But Noraid’s implicit association with the IRA’s violent activity remained.
Throughout the Troubles, Noraid thrived when the IRA appeared to have the moral high ground.
Fundraising increased after the government’s August 1971 introduction of indefinite internment
for suspected IRA members, after revelations about abusive interrogation practices, and after
the January 1972 “Bloody Sunday” incident, in which British troops shot and killed 13 unarmed
Catholic civil rights protestors. After the July 1972 Bloody Friday bombings, fundraising declined
to such an extent that Noraid leaders contacted high-level IRA members to complain about the
bombing campaign and its effect on Noraid’s work (Wilson 1995).
Rank-and-file IRA members understood the importance of bomb warnings as international im-
age management. Dinker McClanahan, a convicted bomber himself, described the “bad politics”
of harming civilians:
[Y]ou had external audiences . . . That could have been an audience in America, who
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are supplying the funds, or supplying the weapons – In the early years, I’m talking say
1970 until probably ’76, ‘77, your main source of weapons was coming from the US ...
[W]hat I’m saying is bad politics plays bad in the bars and in the clubs of New York
and wherever, when you’re asking for money to send back to the IRA.
The former high-level RUC Special Branch officer offered a similar analysis:
Could you continue to kill people in the numbers that you were and still maintain
[support in] your American diaspora? Because you’re not a couple of freedom fight-
ers coming down from the hill fighting an armored car. You’re actually blowing up
innocent people shopping. . . . You can’t do that.
3.5 Political Incentives for Warning: Cultivating International Legitimacy
And for people outside in other places looking in they could say, “Well yes, right, why is Britain
in Ireland?” – Republican #2
Another factor raising the IRA’s political cost (X) for excessive killing was the group’s depen-
dence on support from US politicians. Throughout the Northern Ireland conflict, the IRA sought
to cultivate a positive image internationally, portraying itself as a self-determination movement
throwing off a foreign occupation. The IRA faced a concerted effort by the British government
to discredit this narrative. As part of that strategy, the British government sought to decrease its
military presence in Northern Ireland, transferring anti-IRA duties from largely English troops to
the Northern Ireland-born UDR and RUC. Republican #2 recalled:
[F]rom the middle-late 70’s it was a British army policy of normalization, because they
wanted to put locally-recruited forces more to the front line against the IRA . . . Because
it was an easy argument for the IRA to say that British army forces shouldn’t be in
Ireland. And for people outside in other places looking in they could say, “Well yes
right, why is Britain in Ireland?”
As the British army sought to hand security duties over to local forces drawn disproportionately
from unionist communities, the IRA became increasingly vulnerable to accusations of sectarian-
ism. Attacks on the UDR and RUC were largely attacks by Catholics on local Protestants – not
attacks on occupying English troops. The army troops who remained could be construed as peace-
keepers helping to quell sectarian violence. Séanna Walsh recalled:
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[T]he way the British portrayed what was happening here was, there were two warring
communities, Catholics and Protestants, and [the British] were in the middle trying
. . . to keep these warring factions apart. Which is absolute bollocks as far as we’re
concerned.
The commercial bombing campaign also risked playing into the sectarianism narrative. The IRA
tended not to bomb businesses in its own, largely Catholic, nationalist neighborhoods. Most com-
mercial bombings would affect businesses in mixed or Protestant areas. No-warning attacks at
these locations would disproportionately kill Protestant civilians. Bomb warnings reduced the
incidence of such apparently sectarian atrocities. In doing so, they helped to ensure that when the
IRA did kill people, the images fit the revolutionary narrative.
These perceptions were critical to winning diplomatic support from American politicians. Aside
from the issues of fundraising and gun-running, the IRA saw the United States as a powerful
source of political leverage to influence the British government. Post-Bloody Sunday outcry by
Irish-American politicians, most notably Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), was instrumental in pres-
suring the British government to suspend Northern Ireland’s parliament in 1972 (Wilson 1995: 77).
The long-term effect of this change was to make Britain’s involvement in Northern Ireland appear
even more colonial and the IRA’s violence more legitimate.
In another public relations victory for the IRA, US politicians, clergy and activists advocated in
favor of IRA gunman Joe Doherty, to stop his extradition from a New York jail to the UK for
killing a British Army captain. The pro-Doherty campaign rested on an assertion of “political
prisoner” status – a proposition anathema to British policy but endorsed by 132 Congressional
Representatives, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), and the New York City Council, which named a
street corner after Doherty. The Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan governments’ effort to ex-
tradite Doherty dragged on for eight embarrassing years (Wilson 1995: 261).
Most significant, however, was the role of US President Bill Clinton. Clinton’s 1994 decision to
grant a visa for Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams, against the wishes of the British government,
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gave Adams an opportunity to address the American public through high-profile media appear-
ances (Moloney 2002: 420). Clinton’s endorsement helped to legitimize Sinn Féin’s role in the
peace process. His appointment of a special Northern Ireland negotiator, Senator George Mitchell
(D-ME), helped to secure the IRA-UK peace settlement, which Clinton endorsed with a visit to
Belfast and a high-profile handshake with Adams. Séanna Walsh expressed the IRA’s understand-
ing of Clinton’s role:
One of the lessons that we had from the previous ceasefires of the mid-70’s was that to
get any movement from the British that we had to internationalize it. If it was interna-
tionalized, well then in that context, you could be a wee bit more relaxed. If the British
said something and you had international guarantors to ensure that, “Actually this is
what you said,” once you do that, once you bring people like that into the equation,
well then that changes the whole context. So it was crucial that people like Bill Clinton
and the whole Irish American diaspora really bought into what was going on here.
The support of US politicians was critical, particularly during the 1990’s, and Americans had
already demonstrated an aversion to civilian atrocities like the Bloody Friday incident. Even in
cases like the Manchester and Bishopsgate bombings, where the lives at stake were not Irish, the
IRA found itself in an international spotlight, with substantial political liabilities (formally, a high
value of X) if it failed to give warnings and its bombs killed civilians. Overall, this discussion of
the IRA’s support structure provides strong support for H1, that militants are more likely to give
warnings when they pay a high cost for harming civilians.
3.6 Other Incentives to Warn: Multiplying Damage to “Legitimate” Targets
Police were open season if somebody could have a shot at them. – Republican #1
Beyond using warnings to avoid the negative political ramifications of harming civilians, the IRA
used warnings to impose damage on British security forces and the Northern Ireland economy –
both legitimate targets in the eyes of the IRA and its supporters. This aspect of warnings corre-
sponds to my theoretical model’sG parameter, representing the costs paid by the Government (and
added to the Militant’s end-state utility) when the Government mobilizes. Like the Militant in my
model, the IRA gave warnings in part to impose costs on the state.
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When planning a commercial attack, the IRA looked for ways to capitalize on the predictabil-
ity of the government’s response. Having planted a bomb and given a warning, the IRA could
predict more or less how police would approach the scene and conduct their search and evacua-
tion. According to John O’Hagan, an IRA member previously imprisoned for explosives-related
offenses, it was a “very rare occasion that [the IRA] didn’t look for the second opportunity” to
attack police as they responded to the warning about a commercial bomb. The “second oppor-
tunity” might involve planting a sniper at the scene of the bombing. (In Republican #1 ’s words,
it was “open season” on police “if somebody could have a shot at them.”) The second opportu-
nity might also involve planting a second bomb at the scene of the commercial attack, timed to
explode while security forces were there. Or the opportunity might involve booby trapping the
commercial bomb itself. The British Army’s 321st EOD squadron, tasked with responding to IRA
bombs in Northern Ireland, lost twenty explosives experts during the conflict. Several were killed
by booby trapped devices, otherwise standard-looking bombs with hidden components that det-
onated when an ammunition technical officer attempted to disable the device (Ryder 2005: 46).
The IRA could also use misleading warnings and dummy devices to induce unnecessary police
responses and further disrupt the economy. The commercial bombing campaign was intended to
cause disruption, via the bombs’ physical effects first of all, and also by forcing evacuations and
traffic diversions in the middle of the business day. The IRA realized that warnings could create
the latter effect even if they didn’t all correspond to real bombs. When mixed with a few true
warnings, surplus warnings acted as economic damage multipliers. Republican #2 recalled:
If on the same day you planted one bomb but you give three other bomb warnings,
you could cause major disruption: traffic disruption, business disruption, you would
treble the effect of just planting one bomb.
These statements by IRA members show that the group’s logic was the same as that of the Militant
in my theoretical model, who uses warnings to impose added costs (G) on the state as it mobilizes
to defend itself.
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3.7 Evaluating the Theory
Recalling the summary of my theory in Chapter 2, the Militant’s condition for giving pre-attack
warnings, X +G > D1 −D2, yields three basic hypotheses:
H1: Militants are more likely to give warnings when they pay a high political cost for causing excessive
casualties.
H2: Militants are more likely to give warnings when responding to warnings carries a high cost for the
government.
H3: Militants are more likely to give warnings when doing so does not greatly reduce the expected damage
from an attack.
My interviews of IRA members and Northern Ireland police lend clear support to H1, H2, and
H3. By IRA members’ own accounts, the group gave pre-attack warnings to avoid the political
cost (X) it would suffer if its attacks caused excessive casualties. In the IRA case, “excessive”
casualties meant harm to civilians who were not part of the “Crown Forces” maintaining British
sovereignty over Northern Ireland. Important political constituencies – local nationalist commu-
nities, the Irish American diaspora, and US politicians with leverage to influence the British gov-
ernment – would withdraw their support if the IRA indiscriminately attacked civilians. To avoid
such political costs, the IRA gave pre-attack warnings when bombing commercial targets. No-
tably, the IRA did not give warnings when attacking police and military targets. To the contrary,
the group used warnings as a means of imposing additional damage on police and army targets,
via ambushes. These ambushes, and the IRA’s use of surplus warnings to “treble the effect” of
real bombs, lend support to H2, which predicts warnings in cases where the militant group seeks
to impose mobilization costs (G) on the government.
Looking at the other side of the Militant’s condition for warning (X + G > D1 − D2), pre-attack
warnings were enabled by a relatively low operational cost of giving warnings when attacking
commercial targets. In commercial attacks, the target was physical in nature – a building or a
piece of infrastructure. Those objects are immobile, so giving a warning makes comparatively
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little difference in the expected damage to the target. Consistent with H3, the IRA gave warnings
before commercial attacks, but not before attacks on people, in which the operational cost of giv-
ing warnings would have been much higher.
One potential critique of my hypothesis testing bears mentioning here. It is conceivable that a
militant organization like the IRA would choose its targets based on the political costs of harm-
ing civilians. A group with a casualty-averse support base might refrain from attacking targets
where the risks to civilians are very high, choosing instead to focus on different targets, such as
police patrols or physical infrastructure in remote areas. In such cases, the operational cost of
warning (D1 − D2) would not be independent of the underlying casualty aversion of the group
and its supporters. This would make it difficult to test H1 (regarding the cost of excessive killing)
independently of H3 (regarding the operational cost of giving warnings). However, there are IRA
attacks where target choice and casualty aversion are clearly unrelated, and these cases give sup-
port to my theory’s predictions.
The IRA’s unsuccessful October 12, 1984 assassination attempt on British Prime Minister Mar-
garet Thatcher is one example. In an attempt to kill Thatcher, an elite IRA member built a bomb
into the wall of a hotel room directly beneath the room Thatcher would occupy during a planned
stay at the hotel three weeks later. This tactic posed an obvious danger to hotel workers and other
civilians who would be caught in the building collapse when the IRA bomb exploded. Never-
theless, Thatcher was a very important target, giving a high value of D1. A warning would have
allowed Thatcher to escape, effectively reducing D2 to zero and defeating the purpose of the at-
tack. The IRA chose to carry out the attack, and as my theory would predict, the group did not
give a warning. The explosion partially imploded the hotel, killing five people and wounding
thirty two, most of them civilians. As this example shows, it is not necessarily the case that the
cost of harming civilians determines a group’s targeting (and therefore the operational cost of
warning). It is possible to test H1 and H3 independently, and the IRA case provides support to
both hypotheses.
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4 Tests on Paired Case Studies
In this section, I present two pairs of contrasting case studies as additional tests of my theory. I
have paired groups that engaged in different warning behavior. To enable tests of hypotheses
involving my theory’s subtle independent variables (the political cost for excessive casualties, the
mobilization cost that can be imposed on the government, and the difference in expected damage
from warning and non-warning attacks) I have selected cases to control for fundamental group
characteristics such as their underlying grievances and ultimate political goals. The first case pair
comprises ETA and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). Both groups were motivated by ethnic grievances
and sought secession as a political goal, but only ETA gave pre-attack warnings. The second case
pair comprises the MRTA and Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path). Both groups were motivated
by revolutionary Marxism and both sought to overthrow the Peruvian government, but only the
MRTA gave pre-attack warnings. If my theory is well specified, the differences in militant groups’
warning behavior should be traceable to differences in the groups’ political costs for causing exces-
sive casualties (X), different response costs (G) that could be imposed on their target governments,
differences in the operational cost of giving warnings (D1 −D2), or some combination of these.
In examining these cases, I use my previous IRA case study as a guide to sharpen my hypothesis
testing. For instance, my theory predicts that groups will give warnings when they face high polit-
ical costs (X) for causing excessive casualties. In the IRA case, these political costs were imposed
by local, diaspora, and international supporters who would sanction the group if it harmed civil-
ians. If the IRA case is typical of militant groups’ political calculations generally, a comparative
analysis of warning and non-warning groups should reveal differences in these groups’ under-
lying support structures, with the warning groups having to place greater reliance on casualty-
averse local, diaspora, or international diplomatic supporters. The non-warning groups should
have more permissive political environments, with local, diaspora, and international supporters
less willing or less able to sanction the group. The non-warning groups may also have other
sources of support, which do not depend on the group avoiding excessive harm to civilians.
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4.1 ETA and the “Revolutionary Ethics” of Warning
The Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) is similar to the IRA in many respects.
A nationalist movement, ETA seeks to establish a homeland, Euskal Herria, for Basque people,
who despite their distinct language and cultural identity, have lived under the political rule of
Spanish and French governments for hundreds of years. Like the IRA, ETA has decades of history
as a resistance movement, dating to the 1930’s, when Basque elements fought against Francisco
Franco’s fascists in the Spanish Civil War. For decades after the fascist victory, Franco’s govern-
ment suppressed most expressions of Basque language and culture in Spain. In the late 1950’s,
Basque nationalists began a new guerrilla campaign against Franco’s government. ETA was the
longest-lived of these guerrilla elements, continuing its armed campaign until 2011, when it de-
clared an indefinite cessation of its hostilities. Unlike the, IRA, ETA failed to achieve any of its
political goals, and remains a marginal force in Spanish and Basque nationalist politics.
ETA employed a variety of tactics during its violent campaign. These included assassinations
of police and army personnel, including Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s would- be succes-
sor. ETA’s December 20, 1973 road mine attack on Carrero Blanco’s motorcade was arguably ETA’s
most historically significant action because it helped to ensure Spain’s transition away from fascist
government (Bew and Gurruchaga 2009: 178-80). ETA also employed IRA-like bombing tactics
against economically significant public places, businesses, and infrastructure. In these commer-
cial attacks, ETA sometimes gave warnings like those of the IRA.
For instance, in its “summer campaigns” against Spain’s tourist economy, ETA attacked beaches
and vacation resorts. ETA commandos buried bombs in beaches, with long fuses set to detonate
weeks later. Shortly before the bombs were to explode, ETA would call Spanish emergency ser-
vices to inform them of the impending explosions. A July 20, 2008 ETA operation was typical of
summer campaigns that went as planned: “Four low-power devices” exploded “in Laredo and
Noja after a telephone call on behalf of the terrorist group warned of their placement in the sands
... The announcement took place at half past ten, through a recording in which a distorted female
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voice was heard saying that the bombs would explode between noon and three p.m.” The Spanish
Guardia Civil, a paramilitary police force concerned mostly with suppressing ETA, evacuated the
beaches, warning residents of nearby homes to stay inside and sealing off roads and waterways
until the bombs exploded. These emergency interventions prevented all but one minor injury (El
Correo 2008). ETA also gave warnings before larger bombings. The group’s December 30, 2006
van bombing of a parking garage at Madrid’s Barajas airport used more than a thousand pounds
of explosives, destroying the five story parking garage and damaging 1,300 parked cars. The ETA
commando unit made warning calls to four different media organizations and emergency hot-
lines, giving more than an hour’s notice of the attack. Despite the warnings and authorities’ effort
to evacuate the garage, two Ecuadoran citizens sleeping in their car were killed (La Vanguardia
2010).
This was a pattern throughout ETA’s campaign: Warnings spared many lives, but not all of them.
However, the results of one particular attack show how much worse things could have been, had
ETA not given warnings at all. The June 19, 1987 bombing of a Hipercor supermarket in Barcelona
killed twenty-one people and wounded forty-five. An ETA telephone warning gave roughly forty-
five minutes notice of the attack, but police failed to arrive promptly at the scene and failed to
conduct a thorough search before deeming the warning a hoax and leaving. As a result, people
were still shopping when the bomb went off (Argemi 1994). The Hipercor atrocities accounted for
nearly a quarter of all deaths caused by ETA’s economic bombings during the conflict. Substantial
though it was, the civilian toll of ETA’s campaign, 104 fatalities and 800 injuries in 711 bombings,
is strikingly low given how many Hipercor-like atrocities ETA could have inflicted had it chosen
never to give warnings.16
Antton Etxebeste, a former second-in-command of ETA, agreed to be interviewed for this project
to explain ETA’s rationale for giving pre-attack warnings. Although no longer an ETA member,
Etxebeste has a long history within the group. Most notably, he served as ETA’s representative
16Statistics compiled from the Global Terrorism Database.
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in secret diplomatic talks with the Spanish government, held in Algiers under French auspices
during the 1980’s. When the so-called mesa argel talks broke down, the Spanish government had
Etxebeste exiled to Latin America and imprisoned. He lost his leadership role sometime in the
1990’s, when it became clear that the Spanish government would not allow his release and would
no longer use him as an intermediary to convey messages to the rest of ETA. Etxebeste’s state-
ments show that, in general, ETA’s motivations for giving warnings are consistent with the logic
of my theory and formal model.
Like the IRA, ETA pursued a two-track strategy, targeting Spanish security forces and the Span-
ish economy. As Etxebeste described it, “[t]he two pillars ... of the armed actions to destabilize
the state are the ... occupying forces, then infrastructure.” Spanish police and military personnel
might be attacked with car bombs and roadside mines. In such attacks, ETA gave no warning.
In other types of attacks, however, ETA used warnings to impose additional damage on security
forces. ETA ambushed police as they approached the scenes of bomb threats against infrastruc-
ture. ETA planted extra bombs to kill security forces as they evacuated civilians from commercial
targets, and ETA booby trapped its bombs to kill bomb disposal technicians. Although it may
seem cynical to target security forces as they respond to bomb warnings, Etxebeste disagrees:
“The distinction is clear ... We never considered the occupying forces victims,” only as “targets.”
ETA’s tactics represent a use of warnings to impose added costs (G) on the government as it mobi-
lizes to reduce damage. This behavior is consistent with the logic of H2, which states that militants
will give warnings when mobilization carries high costs for the government. The results of ETA’s
attacks on security forces were quite grim. The group’s 298 bombings of police and military tar-
gets, counting both no-warning attacks and ambushes piggybacked onto civilian attacks, killed
159 and wounded 1,044.17
ETA generally gave warnings when attacking economic targets and infrastructure. Economic
and infrastructure targets are typically physical in nature, and ETA made a distinction between
17Statistics generated from the Global Terrorism Database.
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attacking property and attacking civilians in the vicinity. The group’s strategy did not require
the targeting of shoppers and passers by. Civilian targeting also violated what Antton Etxebeste
termed, “revolutionary ethics.” ETA understood itself as being “in an armed clash between mil-
itary forces,” which nonetheless transpired “in places where ... there would be possible risks to
civilians.” “The aim was to meet the military objective, economic destabilization of the state, and
always avoid any possible side effect of civilian casualties.” Giving warnings was a way of avoid-
ing this “side effect” while continuing to attack the Spanish economy. Etxebeste explained the
process of warning in detail:
In cases in which you needed to give an alert for having placed an explosive, it was the
kommando [ETA’s basic military unit] itself which advised various organizations, not
so much the police, but various agencies of a public, institutional character – it could
be the Red Cross, radio stations themselves, or other organizations of an institutional
character. [The phone call] was normally made with a sufficient time interval – if the
explosive was to explode at midnight, then three quarters of an hour or half an hour in
advance, precisely to give a chance to evacuate so that there was no liability to civilians
in the action itself.
ETA also made efforts to avoid civilian casualties while carrying out attacks on security forces. If
ETA laid a remote controlled bomb alongside a road to attack a passing police vehicle or placed
a bomb near a security forces facility, civilians might enter the area, unaware of the impending
attack. The leader of the kommando had the option, in Etxebeste’s words, “to squeeze or not to
squeeze” the button, and the choice was “always not to do so” if civilians were at risk. If ETA
chose not to detonate the bomb, it would make a warning call after the fact, informing the gov-
ernment about the unexploded device so that it could be found and defused safely.
ETA’s reasons for avoiding civilian casualties were in keeping with my theory, and with the pat-
tern shown in the IRA case. Critical bases of support would impose a high political penalty (X)
by withdrawing their support if ETA killed civilians. As in the IRA case, the political cost for caus-
ing excessive casualties is best seen in cases where the group committed operational or political
errors, encountering costs it avoided at most other times. For instance, in certain controversial
cases, ETA would launch attacks on security force installations, which might have civilian staff
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or work crews performing various tasks. ETA gave general warnings to all civilians not to enter
security forces facilities, or even to pass by them, because the facilities were considered legitimate
military targets for attack. In practice, however, civilians did enter those areas. The tension be-
tween sparing civilians and attacking security forces was most acute in the case of casa cuarteles –
barracks housing Spain’s special Guardia Civil police and their families. These living arrangements
predate the conflict with ETA, but Etxebeste and other ETA members alleged that the Guardia Civil
were using their families as “human shields.” ETA gave a public warning to the Guardia Civil in
advance: “First,” Etxebeste said, “remove the casa cuarteles” from Basque territories, “and if the
cuarteles are not removed, at least civilians should leave the barracks.”
When ETA carried out its threats, the results were horrific. A December 11, 1987 car bomb at-
tack on a casa cuartel in Zaragoza killed eleven people, including five children. A May 29, 1991
attack in the city of Vic killed nine people, also including five children (El País 2009, El Economista
2009). The Basque public’s reaction to these attacks was to denounce ETA for killing civilians, even
though the target itself was “military” and ETA had given a general warning in advance. In the
case of the Zaragoza attack, mainstream Basque nationalist parties responded by signing a pact
with major Spanish parties, denying ETA any future role in negotiations on the status of Basque
regions of Spain (Bew and Gurruchaga 2009: 211). These setbacks show that the group’s political
cost for harming civilians (X) was high.
My analysis of ETA supports Hypotheses 1-3, derived from my theory. ETA gave pre-attack warn-
ings to avoid the political cost for causing civilian casualties (X) and to impose mobilization costs
(G) on state forces who responded to warnings. The group’s warnings were enabled by a low op-
erational cost of giving warnings (D1−D2) in commercial attacks, compared to attacks on human
targets, for which ETA gave no warnings.
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4.2 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
ETA’s warning behavior followed a political situation similar to that of the IRA: supporters ready
to impose a high political penalty for civilian casualties, an opportunity to impose high mobi-
lization costs on the government, and a relatively low amount of damage sacrificed by giving
warnings for attacks on commercial targets. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) engaged
in the opposite behavior: no-warning attacks that caused tremendous harm to civilians. The dif-
ference cannot be explained by fundamental group-level traits like underlying grievances and
political goals, since ETA and the LTTE shared these. Instead, the difference is traceable to a very
different political situation in the LTTE case, yielding a dramatically lower cost (X) for harming
civilians.
The Sri Lankan civil conflict in which the LTTE participated was actually a series of four wars
stretching from 1983-2009. The underlying dispute concerned the treatment of Sri Lanka’s Tamil
minority and the potential creation of an independent Eelam state in majority Tamil areas. Since
gaining independence from British rule in 1948, Sri Lanka’s largest ethnic groups, the Tamils and
Sinhalese, have struggled to stake out their respective roles in Sri Lankan politics. With 75 per-
cent of the country’s population, the Sinhalese have used the nation’s democratic institutions to
enact their policy preferences over those of the 11 percent Tamil minority. The Tamils’ grievances
include the designation of Sinhalese as the country’s official language, the designation of Bud-
dhism as the country’s national religion (most Tamils are Hindu), and discriminatory university
admissions policies that make it difficult for Tamils to hold administrative positions in Sri Lanka’s
government (Weiss 2012: 41-43). Sri Lankan Tamils have also faced outbreaks of ethnically moti-
vated violence, including riots in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983 (BBC 2013a; Chattopadhyahya
1994: 51-66). The “Black July” riots in 1983 killed as many as 3,000 Tamils, spurred half a million
to flee to other countries, and set off the civil wars that killed up to 100,000 people over the next
26 years (Chattopadhyahya 1994; Weiss 2012; Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2009; US State
Department 2009: 6).
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The LTTE was both an instigator of the Sri Lankan conflict and the primary belligerent on the
Tamil side. Active on a small scale since the 1970’s, the Tigers vaulted to prominence on July 23,
1983, ambushing a Sri Lankan Army patrol in Jaffna province and killing thirteen army soldiers.
This event helped to provoke the Black July pogroms. The subsequent flood of refugees stream-
ing into the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu prompted the Indian government to train Tamil
guerrilla groups, including the LTTE, to push Sri Lankan government forces out of Tamil areas.
The LTTE exceeded India’s intended mandate, however. The Tigers attacked the Sri Lankan Army,
massacred Sinhalese and Muslim civilians in Tamil areas, and turned its guns on India, ousting
an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) that landed in Sri Lanka to disarm its former proxies. The
LTTE “liberated” substantial portions of Sri Lankan territory before enacting a ceasefire with the
government in 2002-2006. The LTTE administered a de facto state in these areas, with banking,
postal, educational, and immigration systems. But after peace talks broke down, the government
swept all of this away. In 2008 and 2009, the Sri Lankan Army corralled the LTTE into a small area
of the northern coast, shelling the Tigers (and up to 40,000 civilians) out of existence (Weiss 2012:
46-51, 72-84).
Throughout its history, the LTTE was notable for its extreme violence. On the battlefield, the
group was ferocious, outfighting professionally trained Sri Lankan military forces and massacring
enemy captives en masse. Off the battlefield, the Tigers were notorious for their attacks on civil-
ians. These include the May 14, 1985 massacre of 146 civilians at a bus station and Buddhist shrine
in the city of Anhuradhapura; the August 3, 1990 massacre of 110 civilians at two mosques in the
Batticaloa district; the October 15, 1991 massacre of 109 Muslims in Palliyagodella, Polonnaruwa
district; and the September 18, 1999 massacre of more than 50 Sinhalese villagers in Gonagala,
Ampara (Routray and Singh 2006; Kamalendra 1999; Swamy 2003: 123, AP 1990).
The LTTE also carried out bombings of civilian targets without warning. Examples include the
April 21, 1987 car bombing of the Central Bus Station in Colombo, killing 113 people; the Jan-
uary 31, 1996 suicide truck bombing of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in Colombo, killing 91; the
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July 24, 1996 bombing of a commuter train in a Colombo suburb, killing 64 people; and the Jan-
uary 25, 1998 suicide truck bombing of the Sri Dalada Maligawa (the “Temple of the Tooth,” the
holiest Buddhist shrine in Sri Lanka), killing 17 people (BBC 1987, BBC 1996, New York Times 1996).
These attacks on public places served a communicative function, demonstrating the LTTE’s strength
and the Sri Lankan government’s inability to defeat the Tigers militarily. Although the physical
locations themselves could have been attacked with warning, the LTTE chose to give no warnings,
maximizing the civilian casualty toll. As early as 1987 (the year of the Colombo bus station bomb-
ing) an Indian intelligence agency supporting the LTTE’s fight against the Sri Lankan government
reportedly encouraged the Tigers to attack civilians, arguing: “As long as the south remains quiet,
no pressure can be brought” on the government to settle the conflict (Swamy 1994). Velupillai
Prabhakaran, founder and leader of the LTTE, expressed similar ideas in a 1991 BBC interview,
remarking that, given the escalating civilian death toll, “The Sri Lankan government now knows
it can’t impose a military solution on the ethnic problem” (Morris 1991).
The Tamil Tigers pioneered the use of suicide bombing tactics, often using them to attack civilians
with maximum surprise. High casualty bombings served as responses to operational setbacks on
the battlefield, communicating the Tigers’ resilience despite the Sri Lankan army’s apparent gains.
The Central Bank and Dehiwala train bombings followed shortly after the Sri Lankan Army re-
conquered the Jaffna Peninsula, previously the Tigers’ stronghold, in December 1995. (Stung by
the loss of their de facto capitol, the Tigers responded by causing carnage in Sri Lanka’s capitol.)
In February 2009, as the Sri Lankan army approached the point of final victory over the LTTE,
the Tigers again used suicide bombings to communicate their resilience. The LTTE’s “Air Tigers”
packed two small aircraft with an enormous quantity of explosives and attempted to crash them
into buildings in Colombo, only to be shot down by the Sri Lankan Air Force (Wax 2009). Even if
the LTTE’s intention had not been to target civilians, if the purpose of an attack was to communi-
cate the resilience of the group, it made little sense to accept the added risk of operational failure.
In formal terms, the operational cost of giving a warning in such cases (D1−D2) was prohibitively
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high. The LTTE’s choice not to warn in these cases is consistent with Hypothesis 3, derived from
my theory.
Despite the operational drawbacks of giving warnings, the LTTE still had to consider the polit-
ical ramifications of engaging in deliberate atrocities against civilians. In my theory’s terms, a
very high value of X could have outweighed the high operational cost of giving warnings. It does
appear that the LTTE faced some political costs for excessive killing, because the Tigers did not
claim (and often explicitly denied) responsibility for their bloodiest no-warning bombings, even
in cases where the use of suicide tactics made it absolutely clear that the Tigers had carried out
the attacks. The question is, which audiences were the Tigers worried about offending, and were
these political concerns as severe as those faced by the IRA and ETA?
Recalling from the IRA and ETA cases the different sources of political costs for harming civil-
ians – alienating local supporters, alienating diaspora supporters, and alienating the international
community – it appears that the Tigers did not have to worry about the first two. Particularly
during periods when the Tigers controlled swathes of majority Tamil territory, the organization
owned its own radio stations, ran its own schools, and could generate a propaganda narrative
that portrayed its actions as necessary, given the situation. Interviewed for this project, M.A.
Sumanthiran, a Sri Lankan Member of Parliament and human rights lawyer of the Tamil National
Alliance (TNA), denied that “either side approved of attacks on civilians.” But at the time, the
Tamil Tigers convinced many people that atrocities were “a necessary evil to put up with ... for
the moment until we attain our objective and once we have obtained it, then things will be differ-
ent. ... Nobody will say that was right, but even today there are people who say ‘But at that time,
it was necessary to have done that.’" For many Tamils, the Tigers’ bold actions proved the effec-
tiveness of the group. According to Sumanthiran, Tamils “found the LTTE to have been the only
force that was able to stand up to the government in an effective way. Political parties couldn’t.
We talk, we shout, we scream, but we couldn’t deliver anything. It was only the LTTE that could
actually physically hold the government forces at bay.”
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With regard to diaspora fundraising, the Tigers’ no-warning bombings did not pose much of a po-
litical problem either. During the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Tamil Tigers drew funds and weapons
from large Tamil communities in the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, and elsewhere.
Many Tamils in the diaspora communities were refugees, having fled Sri Lanka following the 1983
“Black July” pogroms. In that instance, Sinhalese Sri Lankans had massacred thousands of Tamil
civilians, with the apparent complicity of the Sri Lankan police and military. Many members of
the Tamil diaspora bore an understandable grudge against the Sri Lankan government and Sin-
halese people generally. Those who did not bear a grudge might still be willing to overlook LTTE
atrocities because the Tigers were the only rebel group capable of wresting an independent Eelam
out of the Sri Lankan state. At any rate, diaspora Tamils learned much of what they knew about
the Sri Lankan war through nationalist news outlets such as Tamilnet, which maintained a close
relationship with LTTE spokespeople. As the only viable militant group, with the ability to craft
a propaganda narrative and shape the flow of information to an emotionally engaged base, the
Tigers were able to commit atrocities and still raise millions of dollars abroad.
However, in terms of international legitimacy, the Tigers did suffer costs for inhumane behav-
ior. Velupillai Prabhakaran bristled at the charge by media and governments that the Tamil Tigers
engaged in “terrorism.” In his 2001 annual public address, Prabhakaran summed up the Tigers’
view of their struggle: “It is neither separatism nor terrorism. We are fighting for the emancipation
of our people against racist tyranny, against military occupation, against state terror” (Ubayasiri
2013). Prabhakaran was not merely quibbling over a word. In the UK, US, and Canada, the desig-
nation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization meant that the LTTE would be banned from raising
funds. Diaspora Tamils might be willing to contribute to the LTTE’s cause, but if governments
intercepted the money, the Tigers would still be denied critical support. This is exactly what tran-
spired. Having already designated the Tigers as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997, the
United States reclassified the group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group in Novem-
ber 2001, bringing post-September 11th investigative resources to bear on the group. The UK and
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Canada proscribed the Tigers in 2000 and 2006. Together, the three countries targeted the Tamil
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), arresting its leaders on charges of funneling millions of dol-
lars to the Tamil Tigers under the guise of medical aid and 2004 tsunami relief. The FBI complaint
against the TRO leaders is particularly telling: In addition to raising funds for the Tigers, mem-
bers of the TRO allegedly offered a million dollar bribe to an official at the US State Department
in exchange for removing the Tamil Tigers from the Foreign Terrorist Organization list.
Given the importance of the “terrorist” label internationally, it is not surprising that the LTTE
left its bloody no-warning bombings unclaimed. However, without strong local opposition to
atrocities, the LTTE’s overall cost for harming civilians (X) was low compared to that of the IRA
and ETA. The international political cost of no-warning attacks was not high enough to outweigh
the communicative value of attacking civilians and the strong operational incentive (D1 −D2) to
ensure the success of each attack.
Discussion
The comparison of ETA and the Tamil Tigers upholds the basic hypotheses derived from my the-
ory. Compared with the LTTE, ETA had a substantially higher political cost for causing excessive
casualties (X), due to local Basques’ aversion to civilian casualties and their willingness to sanc-
tion the group. Tamils in Sri Lanka were unwilling to sanction the LTTE because abuses by the
Sri Lankan government had convinced them that safety should be their primary concern, and the
LTTE was the only group capable of ensuring their safety. At any rate, once the LTTE secured
control of territory, it gained the ability to tax Tamils and recruit coercively, making the group less
vulnerable to popular sanction. The group also had the support of an international diaspora and
a state patron (India) for part of the conflict, rendering the group less dependent on local popula-
tions for financial support and weapons. Of the two groups, ETA was far more accountable, with
a higher X as a result.
Setting aside its attacks on security forces, ETA had a generally low operational cost for giving
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warnings (formally, a low value of D1 − D2), when it attacked immobile targets such as busi-
nesses, infrastructure, and tourist beaches. Sri Lanka’s tourist economy also offered the LTTE
beaches (and Buddhist shrines) to attack, but even in those cases, it chose to attack without warn-
ing. Taken together, this evidence supports H1, that militant groups with high political costs for
targeting civilians are more likely to give warnings. The fact that ETA did so only in commer-
cial and infrastructure attacks supports H3, that militant groups are more likely to give warnings
when the operational costs of doing so are low.
It is difficult to test H2 through a cross-case comparison of ETA and the LTTE. Without observable
LTTE warnings and government responses, it is difficult to know the government’s full cost of
mobilizing if warned. What can be said is that, by Antton Etxebeste’s own account, G played a
role in incentivizing ETA’s behavior. In ambush and cazabobo attacks, the role of the warning was
to draw government forces into harm’s way and impose costs on the state. This evidence supports
H2.
With regard to guiding further research, the comparison of ETA and the LTTE raises an intriguing
question: Is there is a hierarchy of audiences, in terms of their ability to impose political costs for
no-warning bombings? ETA and the IRA, for instance, faced a loss of local support if they carried
out no-warning attacks. This was sufficient to induce warning behavior by these groups. The
Tamil Tigers faced international problems when they targeted civilians (specifically, the designa-
tion as a “special” terrorist group and the subsequent crackdown by the US, UK, and Canada).
The concern over international consequences was not in itself sufficient to induce warning be-
havior by the LTTE. It appears that the loss of local support is far more problematic for a militant
group, particularly if the group relies on local populations for vital resources such as shelter. Sanc-
tion by international audiences appears to be a lesser concern, assuming the group does not also
experience sanction by its local base.
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4.3 The MRTA
In this section and the following, I present case studies of the MRTA (Túpac Amaru Revolution-
ary Movement) and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). These Marxist groups fought simultaneous
revolutionary wars against the government of Peru, but only the MRTA gave pre-attack warnings.
This is a very well controlled pair of cases, and my goal is to identify, in as much detail as possi-
ble, the political factors that encouraged one group to give warnings and the other group to attack
without warning. If my theory is well-specified, the critical factors should correspond to one or
more of the independent variables I have identified: the political cost of harming civilians (X), the
value of response costs that can be imposed on the government (G), and the amount of damage
sacrificed by giving warnings (D1−D2). Those variables should also explain any within-case vari-
ation, where a group gives warnings for some attacks but not for others. I begin with a summary
of the Peruvian civil war in which these two groups participated.
The political conflict in Peru began in 1980, lasting roughly 20 years and claiming the lives of
at least 69,000 Peruvians. Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA were the two main rebel actors. Al-
though they shared a Marxist ideological framework, their origins were different. The MRTA’s
roots lay in mainstream, urban Peruvian socialism, including labor movements and the “legal
left” electoral politics of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). The MRTA espoused
a Leninist ideology and a concept of guerrilla warfare borrowed from Cuba’s Fidel Castro and
Che Guevara (Willakuy 2004: 183-5). At the same time, the MRTA was open to working with
APRA, other left parties, and even reformist elements of the Catholic Church to achieve its goals
of “a socialist economy,” “land reform,” “popular democracy,” and “a new Peruvian identity”
(McCormick 1993: 7). In contrast, Sendero Luminoso originated in the interior region of Ayacucho,
espousing a radical interpretation of Maoism developed by Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, a philos-
ophy professor at the National University of San Cristobal in Huamanga. Guzmán advocated
the destruction of existing economic and social institutions and their replacement with Sendero’s
own organizations – neighborhood committees, labor committees, peasant committees, and oth-
ers. Sendero cadres would “militarize” Peruvian society, destroying state forces and bringing “the
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masses” in line with Sendero’s program, using extreme force against anyone who did not submit
to the party’s “democratic centralism” (Palmer 1992; Marks 1992). Not surprisingly, Sendero Lumi-
noso perpetrated most of the violence during the conflict: 31,331 deaths or 54 percent of the total
people killed, compared to 37 percent caused by state agents and 1.8 percent caused by the MRTA
(Willakuy 2004: 18, 183).
The Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) convened by the
Peruvian government to investigate the former political conflict divides the war into five periods.
The first, from May 1980 through December 1982, began when Sendero Luminoso burned ballot
boxes in Cangallo province to protest Peru’s transition from a center-left military dictatorship to
democracy. The period ended when Peru’s new democratic government placed Ayacucho un-
der military control, effectively acknowledging that police could not contain the growing Sendero
insurgency. The second period, from January 1983 through June 1986, began with the militariza-
tion of Ayacucho and ended with simultaneous riots in three prison facilities in the Lima region.
Sendero Luminoso and the government escalated their violence during this period (the government
killed 238 people in the prison riots alone) and the MRTA began its own armed campaign in 1984.
1984 was the bloodiest year of the conflict, with more than 4,000 deaths and disappearances. Dur-
ing the third period, from June 1986 through March 1989, violence spread to all parts of Peru.
This period ended with the attack by Sendero Luminoso and drug traffickers on a police station in
the department of San Martín. This attack convinced the government to adopt a new strategy of
aligning itself with local campesino (peasant) militias, allowing them to take the lead in dislodging
unwelcome Sendero cadres. The fourth period lasted from March 1989 through September 1992.
During this time, the MRTA tried and failed to take control of the city of Tarma, losing many of its
best officers and entering a state of irreversible decline. As the government’s new anti-subversive
strategy loosened Sendero Luminoso’s hold on the countryside, Sendero expanded its operations in
Lima to include “armed strikes” and car bombings. 1989 was the second deadliest year of the con-
flict, precipitating a political crisis and a self-coup (autogolpe) by President Alberto Fujimori, who
assumed quasi-dictatorial powers in April 1992. Despite the chaos, police in Lima apprehended
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Abimael Guzmán and MRTA leader Victor Polay Campos. The fifth period lasted from Guzmán’s
September 1992 capture through November 2000. Reeling from Guzmán’s loss, Sendero Luminoso
slowly succumbed to the government-backed campesino militias. Government forces decisively
defeated the MRTA in an April 22, 1997 gunfight at a Japanese ambassador’s residence, which the
group had occupied in a futile attempt to exchange hostages for imprisoned MRTA officers. Al-
though he had defeated both Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA, President Fujimori fled the country
in November 2000, attempting (unsuccessfully) to avoid prosecution for corruption offenses com-
mitted during his autocratic rule. Fujimori’s flight effectively ended the conflict, although some
Sendero Luminoso elements have remained at large in remote regions, skimming money from the
Peruvian cocaine trade and occasionally carrying out acts of political violence (Willakuy 2004; To-
bar 2002; US State Department 2014).
Although the MRTA styled itself as a guerrilla army, many of its actions followed an armed pro-
paganda model. According to MRTA second-in-command Miguel Rincón Rincón, the MRTA’s
“conception ... of revolution” was “as the work of the masses themselves.” The MRTA’s role was
to act as instigator of an “organic” process, to carry out exemplary acts that would awaken “the
enormous brain of a people, the imagination of millions” of Peruvians, who would take up the
struggle as their own. Rincón explained: “All of our guerrilla actions sought to convey a message
of justice and revolution to our people” (Rincón 2002). MRTA violence was political theater, with
an underlying moral that the group sought to communicate to the masses. The MRTA selected its
targets and tactics accordingly.
Notably, the MRTA did not give warnings when attacking government targets or companies pro-
viding security for government facilities. For instance, on January 14, 1991, the MRTA detonated a
car bomb at a fueling station adjacent to the Interior Ministry building in Lima. The 150 kg bomb
killed two security guards and injured between fifty and one hundred people in the surround-
ing area. On February 5, 1991, the MRTA attacked a facility belonging to the Pesevisa Company, a
subsidiary of the US-based Wackenhut company, which at the time was tasked with protecting the
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US embassy in Lima. The early afternoon attack took place while the Pesevisa building was fully
occupied. MRTA commandos approached the parking area in front of the building, spraying au-
tomatic weapons fire at the building and planting a bomb that killed two Peruvian security guards
outside the building and wounded as many as one hundred people (US State Department 1991: 9).
However, at other times the MRTA attacked business targets with no relation to the Peruvian gov-
ernment or US security apparatus. Frequently, the group attacked businesses representing yanqui
capitalism in Peru. Citibank was a favorite target of the MRTA, as were American chain restau-
rants. In many of these attacks, the MRTA gave warnings before setting off bombs. The MRTA’s
operations against chain restaurants are particularly well documented and offer the best window
into MRTA tactics. The MRTA carried out at least six attacks on Kentucky Fried Chicken restau-
rants, on March 20, 1985 (when three restaurants were attacked simultaneously); June 5, 1990;
February 2, 1991; and February 16, 1991.18 In the March 20, 1985 attacks, the MRTA used incen-
diary devices to destroy the restaurants. In the other attacks, MRTA members carried homemade
bombs into the restaurants and warned patrons to leave immediately. Cambio, a Lima newspaper
that functioned as the mouthpiece of the MRTA, recounted the February 2, 1991 MRTA operation
that left “Kentucky In Ruins”:
[F]our people arrived at the premises, three men and a woman, posing as customers.
One of them placed a travel bag under a dining table, while the woman warned the
dozen attendees to leave the premises, which “would be blown up in a few moments.”
With that said, the visitors and staff moved to safety, away from the premises, as
the rebels took the moment to escape ... Four minutes later a tremendous explosion
brought down the premises’ cement structures, destroying tables, cabinets, and all fur-
niture in the restaurant, without causing deaths (Cambio 1991a: 5).
A US State Department report recounts the February 16, 1991 assault on a Kentucky Fried Chicken
restaurant and a Pizza Hut franchise that shared the same building:
Up to 13 well-dressed MRTA members simultaneously entered both restaurants and
immediately disarmed the restaurant guards. Some of the terrorists then guarded the
exits while others robbed the patrons and cash registers. Still others placed explosive
18Event counts taken from the Global Terrorism Database and US State Department (1990, 1991).
68
devices on the floors of both restaurants. After the explosives were in place, the terror-
ists ordered everyone to leave the premises (US State Department 1991).
The MRTA’s bombs destroyed both restaurants without causing injuries.
The MRTA carried out symbolic actions against other targets as well. The period surrounding the
United States-led Persian Gulf War was particularly significant. On January 25, 1991, the MRTA
rocketed the facade of the US diplomatic embassy in Lima, leaving behind leaflets titled “Gringos
out of the Middle East and Peru!!!” The leaflets previewed the MRTA’s campaign against US busi-
ness targets and symbols of US oppression, in solidarity with “the Iraqi people” and all “peoples
of the third world” (Ibid, 9). The February 2nd and 16th Kentucky Fried Chicken attacks were
part of this campaign, as were attacks on the North American Institute of Peru, a public statue of
former US President John F. Kennedy (described by Cambio as “the smiling face of imperialism for
Latin America”), and several of Peru’s US Binational Centers (BNCs) for education (Ibid. 5).
The MRTA attacked BNC facilities frequently. Between June 25, 1987 and August 22, 1991, the
MRTA attacked Binational Centers as many as sixteen times.19 The BNC attacks tended to occur
at night or in the early morning hours when the buildings were less likely to be occupied. How-
ever, in certain daytime attacks, the BNC facilities did receive bomb warnings, by telephone or
from MRTA members verbally as they overpowered security guards and began placing bombs
inside the buildings (US State Department 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991).
The MRTA’s campaign against American interests also extended to targeting Mormon places of
worship. Cambio rationalized targeting the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS) on the
grounds of the Mormons’ “North American origins and interests.” Between Christmas day, 1989
and May 2, 1991, the MRTA carried out at least twenty-six bomb attacks against LDS churches No
one was killed in the attacks, and only two injuries are reported. The low casualty numbers are
most likely attributable to the MRTA’s choice to attack at night, when the buildings were likely to
19In some cases, no organization claimed responsibility for the attacks.
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be empty. (The two injuries occurred during evening services, of which the MRTA may not have
been aware prior to the attacks.) Documentary sources do not report any pre-attack warnings, but
since the MRTA expected the buildings to be empty, warnings would have seemed unnecessary
to those planning the attacks (US State Department 1989, 1990, 1991).
Which strategic incentives caused the MRTA to give warnings for some attacks but not for others?
First, one should note that all pre-attack warnings were associated with attacks on property tar-
gets. The operational cost of giving warnings (D1 −D2) was relatively low in such cases because
the physical target could not be moved out of the way after a warning was given. Second, the
MRTA’s own statements describe a concerted effort to reduce civilian casualties.
According to Miguel Rincón, the MRTA planned all of its attacks “to ensure that the blow only
affected those it ought to affect” (Rincón 2002: 49). The MRTA fully intended to harm government
officials and private contractors involved in counter-revolutionary efforts. Those people were at-
tacked directly, without warning. But when the MRTA attacked symbolic targets – the bust of JFK,
Citibank, Kentucky Friend Chicken, and the US Binational Centers – the MRTA primarily sought
the spectacle of destroyed yanqui property (“Kentucky in Ruins,” as Cambio put it). Killing civilian
people inside that property was beside the point, and actually counterproductive because it un-
dercut the MRTA’s humanitarian appeals to would-be supporters.
Interviewed years later by the truth commission, MRTA leader Victor Polay explained that the
MRTA chose more discriminate tactics to differentiate itself from the extreme violence of Sendero
Luminoso and the “corporate and fascist” conduct of the government (Polay 2002: 41). The MRTA
made sure to emphasize the discrimination of its attacks when claiming responsibility for them
(via Cambio). Sparing civilians fit the MRTA’s intended public image as the moderate revolution-
ary group, capable of drawing in reformist elements of the legal left even as it waged an armed
campaign against the Peruvian state. As one demonstration of its moderation, the MRTA claimed
to uphold the same international laws of war that state actors are obligated to uphold. One of the
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MRTA’s critiques of both the Peruvian government and Sendero Luminoso was that neither orga-
nization observed the Geneva Conventions. In the early 1990’s, the MRTA sought the mediation
of the International Committee of the Red Cross to negotiate the release of nine policemen cap-
tured by the MRTA in a raid. An MRTA agent contacted Red Cross officials in Geneva, requesting
their assistance in addition to the assistance the MRTA had already sought from Catholic Church
officials. In a public statement, the MRTA affirmed the Red Cross’s view that the conflict in Peru
“must be conducted with the strictest respect for the norms of international humanitarian law.”
Cambio touted the Red Cross’s subsequent willingness to deal with the MRTA as “virtual recog-
nition of the MRTA as a belligerent force by the Red Cross.” According to Cambio, this was “a
new and important factor” in the trajectory of the conflict (Cambio 1991b: 9). Sendero Luminoso
could not claim Red Cross recognition, and such recognition placed the MRTA in elite company:
At the time, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and the Salvadoran FMLN were the only Latin American
guerrilla organizations recognized as Geneva Conventions compliant. The Red Cross’s recogni-
tion, and the government’s unwillingness to participate in mediated negotiations, also gave the
MRTA a moral stick with which to beat the Peruvian regime. Victor Polay stated at the time: “The
government wants to keep the International Red Cross out in order to continue perpetrating its
atrocities. ... When a government doesn’t want the Red Cross [involved] it is because they are
hiding atrocities” (Idem).
The MRTA’s propaganda narrative depended on maintaining the moral high ground so that a
wide cross-section of Peruvians would flock to the group’s banner. No-warning bombings would
have sabotaged the group’s message and alienated those the MRTA sought to “awaken.” The
political cost (X) for causing excessive casualties was high.
4.4 Sendero Luminoso
Sendero Luminoso, on the other hand, showed no compunction about using extreme and indis-
criminate violence. The group’s no-warning car bombings on civilian targets in Lima offer a stark
contrast to the MRTA’s commercial bombings in the same city. On June 5th, 1992, Sendero Luminoso
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exploded five bombs simultaneously, including a 1,200 pound truck bomb outside of the Canal 2
television station, killing five people, wounding twenty, and knocking the TV station offline in
mid-broadcast. On July 16 of the same year, Sendero cadres detonated a 1,000 pound car bomb on
Tarata street in the affluent Miraflores neighborhood, killing twenty five people and wounding
155. On September 6, Sendero Luminoso detonated a 700 pound car bomb at a gas station, killing
seven people and wounding ten.20
These car bombs are just a small sample of Sendero’s atrocities. Throughout the conflict, Sendero
Luminoso showed a consistent pattern of violence toward civilians. Violence had an almost sacra-
mental quality for the group. Abimael Guzmán spoke of a “blood quota” that senderistas and “the
masses” would have to pay for the transformation of their society. Sendero cadres’ willingness
to “cross the river of blood” showed their devotion to Guzmán and to his revolutionary vision,
a belief system that was “all-powerful because it is true” (Willakuy 2004: 38, 326-327; Degregori
1992: 43). This belief system held that “the war itself forges the militant,” or in the words of one
patriotic song, “Blood does not drown the revolution, but irrigates it” (McClintock 1992: 230).
Sendero Luminoso’s logic of violence was essentially the reverse of the MRTA’s: Rather than at-
tacking symbolic targets and setting an example by sparing civilians, Sendero attacked civilian
targets to make a symbolic example of them. Sendero was avowedly brutal toward the “class
enemies” who stood in the way of Guzmán’s campaign of purification. A 1980 Sendero commu-
niqué spoke of “putting a noose around the neck of imperialism and reactionary forces; they will
be grabbed by the throat, choked and, when necessary, strangled. The flesh of the reactionaries
will wither and be shredded, and the black scraps will be submerged in the mud, what remains
will be burned” (Willakuy 2004: 99). Sendero was also cruel toward “the masses” when they re-
fused to participate in the revolutionary struggle. In one of the most infamous atrocities of the
Peruvian conflict, Sendero cadres massacred 69 peasants in the town of Lucanamarca, which had
resisted Sendero’s attempts to reorganize it. According to Guzmán, the March 1983 massacre was
20See UPI 1992; Toledo Blade 1992; Willakuy 2004: 70; and GTD incident summary: http://www.start.
umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199209060008.
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intended “to strike a massive blow and reprimand [the peasants], making them understand that
they were dealing with another kind of people’s combatants, that they were not dealing with the
kind of combatants that operated earlier... we were willing to do anything to gain everything”
(Willakuy 2004: 129). Finally, Sendero Luminoso was not above sacrificing the loyal masses in the
broader interest of remaking Peruvian society. Guzmán, for example, advocated provocative ac-
tions against Peru’s government, which had difficulty distinguishing Sendero guerrillas from the
campesino populations in which they hid. By striking forcefully and melting back into the villages
and towns, Sendero hoped to provoke collective punishment by the government, to “induce geno-
cide” to expose the state’s oppressive nature and demonstrate the moral superiority of Sendero’s
vision (Willakuy 2004: 38, 326-327). (The MRTA, in its few ill-fated forays into the country, wore
military garb, specifically to prevent government retaliation against civilians.)
When Sendero brought its campaign from Ayacucho to Lima, the organization brought with it
Guzmán’s philosophy of using extreme violence to shock, intimidate, or provoke. In its early at-
tempts to gain a foothold in Lima, Sendero followed a strategy of infiltrating unions and social
groups and attempting to place its members in leadership roles. The strategy failed, in large part
because unions were dominated by mainstream, urban leftism like that of the MRTA. To gain trac-
tion, Sendero commenced a new effort to “lead the masses to resistance” with a campaign of agita-
tion and intimidation, including a new tactic, the “armed strike” (Willakuy 2004: 157-158). Armed
strikes were essentially general strikes forced upon city residents, particularly transit workers who
would normally carry people on the way to their respective jobs. Those who violated the strike
would be killed in exemplary fashion – in the case of some bus and taxi drivers, by being strapped
into their vehicles and burned.21
At roughly the same time that it introduced armed strikes, Sendero Luminoso began a wave of
no-warning car bombings in Lima (Willakuy 2004: 422). To understand Sendero’s use of the car
bomb, one has to account for the group’s strategic position on the cusp of the 1990’s. Sendero had
21This insight drawn from an interview of a witness to one burning; see also Willakuy 2004: 168; Marks
1992: 196.
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suffered major setbacks in rural areas, the heartland of its Maoist revolution. Peasants alienated by
Sendero’s brutality expelled the group’s cadres from many areas. Sensing the shift of momentum
away from Sendero in the countryside, Guzmán announced that the group had achieved “strategic
equilibrium” and could now lay the groundwork for the final “Conquest of Power” in urban cen-
ters (Willakuy 2004: 158). In fact, Guzmán’s strategy was a desperate one: convince cadres that
victory is “just around the corner,” destabilize a capitol city already reeling from economic and
political crises, and provoke a United States intervention that would make Sendero’s war a “war
of national salvation” (Willakuy 2004: 161-163).
Although it was cloaked in Maoist revolutionary language, Sendero’s shift toward the cities was ac-
tually a grand provocation, designed to make Sendero look stronger than it was, and Lima less sta-
ble than it was. The plan required spectacular attacks, and the car bomb was the perfect weapon.
Completely indiscriminate when used without advance warnings, these car bombs caused sub-
stantial loss of life – five in the Canal 2 bombing, twenty five in the Tarata bombing, and seven
in the Lima petrol station bombing, to name just a few incidents. Although Sendero carried out
grander atrocities outside of Lima, the car bombings came to symbolize the worst of Sendero’s
campaign to many Peruvians. This in itself validates Guzmán’s analysis, that Lima was “a drum”
to be beaten, and a “sound box” that would amplify what Sendero did and said, making the group
seem stronger and more threatening to domestic and international audiences (Guzmán 2003: 17;
Willakuy 2004: 80).
It is reasonable to ask whether Sendero Luminoso could have achieved the same publicity effects
by setting off car bombs with warning. The IRA’s bombs in London had gained international at-
tention, despite killing very few people. Couldn’t lower casualty car bombs in Lima have done
the same? The answer is probably yes, but the question would only have arisen in Sendero’s mind
if the group had perceived a down side to killing large numbers of civilians in Lima. Sendero was
quite willing to engage in civilian targeting generally, and in Lima, the group had even less reason
to worry about the cost (X) of atrocities.
74
Simply put, Lima was not the Sendero Luminoso heartland. Sendero originated in the university
community in Ayacucho among a largely mestizo (mixed European/native Peruvian) student pop-
ulation. Very often, these recruits were the first generation in their family to learn to read. A
sagging rural economy, the rapid expansion of college education, and Guzmán’s charismatic in-
terpretation of Maoism combined to produce a uniquely radical result. Senderismo could never
have emerged from Lima’s political culture, which was more stable, ethnically more European,
and more hospitable to a conventional rebel group like the MRTA. When Sendero began its cam-
paign in Lima in the late 1980’s, it was still drawing most of its support from rural bases. In this
sense, Sendero was foreign to Lima’s urban environs. Its situation was unlike that of the MRTA,
which carried out bombings in its home community. As a student of Mao, Abimael Guzmán
would have been quite familiar with the “fish and the sea” metaphor relating the local commu-
nity to the guerrilla.22 For Sendero Luminoso, the “sea” was in Ayacucho. By committing atrocities
in Lima, Sendero Luminoso was not polluting its own waters, but somebody else’s. Facing no loss
of core political support if it harmed civilians in Lima, Sendero faced a very low penalty (X) for
excessive killing. As my theory predicts in such cases, Sendero Luminoso gave no warnings before
setting off its car bombs.
4.5 Discussion
An astute analysis by the RAND Corporation observes that, compared to Sendero Luminoso, the
MRTA enjoyed “a much broader base of natural appeal within Peruvian society.” Because of its
APRA pedigree and inclusive message, the MRTA could relate its own struggle to many other
Peruvians’ lives. At the same time, the MRTA’s ideology was left “deliberately ill-defined” in
an effort to incorporate reformist elements of existing institutions in both urban and rural areas.
Driven by Guzmán’s Manichean ideology, Sendero Luminoso shunned existing institutions and cre-
ated “countervailing institution[s]” “from the bottom up,” giving the group “a secure foundation
among elements of Peru’s rural population” (McCormick 1993: 52, 55). In essence, the MRTA
22This metaphor was cited by nearly all IRA interviewees as a reason to avoid harming civilians in their
home community.
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sought a within-system revolution, attempting to rally support and seize control of existing insti-
tutions. Of course, a group intending to make broader political appeals can afford to offend fewer
people, and its political cost for causing excessive casualties will be higher. Sendero Luminoso, seek-
ing to destroy what existed and replace it with a new society, a society it was already building in
the hinterlands, had a freer hand to target civilians outside its zone of control.
The broad similarities between the MRTA and Sendero Luminoso allow us to identify the sources of
their divergent warning behavior very precisely. The difference cannot be explained by divergent
operational costs of warning (D1−D2) because they engaged in different behavior when attacking
similar physical targets with bombs in Lima. Nor can the difference be explained by differences in
the mobilization costs (G) that each could impose on the government. The MRTA gave its warn-
ings directly to civilians, cutting the government out of the process completely. Sendero could have
done the same, had it chosen to. The MRTA and Sendero adopted different warning behaviors be-
cause of different political costs for harming civilians. The group fighting on its own turf, with
an ideology and mobilization strategy that required it to make broad political appeals, opted to
warn. The anti-system revolutionaries, with a lesser degree of political accountability (particularly
in Lima) opted not to warn, because the costs for harming civilians were dramatically lower.
4.6 Summary of Hypothesis Testing So Far
In general, my case studies of the IRA, ETA, the LTTE, Sendero Luminoso, and the MRTA uphold
my theory of pre-attack warnings. The IRA, ETA, and the MRTA gave warnings because these
groups perceived political costs (X) for causing excessive civilian casualties. The LTTE and Shin-
ing Path faced lower costs for causing civilian casualties, and neither group gave warnings. This
result confirms H1, derived from my theoretical model.
Although sparing civilians was the primary purpose of IRA and ETA warnings, these groups also
took advantage of the opportunity to impose additional costs (G) on the British and Spanish gov-
ernments, via ambushes and the forced evacuation of commercial targets. The role of government
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mobilization costs is harder to assess in other cases. The LTTE did not give warnings so esti-
mating the government’s costs is difficult. Although the MRTA did give warnings, it gave them
to civilians directly, and the government played no role in evacuations. (This, in itself confirms
a different prediction of the model, that a high cost for targeting civilians can justify pre-attack
warnings even if there is no added utility from government mobilization.) With regard to H2, my
case studies confirm it to the extent that the evidence will allow direct tests.
It is also true that the IRA, ETA, and the MRTA gave warnings only for attacks in which they
sought to target property. In such cases, the operational cost of giving a warning (D1−D2) is low,
because the real target of the attack is an object or location, which cannot flee the attack if warned
in advance. Targeting physical objects is not itself a sufficient condition for giving warnings, be-
cause the perpetrating group might be largely indifferent to civilian casualties (as the LTTE and
Sendero Luminoso were). But the targeting of property is a common thread uniting the observed
examples of pre-attack warnings. This evidence supports H3.
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5 Quantitative Analysis
In this portion of my dissertation, I use statistical analyses to test hypotheses derived from my
theory of warnings. Most fundamentally, I seek to determine whether the political cost of harm-
ing civilians motivates militant groups to give warnings (the logic of H1). A quantitative analysis
allows me to test this hypothesis on a much larger universe of cases than I could using interview
methods alone. It also allows me to test additional hypotheses. Some of these are refinements of
H1. In order to test a theory about the costs of civilian targeting, one has to operationalize and
measure the concept of “cost.” Where do costs come from, and how do we know if they are high?
My case studies show that militant groups are politically vulnerable when they depend on local
populations for shelter, recruits, and material support. In cases like that of the IRA, where mil-
itants are living in supporters’ homes, they must be very careful not to offend their hosts. The
government’s level of human rights abuse sets an example for what may be considered offensive.
As Lomperis (1996) argues, militants must win “the right to govern” by moral force, not brute
force. A group that is highly dependent on local populations for support, and which fights a rel-
atively non-abusive government, must be careful not to appear more atrocious than the state, lest
local populations withdraw their support. This discussion yields two hypotheses, each a testable
refinement of my original H1:
H1a: Militants who depend heavily on local support are more likely to give pre-attack warnings.
H1b: Militants fighting a non-abusive government are more likely to give pre-attack warnings.
My case studies also show that militant groups with maximalist goals (understood as the full
takeover or dissolution of the existing political regime) may calculate political costs and benefits
differently from groups with moderate aims. This issue arose in my case studies of the MRTA and
Sendero Luminoso. Although the MRTA was a Marxist/Leninist group seeking to overthrow a pro-
US capitalist regime, the MRTA adopted a conciliatory stance toward moderates and reformist
elements of existing social institutions – even the Catholic Church. Sendero Luminoso sought to de-
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stroy all existing institutions and replace them. A group that plans to destroy institutions has no
need to placate them – to appeal to moderates or reformists whose offices the group plans to raze.
In Abimael Guzmán’s words, Sendro Luminoso could “do anything to gain everything”(Willakuy
2004: 129). Shapiro (2013: 152) notes a similar pattern in his comparison of Communist and An-
archist revolutionary groups in early 20th Century Russia. Unlike the Communists, who saw
some portions of the political system as incrementally useful in advancing their revolution, the
anarchists sought sweeping social change immediately. Given their hostility toward existing in-
stitutions, the anarchists “defined as a legitimate target anyone who profited from the existing
economic system or protected it ... anyone who was an agent of the state, who had money, or
who frequented an establishment serving the bourgeoisie and upper classes was a good target.”
Shapiro quotes one historical anarchist as asking, “Would it make any difference which bourgeois
one throws the bomb at?” This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H1c: Militants with maximalist goals are less likely to give pre-attack warnings.
There is a related argument in the academic literature on terrorism by religious organizations.
Hoffman (2006: 89) writes:
[R]eligious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving
but as “outsiders” seeking fundamental changes ... This sense of alienation ... enables
the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist
operations ... indeed to embrace a far more open-ended category of ‘enemies’ for attack
– that is, anyone who is not a member of the terrorists’ religion or religious sect.
By this logic, today’s Islamist groups could justify indiscriminate attacks against non-Muslims,
apostate Muslims, and Muslims who prop up westernized Arab regimes. Politically, it may be
less costly for an Islamist group to engage in indiscriminate violence because the group does not
intend to persuade people outside a small core group of fervent believers. Those believers share
the militants’ Manichean view of guilt and innocence, so they are unlikely to withdraw their sup-
port if the group engages in indiscriminate violence toward unbelievers. This discussion yields a
fourth hypothesis:
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H1d: Religiously motivated militants are less likely to give pre-attack warnings.
I test these hypotheses using a substantial amount of new data collected specifically for this
project.
5.1 Research Design
My plan for the quantitative analysis is as follows. I use the START consortium’s Global Ter-
rorism Database (GTD) to identify a list of bombing incidents in which the perpetrating groups
could have chosen to give warnings. I focus on attacks on civilians, because my case studies have
shown that this is the only type of attack in which one might expect militants to give a warning.
The case studies have also shown that not all groups give warnings when attacking civilians –
and this is the interesting behavioral variation I hope to explain. Among all bombings of civilian
targets, I further narrow my analysis to attacks by groups that carried out at least one hundred
civilian bombing attacks. I filter the observations in this way because of a concern that short-
lived or relatively “unproductive” militant groups (in the sense of producing bombings) may not
achieve enough notoriety for historical news sources to carry detailed reports of their attacks. If
groups do not draw sufficient press coverage (or sufficiently detailed coverage) I may not be able
to “observe” their warnings, and this may bias my results. There is also a chance that filtering the
observations in this way may introduce a different type of bias, particularly if the age or “produc-
tivity” of a militant group is somehow correlated with its propensity to warn. I have no reason
to suspect this at the outset. However, in the concluding chapter, I do discuss the possibility of
lowering the attack count threshold for inclusion as a subsequent extension of my research.
My case universe contains roughly 8,400 attacks by thirty-seven different organizations. I use
news reportage from the LexisNexis database, State Department reports, the Global Terrorism
Database’s event summaries, and other historical material to determine whether the perpetrator
of each attack gave a warning in advance. I consider a variety of sources to maximize my chance
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of finding any information on an attack, which can then be cross-checked against other sources
if the first source is too vague. Some militant groups do not receive as much coverage in Lexis-
Nexis, for instance, because they operate in parts of the world without many English-language
newspapers. In such cases, State Department reports can be a useful source to check, if the group
carried out any attacks on US targets. The Global Terrorism Database summaries are particularly
useful for coding more recent attacks, including in non-English speaking regions. Using a variety
of available sources, and tasking research assistants to spend roughly six minutes coding each at-
tack, I generated a database of roughly 4,700 “hits” – usable data points where secondary sources
permitted a confident coding that there had or had not been a warning.
In addition to a dichotomous outcome variable indicating warnings, I incorporate data on groups’
access to foreign state support and territorial bases (factors making a group less dependent on
local popular support). I also incorporate data on human rights abuses by each militant group’s
target state. Finally, I incorporate information on the scope of groups’ political goals – changing
the political system in place, or destroying it entirely. At the event level, I use logistic regression
to determine whether these covariates predict warning behavior by the perpetrating group.
5.2 Operationalization and Measurement
Unit of Analysis
To establish a universe of cases, I filter all Global Terrorism Database (GTD) entries to include in-
cidents where the attack type ( attacktype1) is given as “Bombing/Explosion” and target type (tar-
gettype1) is a category other than “military,” “police,” “violent political party,” or “terrorists/non-
state militia.”23 In addition to focusing my analysis on cases where a warning might be observed,
filtering observations in this way also conforms to the most common definition of “terrorism” as
politically motivated attacks on civilian targets. Although I do not find it especially useful to de-
bate which organizations are “terrorist” in character, I do believe that this unit of analysis makes
23Attacks on other security-related targets, such as intelligence agents, defense and judicial system bu-
reaucrats, and heads of state are omitted when historical source materials identify these types of people as
an attack’s primary target.
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for more direct contributions to the academic literature on terrorism as a behavioral phenomenon
and military tactic.
I use several other criteria to restrict my analysis to bombing cases where warning was a feasi-
ble tactic. These exclusion criteria are:
• Omitting attacks on “utilities” and “telecommunications” (according to GTD’s coding of
target type). Many militant groups attack physical infrastructure (high tension power lines,
mobile phone towers, etc.) in remote areas where there are no people to warn. No warning
is possible (or necessary) so it does not make sense to include these bombings in the case
universe.
• Omitting attacks on vacant buildings and other uninhabited sites. Militant groups may at-
tack under-construction buildings, empty warehouses, and businesses “after hours.” Be-
cause there is little point to giving a warning in such cases, it does not make sense to include
them.
• Omitting attacks where the weapon was a projectile (e.g. a mortar or rocket), a letter bomb,
an incendiary device, a land mine, a noise bomb, or a leaflet bomb. (These attacks are identi-
fied based on the GTD’s weaptype1 and weapsubtype1 variable). In these incidents, a warning
was either unfeasible (in the case of rockets, mortars, letter bombs, and mines) or unlikely to
affect casualty counts (in the case of incendiaries, noise bombs, and leaflets), so it would not
have made sense for the perpetrator group to give a warning.
• Omitting unsuccessful attacks (coded 0 by GTD’s success variable). Many of these attacks
were thwarted before a warning could have been given — because the bombers were ap-
prehended or because bombs (and bombers) detonated prematurely. GTD’s unsuccessful at-
tacks also include cases where undetonated explosives were found, but it is unclear whether
the perpetrator intended to detonate them or whether they merely dumped them at a loca-
tion after calling off a planned attack. In any of these scenarios, we have no way of “observ-
ing” warnings. Moreover, we cannot necessarily discern the perpetrator’s intended target, to
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determine whether it was civilian or military in nature. I deal with these information prob-
lems by excluding attacks coded as unsuccessful by the GTD. In excluding them, I avoid
biases that might result from bundling military attacks into the analysis, or coding attacks
as non-warning when in fact the perpetrator intended to give a warning. It is possible, how-
ever, that leaving the attacks out also introduces bias – for instance, if many of the unsuc-
cessful attacks failed because a warning was given. The information available on GTD’s failed
attacks is generally vague, so it is difficult to determine how many attacks fit this descrip-
tion. By excluding unsuccessful attacks, I may lose some actual or intended warnings from
the dataset. This is a worthwhile tradeoff, because including unsuccessful attacks would
introduce data points I already know to be problematic.
As noted above, I restrict the analysis to include only attacks by groups that carried out at least 100
bombings – 37 groups in total. This restriction excludes groups whose limited notoriety decreases
the coverage their attacks receive in newspapers and other historical sources used to code the
dependent variable (warnings). Regardless of whether a group gives a warning, a lower level of
press interest means fewer news stories (and fewer words per story) on any given attack by that
group. A lack of press interest creates a form of (under)reporting bias that would understate the
number of warnings given by less prolific militant groups. The 100 bombing criterion reduces the
possibility of such bias. The groups included in my sample are:
• Abu Sayyaf Group
• African National Congress
• Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq
• Al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula
• Al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb
• Al-Shabaab
• Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation
of Armenia (ASALA)
• Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
• Boko Haram
• Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-
M)
• Corsican National Liberation Front
(FLNC)
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• Corsican National Liberation Front
(FLNC) Historic Channel
• Dev Sol
• Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN)
• First of October Antifascist Resistance
(GRAPO)




• Irish Republican Army (IRA)
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
• Movement of April 19 (M-19)
• Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)
• Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
• Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR
- Chile)
• National Liberation Army of Colombia
(ELN)
• National Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola (UNITA)
• New People’s Army (NPA)
• Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)
• Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
• Palestinian Islamic Jihad
• Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC)
• Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
• Taliban (Afghanistan)
• Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
• Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA)
• United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
My dataset covers the years 1970 through 2012, with 2013 and 2014 data to be added in a future
update. The independent variables I code for these incidents include:
Dependent Variable: Warning
My dependent variable is a dichotomous 0/1 indicator of whether the perpetrator group gave a
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warning in advance of the attack. “Warnings” are defined as some form of advance notice given
about the specific attack in question, including telephone calls to police or emergency services,
phone calls to the owners of targeted businesses, in-person warnings to people at the scene in-
forming them of the presence of a bomb and instructing them to leave, and notes placed at the
scene indicating the presence of a time bomb. Another tactic counted as warning is the forcible
removal of people at the scene of an attack — for instance, disarming a security guard and lead-
ing her/him away from the targeted location at gunpoint. Non-specific “threats” are not counted
as warnings, however. Examples include informing a business owner that if s/he does not pay
protection money, the business will be bombed; issuing statements promising bomb attacks if the
government does not grant a concession; and promising to attack people who vote or defy an
“armed strike” declared by militants. Those restrictions notwithstanding, categorical warnings
are counted. Examples include a promise to bomb polling places or state-run universities during
a specific week; warning women to stay away from a particular mosque during a specific week;
and telephone calls and online messages promising attacks in a particular town at a specific hour.24
I employed undergraduate research assistants to code the warning variable, based on a detailed
search and coding protocol. The protocol provided research assistants with a set of search terms
to enter into the Lexis Nexis news database, a searchable electronic database containing newspa-
per, magazine, radio, television, and news wire reportage from American and international media
sources. Research assistants specified a date range for each search: one day before the bombing
event through two days after the event. Specifying the time window in this way maximizes the
chance of “observing” both the bombing itself and any mention of warnings given prior to the
bombing in news coverage of the event. The search terms themselves included the common name
(or names) of the group, the boolean term “bomb!” and the term “warn!”. If these searches failed
to generate hits, research assistants widened the search by removing the term “warn!,” using any
24Categorical warnings are noted using a dummy variable, non-specific, with a comment field explaining
the nature of the warning and why it was included. The non-specific field is also used to identify general
warnings that were not included, with comments explaining the nature of the warning and the reason for
its exclusion.
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hits to confirm that a bombing had taken place and that no warning had been given.25 In cases
where Lexis Nexis contained no information on a bombing, research assistants used other sources
to find information about the events: the US State Department’s yearly Significant Incidents of Polit-
ical Violence Against Americans reports, as well as the Global Terrorism Database’s own “summary”
field, which contains a brief summary of certain bombing incidents – typically those occurring in
recent years and those affecting American targets. Using these procedures, research assistants
were able to code 4,670 of the 8,413 bombings in the case universe.
Independent Variables
I use my case studies to inform the operationalization of my theory’s independent variables. The
most important factor affecting militant warning behavior is the political cost of causing civil-
ian casualties. In the IRA, ETA, and MRTA case studies, the cost of killing civilians was largely
determined by a group’s dependence on voluntary support from local communities. If national-
ist community members had denied the IRA access to their homes, the group would have been
apprehended and imprisoned en masse. ETA’s political legitimacy among Basques was heavily
dependent on its adherence to “revolutionary ethics.” When it violated the ethical principle of
civilian immunity, the Basque public aligned with anti-ETA Spanish parties, freezing the group
out of political negotiations that could otherwise have helped the group to achieve its goals. The
MRTA’s political strategy depended on raising popular support among urban moderates. Without
a major presence in the country’s interior, the tiny group operated clandestinely in cities, carrying
out armed propaganda to mobilize “the masses.” By attacking yanqis and the government, and
sparing innocent Peruvian citizens, the group hoped to mobilize a broad coalition of students, la-
bor activists, and reformist Catholic clergy. Because of their material and political dependence on
local populations, these three groups were obliged to uphold local people’s norms of revolution-
ary conduct.
The LTTE and Sendero Luminoso were not so obliged. We can trace the relative autonomy of these
25Research assistants were also instructed to broaden the search even further if necessary, simply search-
ing for the name of the perpetrator group in news coverage within a week of the attack.
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group to specific factors – for instance, the groups’ control of territory where they could raise taxes
and recruit coercively. The LTTE also benefited from the support of Indian intelligence agents who
trained and equipped the group. These two factors, territorial strongholds and foreign state sup-
port, made these groups much less dependent on local support. Without that dependence, the
LTTE and Sendero could afford to violate the humanitarian norms of local populations.
I operationalize the material and political autonomy of militant groups in terms of their access
to territorial strongholds and state support. I measure these factors using information from the
Big Allied And Dangerous (BAAD 1) dataset created by (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008b). Specifically,
I use the following variables:
• TerrStrong – a 0/1 dummy variable indicating whether a militant group possessed a territo-
rial stronghold on the territory of the target state or outside the state’s borders. The BAAD
1 database has a single coding for each group, applied to all years covered in the database
(1998-2005). My dataset includes the years 1970-2012, so some groups in my analysis do
not appear in the BAAD 1. I have created my own codings of the TerrStrong variable for
those groups, based on the START consortium’s Terrorist Organization Profiles (Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) N.d.) and secondary historical literature on
each group. My codings of each group are listed in the quantitative analysis portion of the
appendix.
• Statespond – a 0/1 dummy variable indicating whether a group was supported by a na-
tional government, with the same coding applied to all years of that group’s existence. For
groups not included in the BAAD database due to the database’s date range, I have coded
the variable based on TOPS profiles and other secondary literature. (See the appendix for
the codings of all 37 perpetrator groups.)
I sum the values of the BAAD’s TerrStrong and Statespond to create a single variable, Autonomy,
with whole number values ranging from 0 to 2. This variable represents a militant group’s rela-
tive autonomy from local populations who might provide it with material, financial, or political
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support. Summing the BAAD’s variables into a single Autonomy measure captures the intuition
that a group with a stronghold and state support is even more autonomous than a group with only
a stronghold or a state patron. It also reduces the number of dummy variables in the regression
model, and therefore the potential for multicollinearity among two or more of the dummies. I
report logit results using the original BAAD dummy variables in the appendix, showing that their
transformation into a single variable has not substantially changed my findings.
In addition to the Autonomy variable indicating the perpetrator group’s relative independence
or dependence on local support, I include a variable expressing the extent of human rights abuse
by the militant group’s target state. Humanitarian abuses by the government are another permis-
sive factor, which may decrease the group’s political costs for harming civilians. Recalling the IRA
case study, Danny Morrison explained that Irish nationalists “weren’t that oppressed," and there
could be no justification for "indiscriminate actions” by the IRA. In the LTTE case, however, the
Black July pogroms and the Sri Lankan government’s apparent complicity helped convince Tamils
that the LTTE’s attacks on civilians were “a necessary evil,” in the words of M.A. Sumanthiran.
Government abuses give a militant group political maneuvering room, helping it to justify its own
indiscriminate attacks, if it chooses to carry them out. To represent this permissive factor, I include
a variable from another existing database:
• Political Terror Scale (PTS) – a five point scale indicating the degree of human rights abuse
perpetrated by a state within its borders. Developed by Gibney (2015), the Political Terror
Scale assigns scores to each state, ranging from 1 to 5. A PTS score of 1 indicates that abuses
such as torture are “rare or exceptional;” a score of 5 indicates that abuse “has expanded to
the whole population,” and that leaders “place no limits” on the coercive tools they use to
shape citizens’ behavior. The PTS score for each state is based on US State Department and
Amnesty International yearly reports on human rights abuse. There are two variants, “S”
(coded from State Department reports) and “A” (coded from Amnesty International reports).
The scores are largely congruent. I rely on the “A” version, except in cases where the lack
of Amnesty International data prevented the PTS researchers from assigning a score to a
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particular country. In such cases, I use the PTS “S” version’s score for the country in that
particular year. For each incident in my dataset, code the variable PTS to indicate the PTS
score of the militant group’s target state. I define “target state” as the state the militant group
is attempting to coerce. For instance, the target state of Hamas is Israel; the target state
of Shining Path is Peru; the target state of the African National Congress is South Africa.
The target state is usually but not always the state in which the physical attack takes place.
ETA attacks on French soil, for instance, are still part of a campaign to coerce Spain, and as
such are coded with the PTS score of Spain during the year of the attack. In the appendix I
provide a table showing each militant group in association with its target state, whose yearly
Political Terror Scale score is given in the PTS field for all of that group’s attacks in a given
year. Because the original Political Terror Scale only covers the years 1976 to the present, I
extrapolate a PTS score to any attack carried out in the years 1970-1975. My coding rule for
these attacks is to apply the target state’s Political Terror Scale coding for 1976 to attacks in
1970-1975. There are only 73 such attacks in my dataset, 72 of which targeted the US and UK,
countries that scored “1” in 1976 and nearly all other years. The one remaining incident was
an ETA attack on Spain, which in 1976 scored a “2” – the country’s modal and median score
for all other years in the original dataset. Given the consistency of these countries’ scores, I
am confident that my extrapolation for the years 1970-1975 does not bias my results.
In addition to these variables indicating the militant group’s degree of autonomy from local pop-
ulations, I include two variables characterizing the group’s motivations and political goals. These
are:
• Maximalist – a 0/1 dummy variable indicating whether the perpetrator group’s political goal
is complete takeover or dissolution of the state, as opposed to a limited goal like secession
by an ethnic enclave. This variable is coded primarily based on TOPs profiles. Groups coded
“1” for Maximalist include Islamists like Al Qa’ida in Iraq (seeking a regional caliphate that
replaces the Westphalian state system) and the African National Congress (seeking the dis-
solution and replacement of the apartheid system). Ethnic secessionists like the IRA, ETA,
and the LTTE are coded as “0,” having a limited political aim that can be granted by the
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target state without a need for regime change or the dissolution of the state itself. Maoist
and Leninist groups are generally coded “1” because of their sweeping transformative aims.
(Although the MRTA apperas to be a very a moderate group in comparison with Sendero Lu-
minoso, my coding rule classifies the MRTA as maximalist.) A full list of Maximalist codings
may be found in the appendix.
• Religion/Islam – a 0/1 dummy variable indicating whether the group’s violent campaign is
motivated at least in part by religion. This variable is imported directly from the BAAD
database. The database’s ContainRelig variable indicates whether a militant group is moti-
vated at least in part by religion. The database assigns a single coding to each group for
all the years of its existence. For groups whose campaigns did not overlap the database’s
coverage, I have assigned a coding based on TOPs profiles and other secondary sources. Be-
cause of the groups and years covered by my dataset, the only religiously motivated groups
are motivated by Islam. For clarity, I name the variable Religion/Islam. I give a list of Re-
ligion/Islam codings in the appendix. It is important to note that the Religion/Islam variable
does not differentiate groups that are motivated only by religion from groups that are only
in part motivated by religion. Nor does it imply maximalism by religious groups. A group
like Hamas, for instance, could be both religious and limited in its political aims, seeking
the independence of Palestine, but not necessarily the establishment of a regional Islamic
caliphate. As such, it can be appropriate to include the Maximalist and Religion/Islam vari-
ables in the same regression model.
For exploratory purposes and as controls, I create a set of dummy variables indicating the types
of targets attacked in each bombing. It is possible that the probability of pre-attack warnings
differs depending on the nature of the target – or that the inclusion of these variables changes
the substantive or statistical signficance of one of the main variables related to militants’ costs for
harming civilians. These dummy variables are derived from the GTD’s targettype variable, which
I have recoded to reduce the number of categories:
• Tourists – attacks for which the GTD’s targettype specifies the target as “Tourists.”
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• Business – attacks for which the GTD’s targettype specifies the target as “Business.”
• Government – attacks for which the GTD’s targettype specifies the target as “Government
(Diplomatic)” or “Government (General).”
• PrivateCitizens – attacks for which the GTD’s targettype specifies the target as “Private Citi-
zens & Property.”
• CivilSociety – attacks for which the GTD’s targettype specifies the target as “Educational In-
stitution,” “Journalists & Media,” “Religious Figures/Institutions,” or “NGO.”
• Infrastructure – attacks for which the GTD’s targettype specifies the target as “Airports and
Aircraft,” “Maritime,” “Transportation,” or “Food or Water Supply.”
The GTD’s targettype variable also indicates that some attacks were directed toward “Other” and
“Unknown” targets. Estimating coefficients on these target types would mean very little, so in
specifications using target type dummy variables, I omit attacks on “Other” and “Unknown” tar-
gets. Unless otherwise noted, models containing the target type dummy variables use Government
as the base category. (Correlationally, this is the category of attack least associated with warnings
by the attacking group.)
I include a dummy variable, Europe, indicating whether an attack took place on the European
continent. The variable is based on the GTD’s region_ loc variable, which includes codes for at-
tacks in both Eastern Europe and Western Europe. My dataset includes 596 attacks in Western
Europe and only one in Eastern Europe. Combining these into a single category gives a dummy
variable, Europe, with 597 “1” values and 2,626 “0” values indicating attacks in other regions. I use
Europe to test an alternative theory – albeit a crude one – to explain why we see pre-attack warn-
ings in some cases but not in others. The theory, simply put, is that Europeans give pre-attack
warnings, for some reason related to their European cultural lineage. This is an idea raised repeat-
edly in informal conversations with political scientists and others who wanted to know “Is it just
the IRA and ETA” (and perhaps some Corsicans) who do this? I have already discussed one Latin
American group, the MRTA, which gave pre-attack warnings in many cases. I include Europe in
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various model specifications to determine whether there is something distinctive about European
attacks – and if so, to determine what it might be.
Finally, I use the GTD’s dummy variable, Suicide, to indicate whether a particular bombing used
suicide tactics. I use this variable as a control, reasoning that the decision to use suicide tactics
may have some bearing on the decision to give a warning. Assuming that a certain percentage of
suicide attacks are motivated by a desire to get as close as possible to a target, one would expect
fewer warnings in cases of suicide attack. One might also expect fewer warnings if, as Hoffman
and McCormick (2004) argue, militants use bloody suicide attacks to signal high levels of resolve.
I use the Suicide variable to determine whether these intuitions hold true.
5.3 Model Specification
I estimate a logit regression model because my dependent variable, Warning is a dichotomous,
probabilistic outcome. A logit model has advantages over linear probability models because the
sigmoidal functional form constrains the model’s predictions to the interval (0,1) on which proba-
bilities are defined. A logit model will never predict negative probabilities or probabilities greater
than 1. The formula for the logit model is as follows, where i is the number of independent vari-
ables, βi is the logit coefficient for xi, and F is the predicted probability of a positive outcome (in




The logit coefficients (βi) must be transformed before they can be interpreted substantively. Intu-
itively, however, a positive logit coefficient indicates that an incremental increase in xi increases
the probability F of the event taking place. A larger positive coefficient indicates a larger positive
effect of xi on the probability F . The model’s substantive predictions can be obtained using the
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This formula may be used to calculate marginal effects, instantaneous changes in the predicted
probability of a pre-attack warning, at a particular value of xi. The formula also gives predicted
probabilities of observing a pre-attack warning, given any combination of xi values. In the follow-
ing pages, I explore the raw logit results, marginal effects, and predicted probabilities, focusing
most heavily on the latter as a way of understanding the model’s substantive predictions for when
we are likely to see pre-attack warnings.
I use several model specifications. Model 1, the most basic, contains only the variables PTS and
Autonomy, representing the permissive factors that may reduce a group’s political costs for harm-
ing civilians. Model 2 includes PTS, Autonomy, and Maximalist. A maximalist group with no
intention of preserving existing institutions will have relatively low political costs for harming
civilians. Model 3 includes PTS, Autonomy, Maximalist and Religion/Islam, another variable that
may indicate a low valuation on existing institutions and a correspondingly low political cost for
harming civilians. Model 5 includes these variables plus the control variable Europe. Model 6 adds
the final control variable, Suicide.
Given the construction of my variable measures, my theory leads me to expect the following:
• Higher values of PTS will be associated with a lower predicted probability of warnings (con-
firming Hypothesis 1a)
• Higher values of Autonomy will be associated with a lower predicted probability of warnings
(confirming Hypothesis 1b)
• “1” values of Maximalist will be associated with a lower predicted probability of warnings
(confirming Hypothesis 1c)
93
The conventional wisdom about religious militancy suggests that “1” values of Religion/Islam will
be associated with a lower predicted probability of warnings (confirming Hypothesis 1d). The
conventional wisdom about European militancy suggests that “1” values of Europe will be asso-
ciated with a higher probability of warnings. Given the likely premium on surprise in suicide
attacks, I expect “1” values of Suicide to be associated with lower probabilities of warning.
To confirm these hypotheses confidently, the predictions should hold even with the introduction
of the target type type dummy variables. The coefficients on the target type dummies will take on
positive or negative values depending on which dummy is omitted to serve as the base category
for comparison. Having spoken with IRA and ETA members about the legitimacy of targeting the
state versus targeting civilians, I expect the Government dummy to be associated with the lowest
probability of warnings. I leave Government out of the model to serve as the base category, so I
expect the coefficients on all other target dummy variables to be positive.
In each model specification, I cluster standard errors on the perpetrating group. This is intended
to account for the correlation in standards errors among observations taken from the same militant
group. The intuition is similar to that of an elections scholar using survey data from many people,
some of whom may be living in the same households. Clustering standard errors relaxes the as-
sumption that each observation’s standard errors are independently and identically distributed.
In reality we expect there to be some relationship between answers given by members of the same
household. We also expect there to be some relationship between the decision to warn or not to
warn, if made by members of the same militant group, in an attack today versus an attack a year
from today.
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Table 1: Logit Results
Probability of Warning Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
PTS -0.7234∗∗∗ -0.3715∗ -0.1738 0.1991 0.2086 0.1647
(0.20) (0.20) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29)
Autonomy -1.0480∗∗ -1.173∗∗ -1.299∗∗ -0.8104∗∗ -0.7956∗∗ -0.9106∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.47) (0.57) (0.32) (0.31) (0.29)
Maximalist -1.430∗∗ -1.550∗∗ -1.001∗ -1.029∗ -0.8155∗
(0.71) (0.61) (0.54) (0.54) (0.46)
Religion/Islam -0.7966 -0.0624 0.0335 0.0701
(0.67) (0.54) (0.56) (0.51)














Constant -0.0616 -0.2728 -0.4076 -0.2897 -2.881∗∗∗ -3.267∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.43) (0.40) (0.86) (0.87) (1.0)
N 3,223 3,223 3,223 3,223 3,223 3,152
Log Likelihood -730.417 -707.451 -701.416 -673.985 -673.016 -626.266
Wald χ2 44.00 38.05 35.83 46.25 48.89 680.98
Pseudo R2 0.2578 0.2811 0.2873 0.3152 0.3161 0.3422
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Standard errors clustered on perpetrator group
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5.4 Results
Table 1 gives the logit results obtained using six different model specifications. Although the raw
coefficients cannot be interpreted substantively, they give a general picture of each model’s pre-
dictions, including the direction of each variable’s effect (positive or negative) and the statistical
significance of that effect. The results are generally consistent with my theory and hypotheses,
with one important exception I discuss in detail below. The coefficients on Autonomy are nega-
tive in all model specifications and statistically significant at a 0.05 α-level or better. Autonomy
– as provided by state support or territorial strongholds that make a group less dependent on
local popular support – is associated with a decreased probability of pre-attack warnings. This
confirms Hypothesis 1a. The coefficient on Maximalist is negative in all model specifications, and
significant at a 0.1 α-level or better. Militant groups whose goals assume full takeover of the state,
destruction of the state, or the broad replacement of social institutions are less likely to give pre-
attack warnings. This supports Hypothesis 1c.
The results for PTS, my measure of government humanitarian abuse, are more complicated. The
coefficients on PTS are negative in Models 1-3. This would support Hypothesis 1a, that higher
levels of government humanitarian abuse will be associated with a decreased probability of pre-
attack warnings. However, in Models 4-6, the coefficient on PTS takes on a negative sign. A higher
level of human rights abuse by the government is associated with an increased probability of warn-
ings. This contradicts Hypothesis 1b, but the result makes sense in light of the estimation results
for the control variables Religion/Islam, Europe, and Suicide.
The variable Religion/Islam has a negative coefficient when introduced in Models 3. This is con-
sistent with H1d, that groups motivated in whole or in part by religion will be less likely to give
pre-attack warnings. The result is not statistically significant, but the introduction of Religion/Islam
attenuates the negative coefficient on PTS by about half. PTS and Religion/Islam are strongly cor-
related, with a Pearson pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.415 (see Table 2 below). Countries
with high levels of government terror are likely to produce (or be selectively targeted by) Islamic
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militants. Introducing Religion/Islam causes the logit model to assign some of the negative effect
previously attributed to PTS to Religion/Islam instead. (The model also attributes even greater
negative effects to Autonomy and Maximalist.)
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Matrix
PTS Autonomy Maximalist Religion/Islam Europe Suicide
PTS 1.0000 0.6069 0.6293 0.4150 -0.8095 0.1798
Autonomy 1.0000 0.3393 0.3427 -0.5518 0.1943
Maximalist 1.0000 0.2347 -0.5739 -0.0026
Religion/Islam 1.0000 -0.3980 0.3321
Europe 1.0000 -0.1606
Suicide 1.0000
Looking again at Table 1, the sign on PTS changes to positive with the introduction of Europe into
the specification in Model 4. Europe exerts a positive and statistically significant effect in all spec-
ifications that include it (Models 4-6). The coefficient on PTS is positive whenever Europe is in the
specification, because the pattern of PTS scores correlates so highly with location. Five militant
groups in my sample are paired with European target states: the IRA (United Kingdom), ETA
and GRAPO (Spain), and the FLNC and FLNC-Historic Channel (France). Each of these groups
gives warnings at a relatively high rate. The UK, Spain, and France also have generally low Polit-
ical Terror Scale ratings – averaging 1.78, 2.25, and 2.22, respectively. Spain’s relatively high PTS
score (by European standards) is an outlier, most likely owing to Spain’s unusually long period of
fascist rule under military dictator Francisco Franco (from 1936 to 1975). The fact that a country
still emerging from fascism produced two prolific militant groups (both of which give warnings
at high rates), means that within Europe, higher political terror levels are associated with higher
frequencies of warning. Outside of Europe, however, high PTS scores are associated with lower
frequencies of warning, exactly as predicted by my theory and H1b. Looking at Models 1-3, where
Europe is not a control variable, the effect of PTS on warnings is negative. But once Europe is in-
troduced, the Spanish case reverses the apparent relationship between humanitarian abuse by
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governments and warning behavior by militants.
Models 5 introduces the variable Suicide as a control. The coefficient on Suicide is negative, al-
though not statistically significant. The introduction of the variable makes very little difference in
the coefficients on other variables previously introduced in Models 1-4, except for Religion/Islam.
With Suicide in the specification, the coefficient on Islam is now positive, although very small and
not statistically significant. One way of interpreting the change in Religion/Islam’s coefficient is
to remember that until their defeat in 2009, the LTTE used suicide tactics very frequently. Reli-
gion/Islam is negatively correlated with the outcome of warning. Suicide is even more negatively
correlated with warning, but positively correlated with Islam. Introducing Suicide in addition to
Religion/Islam allows the model to account for suicide attacks by secular groups such as the LTTE.
Specifications 3-4 attributed a negative effect to Religion/Islam based on many non-warning at-
tacks by groups that use suicide tactics some of the time. But adding Suicide causes the model to
attribute that negative effect not to Religion/Islam but to the tactic of suicide bombing itself.
Turning to Model 6, the results are broadly similar to those of Model 5. The coefficient on Au-
tonomy is negative and statistically significant at a 0.01 α-level. The coefficient on Maximalist is
negative and statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Europe’s coefficient is positive and significant
at a 0.01 α-level. PTS and Islam exert positive, though statistically insignificant effects. One change
is that Suicide exerts a stronger effect, which is now statistically significant at a 0.1 α-level. Broadly,
however, the results are strikingly stable, comparing Models 5 and 6, despite the introduction of
the five target type dummy variables in Model 6.
Of the target type dummy variables, the base category (Government – not shown) is least likely
to receive pre-attack warnings. The progressively higher coefficients on Private Citizens, Business,
Civil Society, Infrastructure, and Tourists indicate that each category is more likely to receive a warn-
ing (compared to Government and to categories with lower coefficients). These dummy variables
contribute explanatory power to the model, bringing the Pseudo-R2 to 0.3422 (allowing for the
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exclusion of 71 attacks on “Unknown” and “Other” attacks so that a more meaningful base cate-
gory could be used). The target type dummy variables allow for more specific predictions about
the probability of a warning, based on the type of person or thing attacked in a given bombing, as
well as the political and regional variables included in the other model specifications. Introduc-
ing the target type dummy variables did not substantially change the coefficients or significance
levels of the variables already introduced in Model 5. This suggests that the logit model’s results
are relatively robust. Once all of the relevant political variables are included, the introduction of
variables specific to the attack do not change the coefficients substantially.
Interpreting these coefficients is straightforward mathematically. The predicted probability (F )
of a pre-attack warning is given by the formula F = 1
(1+e−(β0+...βixi))
, where βi is the coefficient es-
timated for independent variable xi. For the estimated probabilities to mean anything, however,
one must put the right xi values into the formula. It would be possible to calculate a predicted
probability of warnings for suicide attacks by religious militants in countries with PTS scores of
1. But the dataset includes no such attacks, so the prediction does not correspond to any real-life
scenario we have observed before. Some scenarios are outlandish – for example, calculating pre-
dicted probabilities for attacks on European target states with PTS scores of 5. There is no such
country in my sample, in any year (and the mean PTS value associated with attacks in Europe is
1.97).
Looking at the variables in this dataset, Europe is a distinctive region. Its indigenous militants
(groups whose target states are in Europe) are ETA, the FLNC and FLNC Historic Channel, GRAPO,
and the IRA. Each group has an Autonomy score of 0, a Maximalist score of 0, a Religion/Islam score
of 0, and a very low average value of PTS associated with its attacks: 2.23 for ETA, 1.95 and 1.86 for
FLNC and FLNC Historic Channel, 1.96 for GRAPO, and 1.66 for the IRA. Of the 597 geograph-
ically European attacks in my sample, only sixteen were carried out by groups other than these.
Hizballah carried out five attacks (one of them a suicide bombing – the only European suicide
bombing in my sample). The other eleven were carried out by the Armenian Secret Army for the
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Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), an essentially stateless militant group whose primary target state
is Turkey. This is the extent of the diversity in Europe. Table 3 makes the point clearly. The non-
zero average of Autonomy in Europe is due to the handful of attacks by Hizballah (Autonomy=2)
and ASALA (Autonomy=1). The non-zero values of Religion/Islam and Suicide are attributable to
Hizballah. The non-zero Maximalist average is attributable to the Marxist/Leninist GRAPO’s at-
tacks.







The relative homogeneity of European militant groups makes it difficult to compare marginal ef-
fects between European and non-European cases. For instance, we might want to know how the
Maximalist score of the perpetrator group affects the probability of warnings in an attack in Eu-
rope versus an attack outside of Europe. To calculate predicted values, we must assume values
of Autonomy, Religion/Islam, Suicide, and PTS. As mentioned earlier, the only maximalist group to
attack in Europe is GRAPO, with an Autonomy score of 0. A realistic cross-regional comparison
using Maximalist would be restricted to comparing hypothetical groups like GRAPO to other hy-
pothetical groups with Autonomy scores of 0. In Europe, this would include ETA, FLNC, FLNC
Historic Channel, and the IRA (restricting the comparison to cases where Religion/Islam=0 and Sui-
cide=0 by implication). The only PTS value observed in European and non-European cases fitting
the above description is 2. However, among non-European cases, the only bombing by a non-
maximalist group is actually an IRA attack – the group’s sole non-European bombing, carried out
in the United States (which arguably, is not that different from Europe anyway). We can still gen-
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erate point estimates and graphs, but substantively they do not mean much.26
The difficulty in making cross-regional comparisons based on my model and data actually illus-
trates a broader point. Bombings in Europe are distinctive because important political variables
take on such drastically different values in Europe compared to the rest of the world. There may
be some aspect of European culture that makes militants in Europe give warnings at a higher rate.
(This is the logic of the informal theories that come up in casual conversation.) Upon examining
the data however, there is enough cross-regional difference in political variables – government
human rights records, the lack of territorial bases or state support for Europe’s militants, the small
number of maximalist groups operating in the area – we need not reach for cultural explanations
so quickly.
Although we cannot easily compare the logit model’s predictions across regions, we can com-
pare them within regions. To facilitate that within-region analysis, Table 4 presents separate logit
models estimated on European and non-European cases. The vector of independent variables is
identical to that of Model 6 in Table 1, except that the individual European and non-European
models omit the Europe variable. The original model from Table 1 (with the Europe control) is
shown again in the “All Cases” column on the far right.
The results across model specifications are very similar. Most important for my theory-testing, the
coefficients on Autonomy are negative and statistically significant in all three models. The results
so far give strong support to H1a, that higher autonomy (equivalently, low dependence on local
populations’ voluntary support) is associated with a decreased probability of pre-attack warnings.
The coefficients on Maximalist are also consistently negative, though not statistically significant,
across models. This gives some limited support to H1c.
The sign on PTS is positive in the European model. This can be explained by the presence of
ETA, a very reliable giver of warnings, and the country’s anomalously high PTS score (by Eu-
26In the appendix, I do produce a marginal effects graph for this combination of values: Autonomy=0,
Religion/Islam=0, Suicide=0, PTS=2.
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Table 4: Logit Results
Probability of Warning Europe Non-Europe All Cases
PTS 0.7091 -0.1787 0.1477
(0.51) (0.19) (0.29)
Autonomy -3.562∗∗∗ -0.6505∗∗∗ -0.9176∗∗∗
(1.3) (0.20) (0.28)
Maximalist -0.1545 -0.7553 -0.7676∗
(0.43) (0.54) (0.45)
Religion/Islam † 0.2468 -0.0640
† (0.46) (0.50)
Suicide † 0.2468 -0.0640
† (0.46) (0.50)
PrivateCitizens 0.6968 -1.469∗∗∗ 0.0323
(0.48) (0.54) (0.43)
Business 0.6632 -0.4635 0.2617
(0.41) (0.49) (0.37)
CivilSociety 1.280∗∗∗ 0.3808 1.176∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.35) (0.42)
Infrastructure 1.904∗∗∗ 0.1999 1.168∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.40) (0.40)




Constant -1.837∗∗ -1.829∗∗∗ -3.264∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.54) (1.0)
N 561 2579 3152
Log Likelihood -346.593 -263.660 -628.037
Wald χ2 † 70.97 613.47
Pseudo R2 0.0796 0.0867 0.3403
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; †not calculated by Stata; Standard errors clustered on perpetrator group
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ropean standards). I have no a priori theoretical reason to expect a causal relationship between
Spain’s peculiar fascist legacy and ETA’s high frequency of warning. As such, I am inclined to
view this as an outlier case, and the positive correlation between PTS and warnings as a spurious
relationship. The coefficient on PTS is negative in non-European cases, in keeping with my theory
and H1b. The model estimated on all cases splits the difference, however, giving PTS a positive,
small, and statistically insignificant coefficient.
The logit estimator could not calculate coefficients for Religion/Islam and Suicide in the European
model. This is because Hizballah’s handful of European attacks had no warnings, and the esti-
mator cannot calculate coefficients on variables that do not vary. The non-European model lacks
a coefficient for Tourists because there were no warnings prior to the 7 attacks on tourism targets
outside of Europe. However, the models are still broadly comparable. With the exception of PTS,
the results for the theoretically significant variables are stable. The sign changes among the target
type dummies are interesting to note, however. Government predicts a moderate probability of
warnings in the non-European model, compared to a very low probability in the full model and
European model.
Due to the lack of variation in PTS and Autonomy scores, it is not possible to provide controlled
comparisons of predicted probabilities among European bombings.27 It is, however, possible to
give meaningful comparisons using the non-European cases. Because I am calculating marginal
effects for the non-European cases only, I use the logit model separately estimated on those cases.
Other than the change to the coefficient on PTS, the results are not substantially different from the
results of the full model, except for a slight attenuation of Autonomy and Islam’s positive effects
on the probability of warning. I include marginal effects tables based on both the non-European
model and the “All Cases” model in the appendix, demonstrating that the marginal effects are not
markedly different.
27One could compare predictions for low and medium autonomy non-religious, non-suicide, non-
maximalist attackers like ASALA, but the PTS value for all ASALA attacks is 3, a value not observed in
any other European attacks.
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Figure 1: Probability of Warning: Non-Maximalist, Non-Religious, Non-Suicide Attacker
Figure 2: Probability of Warning: Maximalist, Religious, Non-Suicide Attacker
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Figure 3: Probability of Warning: Non-Maximalist, Religious, Suicide Attacker
Figure 4: Probability of Warning: Maximalist, Religious, Suicide Attacker
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Figure 5: Probability of Warning: Maximalist, Non-Religious, Non-Suicide Attacker
Figures 1-5 show the logit model’s predictions based on different levels of Autonomy. Each graph
assumes particular values of Maximalist, Religion/Islam, and Suicide and PTS fixed at 4 (a common
value in non-European cases). Each graph also assumes a government target, facilitating con-
trolled comparisons across graphs. Each point represents a predicted probability of warning. The
prediction is surrounded by a 95% confidence interval, depicted with an upper and lower bar. It
is important to note that this is the confidence interval for the point prediction, not for the overall
effect of the variable. The statistical significance of each variable’s effect is shown in the original
regression tables.
Figure 1 gives predicted probabilities for non-maximalist religious groups (Hizballah, for exam-
ple) carrying out conventional non-suicide attacks. Figure 2 gives predictions for maximalist reli-
gious groups (the various Al Qa’ida branches, for instance) carrying out non-suicide attacks. Fig-
ure 3 gives predictions for non-maximalist religious groups carrying out suicide attacks. Figure 4
gives probabilities for maximalist religious groups carrying out suicide attacks. Finally, Figure 5
shows predictions for non-religious maximalist groups (Marxist guerrillas, for instance) carrying
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out non-suicide attacks. (Because of a lack of comparable real life cases, I do not generate a graph
for non-religious non-Maximalists, or non-religious groups carrying out suicide attacks, at PTS=3
and all three Autonomy levels.)
Comparing the graphs, we see the highest predicted probability of warnings in Figure 1 (non-
maximalist, religious, non-suicide attacks). At a low autonomy level, when the group is com-
pletely dependent on local populations’ voluntary support, there is a 14 percent probability of
the group giving pre-attack warnings. The probability of pre-attack warnings by the same group
decreases to roughly 4 percent if the group acquires both a state sponsor and a territorial base (giv-
ing it high autonomy). In all of the graphs, the predicted probability of warning is considerably
higher for militant groups that are heavily dependent on local popular support for their survival.
Autonomy’s effect is substantively significant, lending further support to my theory and H1a.
The next highest probabilities of warning are seen in Figure 2 (maximalist, religious, non-suicide
attacks). Low autonomy groups in this category have a roughly 7 percent probability of warning,
but this decreases to roughly 2 percent if a group has a territorial base and state support. Look-
ing at Figure 3 and Figure 4, we see relatively lower predicted probabilities for suicide attacks by
non-maximalist religious groups and maximalist religious groups, respectively. This is what con-
ventional and academic wisdom would lead us to expect. Suicide attack is an excellent tactic for
achieving surprise, and militants seem disinclined to spoil it by giving warnings. It is interesting,
however, that even in cases of suicide attack, there is some probability of observing warnings. An
August 4, 2002 suicide attack by Hamas (a non-maximalist religious group) provides one exam-
ple. Having boarded an Israeli bus, the bomber realized that not all of the passengers were Jews.
According to news reports, “the bomber apparently warned two Arab students of the impending
attack, and they got off the bus shortly before it blew up” (Steele 2002).
These graphs also highlight an important prediction of the logit model: secular militant groups are
less prone to give warnings, compared to religious groups. Looking at Figure 5, a maximalist non-
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religious group carrying out a non-suicide attack has at most a 5 percent probability of warning,
assuming it depends entirely on local populations’ support (Autonomy=0). That is lower than the
probability of a militant Islamic group warning before a non-suicide attack – and lower than the
chance of a suicide bomber warning, assuming the militant group is non-maximalist, religious,
and fully dependent on local support. Conventional wisdom would associate religion, particu-
larly Islam, and suicide bombing with very low probabilities of warning. The model, however,
also considers the many non-warning attacks by secular maximalist groups (Sendero Luminoso for
instance). Taking all of those attacks into account, the model predicts that secular groups will ac-
tually be less likely to give warnings.
Figure 6: Probability of Warning: Civil Society Target
Figures 6-10 provide a comparison of the model’s predictions when the details of the attacker and
attack are held constant, but the type of target is allowed to vary. To visualize effect of target se-
lection, each of these figures assumes a non-maximalist religious group carrying out a non-suicide
attack on a state with a PTS score of 4. The Moro Islamic Liberation front would be one example
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Figure 7: Probability of Warning: Infrastructure Target
Figure 8: Probability of Warning: Government Target
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Figure 9: Probability of Warning: Business Target
Figure 10: Probability of Warning: Private Citizens Target
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of such a group, although the Philippines’ PTS score sometimes rises to 3. Figures 6-10 show pre-
dicted probabilities for attacks on civil society, infrastructure, government, business, and private
citizen targets respectively. The probabilities of warning are highest for attacks on civil society tar-
gets, approaching 18 percent for low autonomy groups (Boko Haram, for example, although the
group has increased its territorial control since 2012). The probability of warning is slightly less
for infrastructure and government targets, still less for business targets, and quite low for private
citizen targets. We can make sense of this by considering what the extremes represent: attacks on
schools, religious institutions, journalists, and NGOs, versus attacks on all other private individu-
als. Recall from the Peruvian case studies how the MRTA attacked US Binational Centers, but gave
warnings for people in those facilities to leave before the bombs went off. Although the generic
term “private citizens” carries a connotation of innocence, militant groups often target specific
private individuals with bombs. In these cases, a no-warning bombing is not indiscriminate, in
the same way as a no-warning bombing of a school or church would be. It is not too surprising to
find that private citizens receive warnings at the lowest rate of all the target categories.
The relatively high rate of warnings for infrastructure attacks makes sense because infrastructure
cannot easily be moved out of the way of a bomb. The low rate of warnings for businesses makes
sense considering that many of the non-European groups in my sample are Marxists who view
capitalism (and American-owned businesses) as their imperialist enemies. The moderate rate of
warnings for government targets is surprising, however. The IRA and ETA viewed courts, judges,
and other agents of the state as legitimate military targets, and often attacked them without warn-
ing. In the European and “All Cases” models, government targets did receive the lowest frequency
of warnings. The most likely explanation for the difference across regions is that non-European
conflicts frequently take place around political transitions. Europe’s governing institutions are rel-
atively well established. Even after the fall of the Iron Curtain, Europe experienced a low degree
of violence around elections themselves. The most prolific groups in Europe, the IRA and ETA,
may view the electoral boundaries and processes as illegitimate, but they do not bomb polling
stations. Outside of Europe, things are different. Sendero Luminoso’s first violent act was the theft
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and burning of ballot boxes to protest Peru’s transition to a democratic political system. The Tal-
iban has also bombed polling stations to protest the introduction of democracy. In many cases,
the group has given warnings about these attacks.28 We observe a higher frequency of warnings
for government targets outside of Europe, possibly because non-European militants are attacking
nascent institutions to deter people from participating – not simply to catch and punish people
once they have participated. The warning itself may be valuable in making the deterrent threat as
explicit as possible.
The next three figures show comparisons that are not so closely controlled. Instead, these de-
pict contrasts between different types of groups carrying out attacks commonly associated their
types. Figure 11 shows a contrast between a maximalist non-religious militant group carrying out
non-suicide attacks on civil society targets and a maximalist religious group carrying out suicide
attacks on government targets. Substantively, this is like comparing a Latin American Marxist
group, using tactics typical for that variety of militant, to a branch of Al Qa’ida carrying out sui-
cide attacks. Both stylized types show a low probability of warning, even in cases where the
group depends entirely on local people for support. (Al Qa’ida in Iraq and Al Qa’ida in the Ara-
bian Peninsula fit that description when the BAAD database was compiled.) As discussed above,
secular groups like the Latin American Marxists have lower probabilities of warning in general,
but the assumption of a civil society target, paired with the assumption of suicide tactics by the
Al Qa’ida-type group, give some separation between the model’s point predictions for the two
groups. The 95% confidence intervals overlap, however, meaning that we cannot be 95% certain
that the actual probabilities of warnings by the two groups are different.
28For example, the Global Terrorism Database lists a rash of incidents on September 18, 2010, which were
preceded by general warnings about attacks on polling places. See incident numbers 201009180007 through
201009180013 and 201009180015 through 201009180028.
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Figure 11: Probability of Warning: Maximalist, Religious, Non-Suicide Attacker and Maximalist, Religious,
Suicide Attacker
Figures 12 and 13 show contrasts between a maximalist religious group carrying out suicide at-
tacks on private citizens and a non-maximalist religious group carrying out non-suicide attacks
on civil society targets. One may envision this contrast as a comparison between an Al Qa’ida
or Taliban-like group and a group like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Hizballah, or
Hamas. In both figures, the maximalist group is assumed to be fighting a highly abusive govern-
ment with a PTS score of 5. In Figure 12, the non-maximalst group is assumed to be fighting a
slightly less abusive government, with a PTS score of 4. In Figure 13, it is assumed to be fighting
a government with a PTS score of 3.
In both figures, the maximalist religious group’s use of suicide tactics creates a very low proba-
bility of warning, practically zero. There is separation not only from the non-maximalist groups’
predicted probabilities of warning but also between the confidence intervals of the point predic-
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Figure 12: Probability of Warning: Non-Maximalist, Religious, Non-Suicide Attacker (PTS=4) and Maxi-
malist, Religious, Suicide Attacker
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Figure 13: Probability of Warning: Non-Maximalist, Religious, Non-Suicide Attacker (PTS=3) and Maxi-
malist, Religious, Suicide Attacker
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tions (although in Figure 12 one pair of confidence intervals overlaps). Again, it is important to
remember that the overlap of confidence intervals means only that a pair of point predictions may
not be separate in reality (a 5% chance of a Type I error). Overlapping confidence intervals does
not mean that a particular variable has a significantly insignificant effect.
Given the different assumptions about the government’s PTS score, the separation between the
non-maximalist militant’s and maximalist militant’s predicted probabilities is greater in Figure 13
than in Figure 12. Although its coefficient is small in the estimated logit model, PTS does play a
role in shaping the model’s point estimates.
5.5 Discussion
The results of my quantitative analysis have confirmed the most important hypothesis derived
from my theory of warnings, as refined through the discussion of my qualitative case studies.
That hypothesis is:
H1a: Militants who depend heavily on local support are more likely to give pre-attack warnings.
Militant groups who depend on voluntary support from local populations – as opposed to state
support or the shelter and support they can extract from territory under their control – are be-
holden to the views of their local hosts. If local populations expect militants to uphold a high
standard of humanitarian behavior, militants are obliged to do so, or they may find themselves
turned out on the street (or unable to recruit or raise funds). This finding comports with argu-
ments from the literature on guerrilla warfare, arguing that moral legitimacy is a prerequisite for
ultimate success in overthrowing and replacing the government (Lomperis 1996; Mampilly 2011;
Mao 1989).
An important question, then, is how local populations develop their expectations for the mil-
itant group. What makes the population desire restraint, versus indiscriminate targeting and
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bloodshed? My case studies suggested that local populations adopt different views based on the
government’s behavior. If the government abuses civilians, local populations will be willing to
tolerate some abuses by a militant group that offers a chance to overthrow the government. This
logic led to a second hypothesis:
H1b: Militants fighting a non-abusive government are more likely to give pre-attack warnings.
The logit models with few controls appeared to support this prediction. Higher PTS, representing
higher levels of government abuse, was associated with higher frequencies of pre-attack warn-
ings. This result disappeared when I introduced Europe as a control variable in the model. The
result reappeared (although it was not statistically significant) when I estimated the logit model
on a subset of data containing only attacks outside of Europe. The apparent effect of Europe in the
full model is a result of Spain’s post-fascist political legacy, which has created a persistently high
level of government abuses (high PTS) even after the transition to democracy. This coincided with
the emergence of two militant groups, ETA and GRAPO, both of which give pre-attack warnings
a high percentage of the time. Subsetting the data to look only at non-European cases (a decision
made to allow better comparisons of marginal effects) showed that PTS does have the hypothe-
sized effect, but only once we drop Spain from the analysis. These results give qualified support
to H1b. If the government sets a negative example by abusing civilians, local populations may
not hold militants to a very high standard. No-warning attacks that harm civilians may pale in
comparison with the abuses of the state. But if the state sets a relatively good example of human-
itarian behavior, local populations will expect the militant group to do the same. Its support will
depend on how well it conducts itself in its dealings with civilians. No-warning attacks will carry
high political costs for dependent (non-autonomous) militants fighting relatively well-behaved
governments. Militants fighting those governments are more likely to give pre-attack warnings.
My results also give qualified support H1c, which states that militants with maximalist goals are
less likely to give pre-attack warnings. The coefficients for Maximalist are consistently positive
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across model specifications, allowing for subsetting as well. They are also statistically significant
at the 0.1 α-level, and the effects are apparent in graphical representation of the model’s marginal
effects and predicted probabilities. The logic of this hypothesis is that groups with maximalist
goals plan to replace existing institutions. A group with this type of plan sees little benefit in ap-
pealing to elements of the old system. In fact, it may see little value in restraining its behavior
toward anyone outside its base of support. That base will also be willing to tolerate abuses of
those on the outside, so the militant group’s cost for indiscriminate no-warning attacks (on the
out group) will be relatively low.
I also tested a fourth hypothesis regarding the likely effects of religion on warning behavior:
H1d: Religiously motivated militants are less likely to give pre-attack warnings.
In analyses of the full dataset , the coefficient on Religion/Islam is negative, though not statisti-
cally significant. When the model is estimated on the subset of non-European attacks, the sign
of the coefficient reverses. Religion’s apparent positive effect on warning is the result of secular
groups (including Sendero Luminoso and the LTTE) engaging in hundreds of no-warning attacks.
The Islamic religious organizations in the non-European subset give warnings some of the time.
Recall the report on the Boko Haram attack, in which the group blew a hole in a prison wall and
fought a gun battle to free its members from captivity. Residents of the surrounding area reported
that “Boko Haram sent message that they will raid the prison and free their members,” and that
residents should “steer clear of the area” (Tukur 2013). In Europe, however, the only religious
group to carry out attacks (Hizballah) gave no warnings. Non-religious groups like ETA and the
IRA gave warnings for a high percentage of their attacks. Overall, this analysis cannot confirm
H1d, but does not conclusively disprove it either. What one can say is that religious organizations
are more sensitive to their local political circumstances than stylized Western accounts would sug-
gest. These groups know to respect the constituents, at least some of the time. (Recall also the story
about the Hamas suicide bomber warning Arab boys to leave the doomed bus.) At the same time
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secular groups like Sendero are clearly capable of abuse on a massive scale. The relationship be-
tween warnings and religion is far from clear.
A clearer finding, related to religion, is that suicide attacks predict a lower probability of warnings
by the perpetrator group. The logic is clear enough. If the goal of suicide attacks is to achieve
surprise or demonstrate resolve (Hoffman and McCormick 2004), the bomber should not give the
game away by warning. Religion is one motivation for suicide attack (Bloom 2004). The variables
Religion/Islam and Suicide have a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.3321. Suicide’s pairwise cor-
relation with Warning is only -0.0909, compared to Religion/Islam’s correlation of -0.1978 with the
warnings variable. Yet when Suicide is introduced into the regression equation, it takes on a sub-
stantially larger effect than Religion/Islam, and pushes Religion/Islam’s coefficient above zero. The
relationship among these variables is not simple, but given religion’s role in pushing people to-
ward suicide by “martyrdom,” it may be exerting an effect that does not show up in the regression
coefficients themselves.
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6 Warnings, Phone Chains, and Trust
In this section, I discuss the interactive aspect of warnings – how militant groups communicate
them to governments and how governments respond. In cases where the militant group cannot
directly warn people at the scene of an attack, they must warn the government and hope that
emergency and security personnel will be dispatched to clear the area around the bomb. If the
government does not do this, the warning may be wasted and the bomb will harm people the
militant group did not intend to harm. Of course, militants can also issue hoax warnings to force
unnecessary evacuations or draw security personnel into traps. The government, realizing these
dangers, must decide whether to believe the person giving the warning. Is she an actual rep-
resentative of a militant group, and if so, is that militant group giving a truthful warning or a
misleading one? Even if the warning is likely to be true, is it worth undertaking a costly and dan-
gerous response, given the amount of damage the government can expect to prevent?
To understand the logic of this situation, I present a formal model of militant/government inter-
action. I use a signaling framework, as developed by authors such as Spence (1973) and Cho and
Kreps (1987). To the basic structure of the signaling game (an informed player signaling her “type”
and an uninformed player choosing a strategy based on inferences about the signaler’s type) I in-
troduce “noise.” Noise is a concept derived from information theory, advanced by authors such
as Shannon (1948). In game theory, noise represents additional uncertainty about whether the
signaler’s message will reach the receiving player unchanged, or whether flaws in the signaling
“technology” will change the message before it reaches the receiver. In my game, noise represents
the probability that a prank caller gives the government a false warning, which cannot be distin-
guished from the warning of a militant. (Militants may also give false warnings of their own.)
Information theorists and game theorists have noted unexpected results when noise is introduced
to signals. Shannon proves mathematically that noisy signals can contain more information than
clean signals. Game theorists Haan and Sloof (2011) note that higher levels of noise may induce
separating equilibria where none existed before. In a strategic context, the introduction of noise
may make it easier for actors to signal their type to the receiving player. This result is not upheld in
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experimental settings, but I find support for it in my analysis of communication between militants
and governments. My formal model and empirical analysis make an important contribution to
the literature on political conflict, as well as the literature on signaling in general.
6.1 Formal Model
I base my formal model on a few intuitions drawn from the IRA’s Bishopsgate and Manchester
bombings, as described in the introductory section. Those intuitions are:
First, warnings tend to reduce the human toll of attacks. They allow the government to move
people out of the way, mitigating the attack’s effects on people despite the attack’s destructive
physical impact on property. Despite their tremendous power, the bombs at Bishopsgate and
Manchester killed only one person, a news reporter who ignored police instructions to evacuate.
Casualty reduction is the most notable effect of these bomb warnings. I structure my formal model
based on the assumption that some militants reduce casualties intentionally for political reasons.
Second, mobilizing in response to warnings is costly. In the Manchester bombing, for instance,
police evacuated a large section of the city’s commercial center in response to the IRA’s warnings.
Such interventions can cost millions of pounds (or dollars) in lost productivity. I structure my
model based on the assumption that mobilizing in response to warnings is costly for the govern-
ment.
Third, militants may give warnings even when they are not attacking. There is nothing to stop
a group like the IRA from warning about an attack when it has not actually set one in motion. As
most people who attended large secondary schools or universities can attest, pranksters can also
give false warnings. False warnings from any source create problems for the government and its
first responders. Police rarely observe the person sending the warning. They must decide how
to respond without knowing the identity of the sender or whether the threat is real. I structure
my model based on the assumption that governments form probabilistic beliefs upon receiving
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warnings. They decide how to respond based on their probabilistic beliefs.
Fourth, prank warnings may interfere with militants’ attempts to give true warnings. False warn-
ings are a type of noise. A high level of noise may reduce the informative value of the signal,
raising the government’s expectation that any warning it receives will be a prank. Even if a mil-
itant group does not give false warnings, a higher rate of prank warnings from actors outside
the group may make militants’ truthful warnings seem less credible. However, under particular
circumstances I explain below, noise can make true warnings sound more credible.
6.1.1 Specification
I model the logic of pre-attack warnings as a signaling game played by the Government, a Militant,
and Nature. The sequence of moves is as follows:
1. Nature selects the type of the Militant. With probability α the Militant is “attacking” (Type
A). With probability 1− α the Militant is “not attacking” (Type ¬A).
2. The Militant sends a signal “S” to the Government. The Militant may send a warning of an
attack (S = W ) or a signal of no warning (S = ¬W ). The Militant may send either signal,
regardless of whether she is of the attacking or not attacking type.
3. Nature determines whether the Militant’s signal reaches the Government as intended, or whether
prank callers will convert no-warning signals to warning signals. Mathematically, if the Mil-
itant has sent a signal of no warning (S = ¬W ), Nature changes the signal to a warning
(S = W ) with probability ω. With probability 1 − ω Nature allows a no warning signal
to reach the Government unchanged. In cases where the Militant has intentionally sent a
warning signal (S = W ), Nature always allows the signal to reach the Government without
interference.
4. The Government observes the signal S sent by the Militant, and chooses to respond by mobi-
lizing police (R =M) or by not mobilizing police (R = ¬M).
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Note that in my specification, it is Nature that decides whether an attack is to take place at any
particular moment. This assumption, though unrealistic, is useful because it abstracts away other
issues that I am not trying to model or explain: why political organizations choose violence as
a tactic, why they choose particular targets, why they choose a particular moment to strike, etc.
My specification accounts for the basic fact that at any given moment, a militant group (or cell
thereof) may be in the process of carrying out an attack. Regardless of whether the group is ac-
tually attacking, it has the option of giving a warning as if an attack were about to take place. By
letting Nature determine whether an attack is underway, I am able to model militants’ calculations
about warning, as well as the Government’s mobilization decision under conditions of uncertainty,
without needing an elaborate model of militant behavior at earlier stages.
The Government and Militant receive utilities that are closely related. Some of these are zero-sum.
For instance, the Militant derives utility by inflicting damage (i.e. negative utility) on the Govern-
ment. If a Militant is attacking and the Government does not mobilize police, the Militant receives
utility D1 and the Government receives −D1. If the Militant is attacking and the Government mo-
bilizes police, the Militant receives utility D2 and the Government receives −D2. By assumption,
D1 > D2 > 0, meaning that the Government can reduce the expected damage from a bombing by
mobilizing to clear the targeted area and attempting to defuse the bomb. The D1 and D2 param-
eters incorporate the probability of a bomb destroying its target, without requiring any explicit
modeling of that probabilistic outcome. The Government and Militant also derive utility based on
whether the Government mobilizes, regardless of whether the Militant has attacked. Any time the
Government mobilizes, it receives utility −G and the Militant receives G. This captures the reality
that mobilizations are costly to governments and therefore useful to militant groups that wish to
inflict economic damage on the government. This specification also captures the reality that mo-
bilizations are costly whether or not a bomb attack is underway. A Militant who is not actually
attacking can still inflict damage on the Government by giving a false warning and inducing a Gov-
ernment mobilization in response to the false alarm.
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The model includes three additional parameters, X , Y , and Z, representing political costs that
Militants and Governments incur if they engage in behavior that key audiences find unethical or
otherwise offensive. For example, an attacking Militant who does not give a warning and as a
result fails to induce a Government mobilization suffers a penalty of −X . This penalty represents
the political cost of engaging in indiscriminate violence, when the Militant’s support base would
prefer the group to give warnings and allow the Government to evacuate civilians. A Militant also
suffers a penalty,−Y , if it is not attacking but it gives a warning and induces a mobilization by the
Government. This specification captures the possibility that governments may publicly shame the
militant group for disrupting daily life (including the lives of the group’s local supporters), or that
militant organizations who lie about bombings may have future difficulties convincing the gov-
ernment or the public that they mean what they say. False warnings benefit militants in the short
term, but they may hinder militants’ attempts to issue credible statements, threats, or diplomatic
proposals later. Finally, the Government suffers a political penalty of −Z if the Militant is attack-
ing, the Government receives a warning, and the Government does not respond. This specification
captures the reality that, beyond the expected physical damage and loss of life, a government
may suffer political costs when citizens learn that the government failed to protect them despite
receiving truthful warnings of an attack.
6.1.2 Equilibrium
This is a sequential game of incomplete information. The Government and Militant have common
knowledge over all probability and payoff parameters. However, only the Militant observes Na-
ture’s selection of the Militant’s type, B ∈ {A,¬A} (i.e. whether the Militant is attacking). The
Government cannot directly observe the Militant’s type and must infer that information based on
the prior probabilities of attacks (α) and prank warnings (ω), the expected signaling behavior of
each type of Militant in equilibrium, and the signal received from the Militant. The solution con-
cept for the game is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium – a strategy profile and belief system such
that the strategies are sequentially rational given the belief system and the belief system is consis-
tent, given the strategy profile. (Beliefs at information sets not reached in equilibrium are specified
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as necessary, because they cannot be calculated by Bayes’ rule.) Given the structure of this game,
the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium comprises the following elements:
1. The Militant’s optimal selection of a signal (W or ¬W ), conditional on the Militant’s type
and the expected Government response R to the signal.
2. The Government’s formation of an updated belief (θ) about the Militant’s type, conditional
on the signal received.
3. The Government’s optimal response (M or ¬M), given its probabilistic belief θ and the ex-
pected payoffs for mobilizing or not mobilizing.
We can consider each element in turn. At the stage of the Government’s response, the Govern-
ment faces tradeoffs. For instance, a Government that mobilizes in response to a truthful warning
will receive −D2 − G as opposed to −D1 − Z if it does not mobilize. Assuming that an attack
is underway and the attacking Militant gives a warning, the Government’s choice is between an
economically costly mobilization and reduced damage from the attack, versus a politically costly
non-mobilization and suffering the full expected damage of an attack. However, because the Gov-
ernment cannot directly observe whether an attack is underway, there is also a possibility that the
warning came from a non-attacking Militant or a prank caller (i.e. the move by Nature to convert
a non-warning signal to a warning signal). If the warning is false, the Govenment will receive −G
for mobilizing or a status quo utility of 0 for not mobilizing. The Government’s inference about
the probable type of the Militant (attacking or not attacking) is critical to determining the optimal
response.
Where θW represents the Government’s belief about the Militant’s type, conditional on receiving
a warning, and UG(R|B,S) represents the Government’s utility for a particular response, given the
type of the Militant and the Militant’s signal, the Government’s choice between mobilizing and not
mobilizing depends upon the following inequality:
θW (UG(M |A,W )) + (1− θW )(UG(M |¬A,W ) ≷ θW (UG(¬M |A,W )) + (1− θW )(UG(¬M |¬A,W )
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The left side expression represents the expected utility of mobilizing and the right side expression
represents the expected utility of not mobilizing. Plugging in the Government’s payoffs for the
generic utility expressions gives θW (−D2−G)+ (1− θW )(−G) ≷ θW (−D1−Z)+ (1− θW )(0) and
a condition on the Government’s belief θW of:
θW ≷
G
D1 −D2 + Z
The right side of this expression represents the ratio of the Government’s costs of mobilizing (G)
to the Government’s expected damage savings if it mobilizes in response to a truthful warning,
rather than not mobilizing. If θW exceeds the value of the ratio, the Government mobilizes upon
receiving a warning. Similarly, we can express the condition for the Government mobilizing or not
mobilizing in response to a non-warning signal, as:
θ¬W (UG(M |A,¬W )) + (1− θ¬W )(UG(M |¬A,¬W ) ≷ θ¬W (UG(¬M |A,¬W )) + (1− θ¬W )(UG(¬M |¬A,¬W )
or equivalently: θ¬W (−D2 − G) + (1 − θ¬W )(−G) ≷ θ¬W (−D1) + (1 − θ¬W )(0). This gives a




The right side represents the ratio of the Government’s costs of mobilizing to the Government’s
expected damage savings if it mobilizes during a no-warning attack. If θ¬W exceeds the value of
the ratio, the Government mobilizes upon observing a signal of no warning.
At the stage where the Government updates its beliefs, the solution is given by Bayes’ Rule. For
instance, the Government’s probabilistic belief upon receiving a warning is:
θW = Pr(A|W ) =
Pr(W |A)Pr(A)
Pr(W |A)Pr(A) + Pr(W |¬A)Pr(¬A)
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The value for θ will depend on the Government’s prior beliefs about the probability of an attack
and the probability of a prank call. For example, if in equilibrium, an attacking Militant would
give a warning but a non-attacking Militant would not, the Government’s belief upon receiving a




α(1−ω)+ω , and upon receiving no warning: θ¬W =
(0)(α)
(0)(α)+(1−ω)(1−α) = 0. Bayes’ Rule may be used to calculate θ for any signal that could be received
in equilibrium. The Government’s beliefs upon receiving off-equilibrium signals will be specified
as necessary, fulfilling the requirement that in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, players must have
defined beliefs even at off-equilibrium information sets.
At the stage where the Militant chooses its optimal signal, the Militant faces a choice between
a guaranteed payoff for warning of UM (W |R), where R is the Government’s expected response,
conditional on the Militant’s signal, and an uncertain payoff based in part on the probability that
a prank call is made, changing the Militant’s non-warning signal to a warning. This event is deter-
mined in a random draw by Nature, with probability ω that a prank call is made, and probability
1 − ω that no prank call is made and the non-warning signal reaches the Government unchanged.
The Militant’s choice of signals then depends on the following inequality:
UM (W |R) ≷ (ω)(UM (W |R)) + (1− ω)(UM (¬W |R))
The Militant’s choice of the optimal signal will depend on the government’s expected response
to a warning or non-warning. For example, assuming that the Government responds to warnings,
but not to non-warnings, an attacking Militant warns if the left side of the following expression
exceeds the right side:
D2 +G ≷ (ω)(D2 +G) + (1− ω)(D1 −X)
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A non-attacking Militant warns if the right side of the following expression exceeds the left side:
G− Y ≷ (ω)(G) + (1− ω)(0)
Using the above logic, the model can be solved to find the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for differ-
ent combinations of parameter values.
Four strategic scenarios
One useful way of discussing the model’s equilibrium and results is to examine the minimum
conditions for Militants and Governments to give warnings and mobilize, respectively. These con-
ditions establish four basic strategic scenarios, based on what the attacking Militant and the Gov-
ernment would do if incomplete information were not an issue. Given the payoff structure of the
Government, mobilizations are never rational unless D1 − D2 + Z > G. If this condition is not
met, no probabilistic belief can satisfy the condition for mobilization in response to a warning:
θW >
G
D1−D2+Z . Note also that the attacking (A-type) Militant requires D2 +G > D1 −X before it
will offer pre-attack warnings to a Government that would mobilize in response. The Government
and attacking Militant conditions can be rewritten in relation to zero and expressed as part of the
same inequality: D1 −D2 −G+ Z ≷ 0 ≷ D1 −D2 −G−X .
The four possible orderings of this expression give four strategic scenarios, based on the Govern-
ment and attacking Militant’s preferences. An ordering ofD1−D2−G+Z > 0 > D1−D2−G−X
implies that the Government would be willing to mobilize in response to true warnings and the at-
tacking Militant would prefer to give such warnings and elicit a mobilization. D1−D2−G+Z >
D1 −D2 − G −X > 0 implies that the Government would mobilize in response to true warnings
but Militants would never give such warnings to mobilize the government. With an ordering of
0 > D1 −D2 −G+ Z > D1 −D2 −G−X , the Government cannot afford to respond to warnings,
although attacking Militants would prefer to give such warnings and mobilize the Government.
A fourth ordering would produce a Government that could never afford to respond to warnings,
and an attacking Militant that would never give truthful warnings to mobilize the Government.
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However, this outcome is nearly impossible to achieve. Combining the Government’s and attack-
ing Militant’s conditions gives D1 −D2 −G−X > 0 > D1 −D2 −G+ Z, a logical contradiction
for any X,Z > 0. To avoid contradiction, we must set Z = X = 0, loosen the inequalities in
the players’ conditions, and set D1 − D2 = G. Additionally, we must specify that the attacking
Militant warns when indifferent and the Government mobilizes when indifferent. In sum, we must
make strong assumptions in order to have a Militant that would never want to mobilize the Gov-
ernment and a Government that could never afford to mobilize anyway. In this game, the bloody
surprise attacks we associate with terrorism are generally not a jointly optimal outcome for the
attacking Militant and Government. To the contrary, undefended surprise attacks generally repre-
sent a missed opportunity: one or more players in the game preferred an equilibrium of warnings
and casualty-reducing mobilizations, but this outcome was not realized because of an incompati-
bility with other players’ incentives or because uncertainty over the Militant’s type prevented the
Government from mobilizing.
6.1.3 Empirical Implications
In this section I summarize the more interesting results of the model. For brevity, I include only
as much mathematical detail as is necessary to demonstrate the logic underlying the results. I
provide a full equilibrium analysis and algebraic proofs of the propositions in the appendix.
Result 1: Three Factors Produce Pre-Attack Warnings
Recalling the sequential structure of the game, we can determine whether the attacking Militant
warns based on the Militant’s payoffs and the expected behavior of the Government. Since the
Militant knows its own type, the expected equilibrium behavior of a non-attacking Militant is not
an immediate concern. Looking at the decision of an attacking Militant, two inequalities are of
interest: D2 +G ≷ D1 −X and D1 ≷ D1 −X .
The first inequality represents the attacking Militant’s condition for warning a Government that
would mobilize in response (giving the left side payoff) or not warning the Government so that it
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does not mobilize (giving the right side payoff). The second inequality represents the attacking
Militant’s condition for warning (giving the left side payoff) or not warning (giving the right side
payoff), assuming a Government that does not mobilize regardless of the signal. Rewriting the first
inequality as X ≷ D1 −D2 −G, we see that when a Government mobilizes only when warned, the
attacking Militant’s choice of signals depends on the political cost for harming civilians, balanced
against the amount of expected damage sacrificed by warning and the cost that can be imposed on
the Government by inducing it to mobilize. Higher values of X and G will encourage the Militant
to warn, and higher values of D1 −D2 will discourage warning. Looking at the second inequality
(giving the incentives for warning or not warning an unresponsive Government), the choice de-
pends only on the value of X . If there is any cost for harming civilians, an attacking Militant will
give warnings.29 We can summarize these findings in a proposition:
Proposition 1 (attacking Militants’ incentives for warning)
An attacking Militant’s incentive to warn:
1. Increases as the political cost for harming civilians (X) increases
2. Increases as the Government’s cost of mobilizing (G) increases (assuming the Government will
mobilize when warned)
3. Decreases as the expected damage sacrificed (D1 − D2) increases (assuming the Government
will mobilize when warned)
4. Depends only on whether X > 0 in cases where the Government will never mobilize.
Figure 14 represents the proposition graphically, in cases where the Government would mobilize in
response to a warning, but not to a non-warning. Above the surface, the attacking Militant gives
warnings. Below the surface, it does not.
29There is also a possibility that the Government could mobilize regardless of the signal, in which case the
attacking Militant always receives D2 −G and is indifferent between warning and not warning. We would
specify the Militant’s behavior as necessary to sustain the equilibrium.
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Figure 14: Attacking Militant’s Signal When Government Mobilizes Selectively
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In interpreting the figure and the proposition, it is important to consider what it means to col-
lapse D1 and D2 onto a single axis. In effect, we are treating these parameters as if they represent
a single variable, “expected damage sacrificed.” Empirically, we expect that with advance warn-
ing of an attack, a government can dispatch police to the scene of the emergency, evacuate people,
and attempt to thwart the attack (e.g. by defusing the bomb). The damage sacrificed is likely to
depend upon the competence of police and bomb squads, and also on the type of target attacked.
If the target is a specific person, for example, the damage sacrificed may be quite high, because the
intended target may be moved out of the way, spoiling the attack entirely (D2 = 0). If the target is
a group of people, police may succeed in moving some of them out of the way, but some may still
be harmed. D2 will be non-zero, but overall, D1 −D2 will be relatively high. However, if the tar-
get is something that cannot be moved, a building for instance, D2 will not be much smaller than
D1. Attacks on physical property, particularly buildings and other large, immobile property, will
have relatively low values of D1 −D2. Because the damage sacrificed is lower, Militants will have
greater incentive to give warning when attacking property targets, as opposed to human targets.
We can derive four testable hypotheses from Proposition 1:
H1: Militants are more likely to give warnings when they pay a high political cost for causing excessive
civilian casualties. In concrete terms, certain militant groups may require the support, or at least the
acquiescence of certain political audiences. If those audiences hold casualty averse preferences,
the militant group may give warnings to prevent excessive casualties from the attack.
H2: Militants are more likely to give warnings when responding to warnings carries a high cost for the
government. For instance, militants have incentives to give warnings when they attack econom-
ically critical areas. Evacuating and searching those areas imposes costs on the state’s economy.
Deliberately imposing these costs may be a useful coercive tactic for the militant group.
H3: Militants are more likely to give warnings when doing so does not greatly reduce the expected damage
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from an attack. For instance, if an attack targets physical property such as shops and infrastructure,
a warning sacrifices relatively little expected damage. The damage sacrificed will also vary based
on the government’s emergency resources: whether it can pre-position fire crews at the scene of a
threat and whether it has competent explosives experts to locate and defuse bombs.
H4: In cases where the government cannot mobilize at all, militants who face any cost for harming civilians
will warn the government.
The logic of H4 is simple and rather cynical: When the Government cannot afford to mobilize, there
are no tradeoffs for the attacker. Warning avoids the political cost of harming civilians without any
risk of a bomb squad finding and defusing the device. The attacking Militant gives warnings be-
cause it knows the warnings will never be heeded. Empirically, one might observe militants warning a
disorganized government with no capacity to mobilize; warning the government before attacking
targets that are too difficult to evacuate (stadiums, city centers, etc.); or warning the government
before attacking distant rural areas or busy urban areas that are hard for emergency services to
navigate. In these scenarios, the attacker’s warning is self-exculpatory but empty because no one
expects the government to mobilize.
Result 2: Militants Give Truthful Warnings and Governments Mobilize In Response
Recall that in cases where D1 − D2 − G + Z > 0 > D1 − D2 − G − X , attacking Militants and
the Government have compatible incentives. The attacking-type Militant prefers to give warnings
when such warnings can induce a Government mobilization. The Government prefers to mobilize
when it knows it has received a truthful warning. The only factor that can prevent cooperation of
this type is incomplete information, specifically the Government’s uncertainty about the Militant’s
type. This uncertainty arises from two sources. First, the Government may receive a prank warning
with probability ω. In addition to this problem of random noise in the signal, the Government also
knows that non-attacking Militants may choose to give false warnings of their own. However,
given sufficiently high penalties (Y ) for non-attacking Militants who give warnings, both Militant
133
types will signal truthfully. They will continue to signal truthfully whether or not the Government
mobilizes in response to warnings it receives. The conditions for this result are:
1. D1 −D2 + Z > G > D1 −D2 −X
2. Y > (1− ω)G
3. X > 0 (and when indifferent, attacking Militants do not warn)
4. When indifferent between warning and not warning, non-attacking Militants do not warn.
Because both Militant types are signaling truthfully, the Government is able to update its beliefs.
θW =
α
α(1−ω)+ω giving a condition of α >
Gω
D1−D2+Z−G(1−ω) for the Government to mobilize when
warned. Having met the conditions discussed in Result 1 (X > D1 − D2 − G and X > 0), the
attacking Militant sends warnings regardless of the Government’s anticipated response. θ¬W = 0
and the Government never mobilizes upon receiving non-warnings.
Figure 15 (on page 135) represents this condition. Above the surface, the Government mobilizes
only in response to warnings. Below the surface it never mobilizes, regardless of the signal.
There is also the possibility that non-attacking Militants face a Y penalty too low to deter them
from giving warnings – formally, (1 − ω)G > Y . Militants’ signals “pool” and the Government re-
ceives a warning regardless of the Militant’s type. The Government cannot update its beliefs based
on the signal, and the prior probability of attacks (α) may or may not be sufficient to justify mo-
bilization. The Government mobilizes if α > GD1−D2+Z . Both types of Militant continue to warn,
regardless of the Government’s anticipated response. The conditions for this result are:
1. D1 −D2 + Z > G > D1 −D2 −X
2. (1− ω)G > Y
3. X > 0 (and when indifferent, attacking Militants do not warn)
4. When indifferent between warning and not warning, non-attacking Militants warn.
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Figure 15: Government Response to Warnings When Militants Signal Truthfully
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Figure 16 shows the condition for Governments to respond to warnings under conditions of signal
pooling. Above the surface, the Government mobilizes only in response to warnings. Below the
surface, it does not mobilize in response to warnings or to non-warnings.
Figure 16: Government Response to Warnings When Militants Pool On Warning
Although there are differences between the figures, the condition portrayed in each is broadly
similar. When Militants signal truthfully, the Government mobilizes if it receives a warning and
α > GωD1−D2+Z−G(1−ω) . When both types of Militant warn, the Government mobilizes if it receives
a warning and α > GD1−D2+Z . In either case, the Government’s decision to mobilize depends upon
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the cost of mobilizing (G), the expected damage saved by mobilizing (D1 −D2), and the political
penalty (Z) the Government will pay if it ignores a truthful warning. We can summarize these
findings in a general proposition:
Proposition 2 (Government incentives for mobilizing)
Assuming that attacking Militants warn, the Government’s incentive to mobilize when warned:
1. Decreases as the Government’s cost of mobilizing (G) increases
2. Increases as the expected damage saved (D1 −D2) increases
3. Increases as the political cost for ignoring truthful warnings (Z) increases
Looking at the role of G, D1, and D2, the Government’s incentives to mobilize increase as the at-
tacking Militant’s incentive to warn decrease. This is because whatever utility the Government
loses via G, D1, and D2, the attacking Militant gains. Not all the utilities are zero-sum, however.
In the same way that X (the cost of harming civilians) incentivizes the attacking Militant to warn,
Z (the cost of ignoring truthful warnings) incentivizes the Government to mobilize when warned.
An observed pattern of warnings and responses is, to some degree, a story of political accountabil-
ity encouraging Militants and Governments to cooperate in a way that saves lives. We can derive
several testable hypotheses from Proposition 2:
H5: Governments are more likely to mobilize when the damage saved will be high. For instance, gov-
ernments will be more likely to mobilize when attacks endanger people who can be moved out of
the way, or when their security forces are highly capable of defusing bombs.
H6: Governments are less likely to mobilize when doing so is costly. As mentioned in the explana-
tion of H2 above, response costs will be higher if governments have to evacuate busy urban areas
or areas of economic significance.
H7: Governments are more likely to mobilize if key audiences will impose political costs on the govern-
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ment for ignoring truthful warnings. In concrete terms, ignoring truthful warnings may be costly if
governments face competitive political systems and news media that will report whether security
forces responded to a warning or ignored it.
Result 3: Noise May Hinder the Government or Help It by Keeping Militants Truthful
The main difference between Figure 15 and Figure 16 above is that in Figure 15, the parameter
ω affects the curvature of the surface. At low values of ω, the curvature is greatest. Assuming a
relatively high starting value of G, small increases will require very large corresponding increases
in α (the prior probability of attacks) for the Government to mobilize when warned. Assuming a
relatively low starting value of G, further increases can be offset by very small increases in α, so
that the Government will still mobilize when warned.
Yet as ω → 1, the surface loses curvature. This is because at ω = 1, it is impossible for non-
attacking Militants to give non-warnings that reach the Government unchanged. Attacking and
non-attacking Militants’ signals effectively pool, and the condition for Government mobilization
becomes: α > GD1−D2+Z , with the critical value of α a simple, linear function of G. This is the
same condition represented graphically in Figure 16. The only difference is that in Figure 16, the
pooling results from non-attacking Militants’ false warnings, not from the random noise of pranks.
Now note that the value of α required by the Government to justify mobilizing is as low or lower
in the case where non-attacking Militants do not warn (Figure 15), compared to the pooling case
(Figure 16) where the non-attacking Militant warns. Mobilization is always easier to sustain in
the semi-separating case, because for any combination of parameter values, GωD1−D2+Z−G(1−ω) <
G
D1−D2+Z . By implication, things that discourage the non-attacking Militant from warning help to
sustain the Government’s mobilization.
Prank warnings serve such a role. Occurring with probability ω, pranks mobilize the Government
without requiring the Militant to pay Y . The non-attacking Militant’s condition for not warning a
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Government that will mobilize in response is Y > (1− ω)G. A high rate of prank warnings drives
the right side of the inequality toward zero, making warning a less appealing strategy for the non-
attacking Militant and requiring only a small Y to deter the Militant from warning.
Recalling that in the pooling case (Figure 16), the frequency of pranks makes no difference in
the Government’s condition to mobilize, a hypothetical increase in ω would have no down side
for the Government, and would actually be helpful if it crossed the critical threshold at which the
non-attacking Militant is deterred from warning. Prank warnings at this threshold increase the
Government’s ability to mobilize and spare civilians from harm. It is only beyond that threshold, in
the semi-separating case where the non-attacking Militant has already been deterred from warn-
ing, that prank warnings begin to reduce the Government’s incentive to mobilize when warned.
Within that semi-separating case, however, the Government is always better off, until ω reaches a
value of 1 and the condition for mobilizing becomes identical to that in the pooling case. We can
summarize these results in a proposition:
Proposition 3 (Prank warnings and political penalties keep non-attacking Militants truthful)
Given the non-attacking Militant’s condition to refrain from false warnings, Y > (1 − ω)G, the
incentive to warn falsely:
1. Decreases as the probability of prank warnings (ω) increases
2. Decreases as the political cost for giving false warnings (Y ) increases
3. Increases as the Government’s cost of mobilizing (G) increases
We can derive three testable hypotheses from this proposition:
H8: Militants are more likely to give false warnings if mobilizing is costly for the government. As men-
tioned in the explanation of H2 and H6, response costs will be higher if governments have to
evacuate busy urban areas or areas of economic significance.
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H9: Militants are less likely to give false warnings if doing so carries a high political cost. Empirically, the
costs of false warnings will be higher if the militant group’s political strategy depends on honest
communication – in diplomatic negotiations, in appeals to local populations it wishes to govern,
or in warnings about actual attacks where a government mobilization is essential to saving lives.
Another interpretation of Y is as a cost that militant groups impose on their own cells. Granting
that different cells may carry out different attacks, militant leaders may threaten to discipline those
who warn when not authorized to do so. This might occur if D2 + G > D1, such that attacking
Militants prefer the payoff from warning and inducing a response to the payoff from warning a
Government that will not respond. So that attacking cells can carry out the group’s armed cam-
paign more effectively, the leadership of a militant group might threaten to expel, “kneecap,” or
otherwise punish cells or members who warn when not actually attacking.
H10: Militants are less likely to give false warnings if there is already a high probability of prank warnings
Empirically, we may see a high volume of prank warnings if technologies (telephones, email, text
messages, social media, etc.) make it easy for pranksters to give anonymous warnings that cannot
be distinguished from those of actual militants. We may also see a high volume of prank warn-
ings directed at particular targets that are focal points of politics, popular culture, and business.
If pranksters are already giving a high volume of credible-sounding warnings about attacks on a
target, militants have less reason to do so.
6.2 Hypothesis Testing
In this section, I use evidence from my IRA and ETA case studies to test hypotheses about the
communication of warnings and the government response to them. Testing these hypotheses is
somewhat more complicated than testing Hypotheses 1-3 earlier. The difficulty arises from the
zero sum nature of certain payoffs in my model. Hypothesis 5, for instance, states that govern-
ments are more likely to mobilize in response to warnings when the damage saved (D1 − D2)
will be high. Hypothesis 3, discussed earlier, states that militants are likely to warn when doing
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so does not greatly reduce the expected damage from an attack. Looking at any one incident,
evidence presented in favor of one hypothesis seems necessarily to contradict the other. (If the
damage saved by the government was high enough to justify a mobilization, why did the militant
group decide to give a warning in the first place?) The same is true of Hypothesis 6 (governments
are less likely to mobilize in response to warnings when mobilizations are very costly) and Hy-
pothesis 2 (militants are likely to warn when doing so is costly for the government). The non-zero
sum nature of the penalty parameters Y and Z helps to explain why warning could be in a mil-
itant group’s best interest at the same time that responding is in the government’s best interest.
But on the equilibrium path, the players in the model may not incur these penalties. By impli-
cation, then, we should not see actual militants and governments incur them. Two strategies can
help us unravel this logical knot. First, we can ask former conflict participants which costs and
benefits they weighed in making their decisions about whether to warn and whether to respond.
Second, we can look for informative accidents. The actors in the model may never incur costs on
the equilibrium path, but reality is messier than theory. There are cases where militants intend to
give warnings but technical failures prevent the from doing so. The La Mon restaurant bombing
and Bloody Friday are two examples. These cases allow us to observe and measure political costs
the actors usually avoided by engaging in equilibrium warning behavior. In other cases, we may
see police respond ineffectively to warnings, despite their best intentions to evacuate people from
harm’s way. The Hipercor bombing by ETA is one example. Despite our inability to observe the
non-zero sum costs when militants are warning and governments are responding, these informa-
tive (and above all else tragic) cases can show us what the costs would have been, had the actors
chosen not to warn or not to respond on a regular basis.
6.2.1 Testing Hypotheses 4, 8, and 9: Come-Ons, Hoaxes, and Empty Warnings
[Y]ou would treble the effect of just planting one bomb by issuing other hoaxes at the same time.
-– Republican #2
Hypotheses 4, 8, and 9 pertain to cynical warning behavior by the militant group. Hypothesis 4,
for instance, states that in cases where the government absolutely cannot respond, militants with
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any political cost for harming civilians will give warnings. In essence, militants will give warnings
when they know those warnings will be useless. This hypothesis is borne out by evidence from
my interviews of Northern Ireland police. Police interviewees cited cases where IRA members
hand-delivered bombs to small business targets such as pubs and lunch counters. The IRA vol-
unteers delivering the bombs did not call police before delivering the bombs, but instead shouted
a warning to people in the shop, telling them to leave. In principle, such a warning could allow
meaningful evacuations of the targeted restaurants (by the patrons on their own initiative), but
some of these bombs had such short fuses that, in the words of the high-level RUC Special Branch
source, “only your people could get out.” The goal of such warnings, the source argued, is not to
allow “anyone else in the shop to get out into the street.” Rather, the goal is to allow the group to
“manage their own public relations” after the fact, by claiming that in every case, the group gave a
warning. In cases where people were killed or seriously injured by reckless or indiscriminate tac-
tics, the IRA could then claim “that was a mistake with the device” or a mistake in “understanding
how long the warning would actually be” – a failure of implementation, rather than evidence of
inhumane intent. By this account, IRA behavior upheld the prediction of Hypothesis 4.
Skipping ahead in numbers, Hypotheses 8 and 9 jointly predict that militant groups will give
false warnings when they can impose high costs (G) on the government and the political cost for
giving false warnings (Y ) is not especially high. Empirically, we should expect militants to de-
scribe their own cost/benefit calculations as a comparison of how much damage can be done with
false warnings, versus how much the militant group values its own future credibility. Recalling
from the IRA case study, truthful bomb warnings served both to spare non-combatants and to
impose added costs to the Northern Ireland economy, beyond the damage caused by explosions
themselves. It was one thing to destroy a physical object or building, and another to force the
shut down of an entire neighborhood or transit system as police frantically evacuated people and
searched for the bomb. The same disruption could also be achieved without the use of a real bomb
if the IRA gave hoax warnings and police responded to them. The IRA could also use hoax warn-
ings to draw security personnel into “come-on” ambushes.
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Come-on attacks used various forms of deception: false warnings, vague warnings, warnings
that mentioned only one bomb when in fact there were several, and warnings that led to hoax de-
vices when there were real devices nearby. In some cases, the IRA would telephone false warnings
about bombs in particular places, stationing observers nearby to watch police as they responded
to the warning. After noting how police approached the area, how they cleared it, and the posi-
tions taken up by police in the protective “cordon,” the IRA would carry out a come-on operation,
issuing another false warning and ambushing police as they attempted the evacuate, clear, and
cordon response. Such incidents were so pervasive, according to an RUC Special Branch intel-
ligence expert, that “uppermost in your mind” when responding to warnings “was that every
single one of them was a come-on. Every single one.”
Even when planning a real commercial attack, the IRA would look for ways of attacking police
who responded to the warning. According to John O’Hagan, an IRA member twice imprisoned for
explosives-related offenses, it was a “very rare occasion that [the IRA] didn’t look for the second
opportunity.” The opportunity might involve planting a second device or a sniper at the scene of
the bombing. (Republican #1 recalled that it was always “open season if somebody could have a
shot” at the RUC.) Or the opportunity might involve booby trapping the commercial bomb itself.
The Army unit tasked with responding to IRA bombs in Northern Ireland lost twenty explosives
experts during the conflict (Ryder 2005: 46) Several were killed by booby trapped devices, oth-
erwise standard-looking bombs with hidden components that detonated when a weapons expert
attempted to disable the bomb.
Antton Etxebeste recalled ETA using similar tactics. The group booby trapped its bombs, planted
extra devices at the scene, and took shots at security forces as they approached. Another favorite
tactic was the cazabobo, literally “fool hunter,” the attachment of bombs to Basque flags and other il-
legal items that police would notice and attempt to remove, with deadly consequences. Warnings,
coupled with all of these tactics, imposed heavy response costs on Spanish and British security
143
forces. (They also made it difficult to defuse IRA and ETA bombs, a fact my interview subjects
repeatedly noted.)
The IRA also used false warnings and dummy devices to induce police evacuations unrelated
to any real bomb threat. The group’s commercial bombing campaign was intended to cause dis-
ruption, via the bombs’ physical effects first of all, and also by forcing evacuations and traffic
diversions in the middle of the business day. The IRA realized that hoax warnings could create
the latter effect without the need for a real bomb. Hoax warnings might be interspersed with
truthful warnings on a particularly busy day of attacks. Republican #2 recalled:
If on the same day you planted one bomb but you give three other bomb warnings,
you could cause major disruption: traffic disruption, business disruption, you would
treble the effect of just planting one bomb by issuing other hoaxes at the same time.
The IRA also made false threats that stood on their own. Pure hoax warnings could be incred-
ibly disruptive, while physically endangering no one and costing the IRA virtually nothing to
carry out. IRA used such tactics extensively during the later part of the conflict. A December 17,
1991 IRA threat against London mainline rail stations induced the British Transport Police and
Scotland Yard to shut down the entire London commuter rail system. A small bomb detonated
near one rail station, but overall, the “attack” was a massive hoax that stranded 1,000 trains and
450,000 commuters and caused £50 million in financial losses. The IRA used hoax tactics against
English highways on March 26 and April 3, 1997, at a stage in the conflict when actual violence
might have set back peace negotiations. These hoaxes caused £80 million in economic losses but
harmed no one physically. Another series of bloodless hoaxes from April 18-21, 1997 shut down
most of England’s major transport infrastructure, including London Heathrow, Gatwick, Luton,
and Stansted airports, the M6 highway, major rail lines around Leeds, London Tube stations, and
Trafalgar Square. According to John O’Hagan, the IRA nicknamed these hoax tactics “the 10p,”
after the ten pence cost of making a pay telephone call.
Although ETA and the IRA behaved similarly in many respects, one important difference in their
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behavior concerned the issuance of hoax warnings. ETA issued misleading warnings to draw
government security personnel into dangerous situations, but it did not engage in pure hoaxes
– warnings with no relation to any real attack. Antton Etxebeste explained that false warnings
“would have discredited us.” By refraining from pure hoaxes, ETA sought to maintain a rep-
utation for, if not trustworthiness, at least credibility. “ETA never lies” outright, according to
Etxebeste. “Never. Precisely so that the credibility of the organization was complete.” To check
the truth of this claim, I consulted high-level Guardia Civil counterterrorism experts. Although
they did not wish to be cited or quoted directly, they confirmed Etxebeste’s account. ETA used
incomplete and misleading warnings to attack the Guardia Civil and police, but the group never
engaged in outright fabrication, the way the IRA did in its massive hoaxes of the 1990’s. When
ETA called on the phone, Spanish security officials could be sure that something terrible was about
to happen, to someone else or to them, depending on what ETA had in store.
Given the other similarities between ETA and the IRA, why did the groups adopt such differ-
ent behavior with regard to hoax warnings? My formal model suggests that the difference should
be attributable to different values of the G and Y parameters, representing the response costs that
can be imposed on the government and the political cost the group expects to pay for lying. The
costs the groups imposed on security forces were comparable. ETA could easily have given false
warnings about attacks on Spanish transit targets, inflicting economic costs just as heavy as those
the IRA imposed on Britain. ETA chose not to, however.
The difference appears to be related to the political costs of lying, here interpreted as the cost
of lost credibility. Antton Etxebeste referenced three specific disasters in ETA’s past, in which the
group had given warnings and the Spanish government had not acted on them. Two were the at-
tacks on casas cuarteles in Zaragoza and Vic, disasters ETA brought on itself by attacking the living
quarters of police and their families, assuming that warnings would cause the families to leave, or
at least provide ETA with moral cover if the families did not leave and ETA’s bombs killed them.
The third disaster was that at Hipercor. In that case ETA did give warnings forty minutes in ad-
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vance, allowing police enough time to clear the supermarket before the bomb exploded in the car
park below. But police failed to act in a timely and effective fashion. In civil proceedings, Spanish
courts later found police responsible for the deaths of the Hipercor victims, citing a slow response
by police, and their failure to search the car park with sufficient care to find the bomb. After clear-
ing the building once, police allowed shoppers back in. This information came out over a matter
of months, however. In the immediate aftermath of Hipercor, ETA paid the political price for the
twenty-one deaths. The day after the bombing, 750,000 people packed the streets of Barcelona in
massive street demonstrations against ETA and its violence (Delaney 1987). This did not happen
in Northern Ireland after Bloody Friday, the La Mon bombing, or the Omagh bombing, the three
worst atrocities of that conflict. The IRA definitely paid political costs, particularly in the loss of
international financing from America, but there were no mass street demonstrations by the public.
At any rate, Bloody Friday, La Mon, and Omagh were caused by Irish Republicans’ own errors:
inadequate warnings, garbled warnings, or setting off too many bombs at once. The Hipercor
attack was a bloodbath because police dismissed ETA’s warning after a belated and superficial
check of the premises. ETA paid a political price and it did not forget the experience. Refraining
from hoax warnings, according to Etxebeste, was one of several procedures the group adopted to
ensure that its credibility was “complete” when it gave truthful warnings. The group’s abstinence
from pure hoaxes, despite the IRA’s engaging in that behavior, is consistent with H9, that militant
groups are less likely to give false warnings when the political cost of doing so is high.
6.3 Testing Hypotheses 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10: Phone Chains, Maps, and Codes
You knew that it was serious when they said “Have you got a pen and paper?”– Journalist #1
To test Hypotheses 4-7 and 10, I consider the communication process that the IRA and ETA used
to issue their warnings. It is difficult to observe all of the political costs and benefits that the IRA,
ETA, and government officials considered in deciding whether to give warnings and whether to
respond. However, the actors in these cases developed an extraordinary set of procedures for the
communication and authentication of warning messages. They did not settle on these procedures
by accident. By examining the procedures and asking conflict participants to explain the under-
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lying logic, I develop a picture of the cost and benefit calculations made by each side. I also gain
insights about how each side viewed the other, including the cost and benefit calculations each
assumed the other was making, when deciding whether to warn or whether to respond.
The IRA and ETA wanted to give warnings for their commercial bombings, but if the groups
could not communicate messages in a timely and credible fashion, the police response would be
ineffective or non-existent. To complicate matters further, police could still ignore whatever warn-
ings they received if they judged it not to be in their own best interest to respond. Given the
circumstances, the IRA and ETA selected the means of warning not only for the effectiveness of
conveying the message. They also considered the role the communication mechanism could play
in structuring police incentives about whether to respond.
The IRA had different methods of communicating a bomb warning, depending on the tactical
details of the attack. The most direct method of giving warning was for one of the attackers to
shout the message to people in the vicinity of the target. This removed the element of uncertainty
over police behavior. “[I]f a device was carried into the shop by masked men,” Republican #2
explained, “the shopkeeper would be directly informed: ‘This is a bomb! Get everyone out!”’
The IRA used this method with small, short-fused bombs — a type used to attack pubs and other
crowded locations where bombs could not easily be hidden, or where a longer-fused bomb planted
in advance might be picked up and moved by some unsuspecting civilian. But short-fuse bombs
and in-person warnings were inherently risky. If the bomb went off prematurely or the bombers
failed to set it down before the timer reached zero, the operation effectively became a no-warning
attack – and a disaster for the bombers. The October 23, 1993 Shankill Road fish shop attack is one
infamous example. Two IRA volunteers disguised as delivery men brought a bomb into Frizzell’s
Fish Shop, hidden under a tray of fish. The IRA’s intended target was a meeting of the Ulster
Defence Association, a loyalists paramilitary group, purportedly taking place in a room above the
shop. The bomb’s eleven-second fuse went off before the IRA men could shout a warning. The
attack killed ten people, including two girls, ages seven and thirteen, and one of the bombers.
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When the IRA employed the less risky methods of hiding a device in the target area or driving
the device in the form of a car bomb, the group typically gave a warning by telephone. Members
of the IRA would inform police and often the target business of the impending attack. Accord-
ing to convicted bomber Dinker McClanahan, these warnings might be given by a spotter, who
after following the bomb team “to make sure everybody’s getting away . . . just drove over to the
nearest telephone.” Another common practice, according to the RUC Special Branch intelligence
expert, was to have an IRA commander at the battalion level or higher make the warning call
from a location far removed from the attack. The caller would know the target of the attack and
the time the bomb was set to go off. She or he would be more experienced and under less stress
than volunteers placing the device. The caller would also be able to choose a telephone based on
convenience. The advantage of this method was that the caller was less likely to garble the details
of the warning. The drawback was that if a bomber left a device in the wrong place, parked a
car bomb on the wrong side of the building, got stuck in traffic, or was stopped at a police check-
point, the warning caller would not know this. She or he would make the warning call as if the
operation had gone as planned. The consequences could be terrible, with police moving people
to the wrong area, possibly taking them closer to the bomb. The twenty-nine fatalities in the 1998
Omagh bombing (carried out by dissident Republicans who rejected the peace agreement) appear
to have resulted from this type of failure (BBC 1998).
These dangers notwithstanding, the IRA incorporated yet another layer of complexity into its
warning procedure: the use of a third party intermediary. Rather than calling police directly, the
IRA typically called a third party not affiliated with the police or the government, and made that
party relay the warning message to police. This procedure became institutionalized as the Trou-
bles dragged on. For the crucial middle link, the IRA might phone charity organizations, members
of the clergy, hospitals, news organizations, taxi cab companies, and even insurance companies.30
According to Dinker McClanahan, those making warning calls generally chose an intermediary
30The examples of taxi and insurance companies were offered by a former taxi dispatcher and Journalist
#1.
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“with credibility or with stature within the local community,” so that police would believe the
warning message. Response time was critical however, so the middle party could be “anybody
who you thought was going to lift the phone immediately. The last thing you wanted was to be
ringing and ringing and there’s nobody.”
The IRA frequently communicated warnings to the Samaritans organization, a charity that op-
erates 24-hour suicide hotlines in the UK and the Republic of Ireland. The IRA also placed warn-
ing calls to the switchboards of news organizations, including the BBC, The Irish News, and RTÉ
(Irish state broadcasting). Journalist #1, who worked at a news organization that received many
warnings, gave a detailed description of the process of handling these calls:
The call would come through to the switchboard and staff were trained to handle such
calls because they were reasonably frequent. . . . The staff . . . were trained to ask
specific information. They would sometimes ask them [the IRA] to repeat information
as well if they were unclear. . . . Usually they would say the message they wanted to
say, that there’s a bomb at such-and-such a place and it’s timed to go off at such-and-
such a time. . . . Sometimes you don’t get that much detail. They would just say there’s
a bomb in the street, or a certain area. . . . You knew that it was serious when they said
“Have you got a pen and paper?” because they want the information to be recorded
accurately and they would speak more slowly and more deliberately to make sure that
you get the information, so that it’s passed on properly to the authorities.
ETA also used a system of intermediaries to communicate warnings to police. According to Ant-
ton Etxebeste, the intermediaries could be “various agencies of a public, institutional character
... the Red Cross, radio stations ... or other organizations.” In addition to making phone calls
through intermediaries, ETA also provided its intermediaries with physical maps that could be
used to locate bombs. According to Etxebeste, ETA used maps to increase the precision of its
warnings when attacking tourist beaches and the Spanish railway system.
A bomb might be buried under a particular section of beach or railroad, with an electronic fuse
set to go off weeks later at a specific time. ETA would know the time and precise location of the
attack, but the sand dune or rail trestle in question would not have a street address. ETA needed a
different means of describing the location of the bomb so that police could find and evacuate the
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threatened area in a timely fashion. Etxebeste recalls that days or weeks in advance of a bombing
(or bombings), a map “was deposited ... in an impersonal mailbox” for “the media or an orga-
nization like DYA [a Spanish emergency service] to pick up.” ETA would call the intermediary
organization, inform them that “there is a map,” and tell them where to find it. The map would
show the section of coastline or railway in which the bombs were hidden, but it would not show
the precise locations of the bombs. As such, intermediaries and police would not have enough
information to locate ETA’s bombs using the map alone. On the day of the attack, minutes or
hours before the explosion, ETA would telephone the intermediary organization again, informing
them that bombs were “more or less in this area of the beach” or “from this kilometer to that kilo-
meter” of the railway shown on the map. The phone call would give police just enough time and
information to evacuate civilians from the targeted area. However, because the map itself showed
a sufficiently large area to be useless without the phone call, ETA could use the same map for
different bomb attacks throughout a campaign.
The use of intermediaries, drop boxes, and maps introduced additional risks of human error cor-
rupting the warning process. The IRA and ETA had reasons for communicating in this way, how-
ever. First, the intermediary system eliminated risks of police tracing a warning phone call and
arresting the person making it. Second, the intermediary system imposed accountability on police
and other emergency responders.
Several IRA interviewees alleged that police and British military or intelligence personnel, work-
ing in collaboration, ignored bomb warnings by the IRA, intentionally causing non-combatant
fatalities to undermine the IRA’s support. Recalling Mao’s metaphor of the fish and the sea, Re-
publican #4 suggested that UK authorities would “[l]et the bombs go off. Let a couple of civilians
be killed” to “pollute the sea.” None of the Republican interviewees could cite a specific occa-
sion when police or the army ignored a bomb warning, but the belief that the authorities ignored
warnings goes back at least to Bloody Friday. In an interview years after the event, IRA Chief of
Staff Seán Mac Stíofáin explained:
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It required only one man with a loud hailer to clear each target area in no time. ... Re-
publicans were convinced that the British had deliberately disregarded these . . . warn-
ings for strategic policy reasons (BBC 2002).
The RUC Special Branch intelligence veteran offered a different interpretation of events, arguing
that the IRA failed to appreciate the complexity of responding to bomb warnings. The police
organization had its own internal phone chain, which the IRA could not see, stretching from a
headquarters switchboard and Force Control office, to Belfast Regional Control or the divisional
or subdivisional headquarters corresponding to the target location, to a dispatcher who would
notify RUC patrols of the alleged bomb in their area. IRA spotters might be watching the scene of
a bomb, and police might be in the vicinity doing absolutely nothing to evacuate the area. “The
brutal fact,” according to the RUC veteran, was that the warning “may not have gotten around
to them because of the chain that it had to go through.” Police who appeared to the IRA as if
they were dragging their feet or ignoring a warning were just as ignorant as the shoppers and
other civilians in the vicinity. By the time police at the scene were alerted to the bomb, they might
have very little time left for the evacuation. IRA members like Seán Mac Stíofáin would have
interpreted any casualties in these attacks as intentional malfeasance by police, committed for
“strategic policy reasons.”
Antton Etxebeste expressed a similarly cynical view of Spanish police. Although ETA accepted
responsibility for the attack at Hipercor and expressed regret at the deaths it had caused, Etxebeste
describes the group’s lingering anger about the behavior of police that day. ETA’s mistake, Etxebeste
argues, was “overconfidence” in the police. Police, through some combination of disbelief, lazi-
ness, or disinterest in saving ETA from the consequences of its own behavior, “set a trap for us.”
ETA “fell into the police’s trap” by showing too much faith and giving police too many ways of
evading responsibility for the damage caused by their inadequate response. After Hipercor, ETA
assumed that police would ignore bomb warnings or drag their feet intentionally so that people
would be harmed by ETA’s bombs. Because “the police themselves might not acknowledge the
warning and might set a trap for us,” ETA instead placed its warning calls through third party
intermediaries – often several at a time. The intermediaries would pass the messages on and if
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police failed to act, the intermediaries could later verify that the group had given warnings and
the casualties were (at least by ETA’s reckoning) the fault of police.
IRA members offer a virtually identical explanation for their group’s use of intermediaries. Re-
publican #4 describes the group’s use of media switchboards as a way “to get a witness” and have
it “on the record” that a warning was given. If police failed to respond or responded too late to
save civilians at the scene, the intermediary could also verify the approximate time the warning
was given and what information it contained. If police knew that journalists and charity workers
had this information, they could not ignore a warning and escape accountability for having done
so. The IRA leveraged police accountability even further by making redundant warning calls, us-
ing “a number of organizations to spread the warning and to get the information out” (Journalist
#1’s words). Redundant channels hedged against “misunderstanding or difficulty in forwarding
the communication,” according to Republican #2. They put the information into the hands of
several organizations, who would forward mutually reinforcing warning messages to police, and
could offer mutually reinforcing accounts of the IRA’s warning later on if the police did ignore the
message and civilians were killed by the bomb.
This use of intermediaries, and redundant intermediaries in particular, follows the logic of Hy-
potheses 5-7. The IRA and ETA knew that police would weigh the costs of responding (G) against
the amount of damage that could be saved by evacuating civilians and defusing bombs (D1−D2).
The IRA and ETA knew they had raised the government’s costs of responding by coupling warn-
ings to ambushes. They had also reduced the damage savings police could hope to achieve, by
stationing snipers near their bombs and booby trapping the devices to keep army explosives tech-
nicians at bay. What was to keep police from ignoring warnings (and imposing heavy political
costs on the militant groups by doing so)? Communicating warnings through intermediaries
raised the government’s political cost (Z) for ignoring truthful warnings and allowing civilians
to die. Using intermediaries made the warning public information – not unlike the public threats
and promises discussed in the international relations literature on audience costs. That literature
152
argues that leaders will leverage their own accountability to structure their future payoffs – mak-
ing it impossible for them to back down from deterrent threats. The IRA and ETA gave warnings
through intermediaries to leverage their opponents’ accountability, structuring police’s future pay-
offs so that failing to respond to a warning carried prohibitively high political costs.
ETA and the IRA appear to have overestimated the cynicism of Spanish and British police, how-
ever. All of the RUC officers I interviewed expressed the same belief that it was their duty as civil
servants to investigate each bomb warning they received. One former RUC officer at the rank of
Chief Superintendent explained:
[T]he only issue you had was somebody’s telling me there’s a bomb somewhere. Do
I believe them? Is it a come-on? Or is it real? In any case, my duty as would be that
of any other public servant in any other part of the world — and that’s what we were,
public servants -– to try to minimize loss of life. And we had no choice but to go.
This did not mean that the RUC put the same degree of energy into investigating every bomb
warning. Police did balance costs and benefits of responding, and in cases where the warning
did not sound credible, they invested relatively little time in investigating it. Former police there,
including the very high-level RUC Special Branch source, describe a “graduated response” to
warnings based on their apparent credibility. Warnings that sounded “childish” or otherwise
unlikely to be authentic received “a cursory check” but perhaps not any attention beyond that.
Warnings that sounded credible received the RUC’s full and persistent attention. The specter
of accountability may have influenced police and other government officials at the policy level,
where people made decisions about standard operating procedures and how risk averse to be
in investigating threats at each “graduated” level. For instance, after a particularly costly hoax
shut down English transit infrastructure in 1997, the British transport secretary stated that his
preference was to investigate every threat rather than “risking death and injury to the public”
(Sengupta 1997). As a high-level RUC source put it, “you were always dealing with people’s
lives.” My IRA and ETA interviewees discuss police incentives in the cynical terms of my formal
model, where governments may rationally decide to ignore bomb threats against their citizens.
But in both the ETA and IRA cases, the manipulation of Z seems to have been a step beyond what
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was necessary to get police to respond. On the other hand, the use of intermediaries was helpful
in resolving a separate issue: trust.
6.4 The Importance of Trust
You have to trust your enemy as well as your friends, don’t you? – Republican #1
From the beginning of the Troubles, police dealt with a high volume of hoax warnings emanating
from people outside the IRA. Available data on the hoax phenomenon are partial, but revealing.
The RUC reported 658 hoax incidents in 1971-2. The British Army’s 321st Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) unit investigated 572 bomb hoaxes from July 1976 to July 1977, a figure that ex-
cludes incidents that the RUC investigated without calling for army assistance. A 1971 report by
RUC’s Chief Constable expressed police frustration with the hoax problem:
Bomb hoaxes, averaging some twenty each day in the city of Belfast were a dreadful
menace and added to the problems of the security forces and the trading and shopping
public. Each hoax necessitated evacuation of buildings and diversion of traffic and
considering that several areas of the city might be affected at any one time it can readily
be appreciated the large number of police required daily for this work.
The IRA sometimes created its own hoaxes to disrupt the local economy. However, non-IRA
hoaxes could stretch police resources at the very moment when the IRA needed police to respond
to a real bomb. Republican #2 recalled:
[S]ome person, with a few beers in them or not, might decide for any one of one hun-
dred thousand reasons, to issue a few bomb warnings. Now it could be an A-level
student under pressure in school. It could be somebody at work who didn’t want to be
there. . . . You just have to extend your imagination to try and cover all the possibili-
ties. . . . [I]f the IRA had an actual device in an area, but by an unfortunate coincidence
some other people were ringing in bomb warnings at the same time causing confusion,
that it could result in mayhem.
The inability of police to deal with the bombs on Bloody Friday was at least partly due to hoax
warnings received at the same time as the IRA’s real bomb warnings (McKittrick and Thornton
2001: 229-230). Even on a day without many warnings arriving simultaneously, there was a fatigue
issue. “[T]here were just as many hoax calls as there were genuine calls,” Journalist #1 recalled.
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“A lot of time and energy and resources was lost on the calls that were hoaxes.”
Consistent with my formal model, a high frequency of hoax warnings (formally, a high value
of ω) threatened to render the government unresponsive. Aware of the problem, the IRA sought a
way to reassure police about the authenticity of its messages. Even if the IRA could not guarantee
the truth of the content (because the group continued to carry out come-ons and hoaxes) the group
sought to establish a basic trust that people purporting to speak for the IRA actually did represent
the group.
One way of doing this was to make multiple warning phone calls for the same bombing. The
IRA reasoned that making several warning calls through different intermediaries would help to
convince police that their real bomb warnings were not pranks and did in fact merit a response.
An angry drunk or a student trying to get the day off might not have the initiative, pocket change,
or phone numbers to call several different intermediaries. So, according to Republican #3, the IRA
might make “two or three phone calls [and] once the emergency services see that there’s a number
of phone calls we made, they know that it’s probably for real.” ETA adopted similar procedures,
making redundant warning calls through intermediaries such as the DYA, Basque media, and the
Red Cross.
ETA also used a second technique to differentiate its warnings from those of prank callers: audio
manipulation. Initially, ETA developed this technique to conceal information from police. Accord-
ing to Antton Etxebeste, ETA used “instruments” to distort callers’ voices, so that if intermedi-
aries recorded the warning calls, the recordings could not be used to identify the voice of the ETA
member. Media accounts describe ETA’s warning messages as having a characteristic sound: “a
recording, in which is heard the voice of a woman, distorted” (El Correo 2008). ETA’s responsibil-
ity claims after a bombing also used this manipulated sound, which was readily identifiable by
media organizations that received such calls. Etxebeste describes this as ETA’s “authorized voice”
(la voz autorizaba). The sound acts as “a code of authentication. ... When that voice is put on the
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telephone, when that voice calls, that is the voice of ETA.”
ETA’s “code of authentication” was the distortion applied to a woman’s voice in the group’s warn-
ing messages. The code made it more difficult for unauthorized individuals to give messages in-
distinguishable from those of the group. Formally, this technique reduced ω, the probability of
prank warnings that cannot be distinguished from those of the militant group. ETA’s audio ma-
nipulation represents an endogenous adjustment of ω, made by the Militant so that the Government
can more easily infer the sender’s type from the signal.
The IRA accomplished the same feat using code words. At some point during the Troubles, the
IRA began to include secret words in its warning messages to police. This intriguing aspect of
IRA-government communication is often discussed in journalistic and historical accounts, but it is
widely misunderstood. Even participants in the warning-and-response process — IRA members,
intermediaries taking warning calls, and police responding to the calls — misunderstand the true
purpose of the words. However, it is now possible, based on interviews of former police and jour-
nalists, to ascertain the true purpose of these words, and how they facilitated the communication
of warnings and other messages from the IRA to police. These interviews also give important
insight into some of the cost/benefit factors influencing police decisions on whether to respond to
IRA warnings.
The conventional understanding of code words, recounted by rank-and-file IRA members and
intermediaries, is that code words proved the authenticity of IRA messages, allowing police to re-
spond selectively to IRA warnings while ignoring non-IRA hoaxes. Aware of the large volume of
false warnings emanating from prank callers, the IRA would generate a code word and circulate
it among command-level members of its organization and among intermediaries used to convey
bomb warnings. IRA members making bomb warning phone calls would incorporate the code
word into their warning messages. As long as the code word did not leak out publicly, intermedi-
aries receiving “coded warnings” would know that the callers represented the IRA. They would
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pass the warnings on to police, informing them that the warning contained a recognized code
word, and police would respond to the warning. This narrative is seriously flawed.
The IRA would select code words that were obscure and incongruous in conversation (“just some-
thing outside your normal speech,” Dinker McClanahan explained). Obscurity drew attention to
the word and made it difficult for anyone outside the IRA to guess the code words.31 Examples of
code words included “Excalibur,” “Wonder,” “Kerrygold” (a brand of Irish butter), and “Martha
Pope” (a peace negotiator working under US Senator George Mitchell).32 At the BBC and other
news organizations, staff who received warning calls might be responsible for recording the infor-
mation, but the news editor assumed responsibility for checking the code words and passing the
messages on to police. Journalist #1 recalled a high degree of compartmentalization in this process
to protect the code words:
Our process at the moment is that if a member of staff receives a bomb warning . . . that
a more senior person contacts the police. And we are limited in what we can say, but
there are times that the more senior person may not even know what the code word is,
because we try and keep it quite tight.
Nonetheless, words did leak out from time to time. On at least one occasion, a newspaper re-
porting on a bombing at London’s Heathrow airport printed the IRA code word used to make the
warning phone call (Leigh 1974). When a leak occurred, or if the IRA had used the same word
long enough so that its compromise could be reasonably expected, the IRA changed the word.
John O’Hagan explained:
It would be an approach made to all outlets saying that the IRA’s code word is —
whatever. And every time the code word was changed they would use the old code
31Journalist #2, a former BBC reporter who worked in Belfast, recalled another more complicated system
involving two codes within the same message. A call would follow the form: “Hello. This is Paddy. There’s
a bomb at [the location of the attack]. The code word is [“Excalibur,” e.g.].” The caller would also append
the words “And we’re gonna bomb,” and make reference to one of three specific locations known by BBC
reporters as de facto code words. The BBC reporter would not identify the locations, and could only recall
one of the locations being used in a warning during her/his tenure at the BBC’s Belfast office. Yet s/he was
confident that the two other locations would have been recognized as IRA code words at that time.
32“Excalibur” provided by an anonymous journalist. For other words see Tendler (1984), Harnden (1999:
5), and The Telegraph (2000).
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word to make the new word activated [sic]. . . . Usually the leadership of the army
would do that. . . . There was one code word for the entire IRA structure. And the one
code word would be decided, signed off on, by the leadership of the army.
The considerable effort spent by the IRA and intermediaries on generating, distributing, and pro-
tecting the code words seems to reinforce the conventional explanation of code words. As Repub-
lican #1 dryly put it: “You have to trust your enemy as well as your friends.” The IRA and police
needed a way to differentiate real warnings from prank calls, so that police could devote their
limited resources only to the authentic warnings of the IRA. There are serious problems with this
narrative, however.
First, there was no particular place in the phone chain where the warnings and code words con-
verged to allow the authentication of each message. According to Journalist #1, different media
outlets “all have their own policies in terms of how they deal with calls.” Journalist #1’s organi-
zation passed the warning on to police, informing them that the warning contained a recognized
word, but the organization would not “give out the code words. . . . [S]ome organizations do tell
the police what the code word was. We feel that the fewer people know it the better.” Further
complicating the dominant narrative, intermediaries forwarded all warnings to the police, includ-
ing warnings that could not be authenticated with a recognized word. According to Journalist
#1, it was “for the security side of things to decide if it’s a real threat or not. We’re not going to
sit in judgment on that.” As a consequence, the RUC received the full set of unfiltered warnings,
including warnings with no code words, warnings with authenticated code words, and warn-
ings purportedly authenticated but not containing the code words themselves. Could the RUC
trust intermediaries who claimed to have separated the authentic warnings from the inauthentic,
although the intermediaries would not provide the code words to police for double-checking? Ig-
noring a warning posed great risks if for some reason the intermediary made a mistake.
According to veterans of the RUC’s Operations Branch (the branch tasked with responding to
warnings) the intermediary’s inclusion of the word would not have mattered anyway. RUC sta-
tions had no master list of words and no procedure for checking them. The RUC veteran at the
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rank of Chief Superintendent recalled:
I served for thirty one years and retired fairly senior in my division. No one was ever
able to explain to me this issue of the code words. No one. . . . There was never a list
in the police stations of these code words. . . . At least never one that I was ever aware
of.
Even if there had been a list of words, the words would not have been used to filter out hoax
calls or to prioritize some warnings for quicker response. By the retired Chief Superintendent’s
account, the RUC treated all bomb warnings with the same degree of urgency:
[T]he right word, the presence or absence of a word made no difference to the re-
sponse. . . . None whatsoever. Because your only question, the only issue you had was
somebody’s telling me there’s a bomb somewhere.
An RUC veteran with the rank of Superintendent recalled that “you still went and did your job”
regardless of whether a warning contained a code word. “I don’t want anybody dying because
we sat and gazed at our navel wondering what we should do. So my memory is no, if you got
a bomb warning, [you would] treat it as legitimate.” The high-level RUC Special Branch source
agreed with this assessment: “In the end, you were always dealing with people’s lives, and if you
got a bomb threat you would have been a very brave and in my opinion very foolish person to
make the judgment that you weren’t going to do something.”
The situation on the other side of the Irish Sea was similar. Peter Gurney, a British army Ammu-
nition Technical Officer (ATO) tasked with dismantling IRA bombs in London during the 1970’s,
recalled that “[f]rom 1973 onwards it was not unusual for the Metropolitan Police to receive up
to 200 hoax calls a day, [emphasis original] at least fifty of them with alleged code words. The
hoaxers read that this was IRA practice and so invented their own; we had no way of finding out
what was real and what was not.”
Setting aside the conventional narrative, which clearly does not hold up, what did code words
do for the IRA that could justify the effort spent on maintaining this system? There are several
answers to this question. First, although police could not ignore no-code warnings, the words did
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let the RUC know that certain calls came from the IRA. According to the retired RUC superinten-
dent, police would be informed by their radio dispatcher if “a recognized code word” had been
used in the warning call. (Ostensibly, the dispatcher obtained this information via the intermedi-
ary passing on the warning.) If the message contained a code word, police would “treat it as the
IRA,” assuming a higher base likelihood of a bomb or a come-on attack waiting for them. This
assumption could affect the amount of time RUC officers spent investigating an incident before
definitively declaring it a hoax. The high-level RUC Special Branch veteran explained that police
would take “graduated steps” before declaring a warning a hoax: “[I]f you got a call, [and] you
did a cursory check, there was no code word, it wasn’t credible, there was no intelligence to sup-
port it, [then] that cursory search and check may have been sufficient.” All things being equal, a
code word and no apparent come-on would have increased RUC suspicions of a real device, and
would have encouraged police to stay on the scene and continue their search. The retired RUC
Superintendent stated that the IRA could also use the code word to reiterate the warning and di-
rect police back to the scene of a bomb if the device failed to go off as planned. In these cases, the
IRA actually wanted army ATOs to find the device and dispose of it, because of the risk the bomb
posed to civilians. The code word offered a way of linking the follow-up phone call to the initial
warning, giving the police reason to re-canvass the scene.
However, the RUC Special Branch veterans suggested that the primary purpose of code words
was diplomatic. Throughout the conflict, IRA leaders communicated with the British government
to discuss the possibility of ceasefires and peace negotiations. Unable to meet with government
representatives directly, the IRA leadership would send an envoy to communicate its messages.
Although initial contacts between the envoy and British representatives might be made face-to-
face through a mutually trusted broker, that broker and envoy might not be available later. The
code word provided a way of verifying the permission of a new envoy to represent the Army
Council in discussions with the government. According to the high-level Special Branch veteran,
“if you have your initial point of contact . . . but that person is no longer going to be able to do
it, [the Army Council] would give you the password that legitimizes engagement with the next
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[envoy]. That password then becomes the legitimate vehicle for the next [envoy].”
The IRA used a similar scheme for making official statements to journalists. The IRA approached
journalists face-to-face or through some personal connection, as in the initial overture to the gov-
ernment, but subsequent statements might be given by a different person or by phone. According
to veteran Belfast journalist Eamonn Mallie:
Somewhere along the way you will meet somebody or somebody will call you and
they will literally say “From now on, the IRA will use the following code word,” so
you know, and they know that you know. Then you will be the contact point [for
statements].
Many of these statements would be claims of responsibility for attacks that the IRA had already
carried out. Journalist #3 recalled receiving such statements by telephone “from somebody who
was using a code word to authenticate that the person who was making that call was genuine.”
These responsibility claims gave credibility to IRA promises later – to continue the violence, to
increase the violence, or to reduce it – if the British government accepted IRA demands for policy
concessions or peace negotiations. But responsibility claims can be faked. Because of its cell struc-
ture, IRA units could carry out attacks semi-autonomously. Renegade factions could also split off
from the IRA. In the short term, it might be in the Army Council’s interest to claim responsibility
for things it had not actually authorized, to seem more cohesive or powerful than it was in reality.
But it was in the IRA’s long-term interest to demonstrate the extent of its control over the violence.
Code words were a means to do this.
Placing a code word in the warning messages ex ante demonstrated that the IRA had given full
authorization for those actions in advance. This demonstrated the scope of the IRA leadership’s
control. The RUC Special Branch intelligence expert explained:
[The code word] was a sign to them [the British government] of how much in control
the Provisional leadership were of their organization. So I’m sitting talking to you and
you say, . . . “You’ve got all these guys out there. All these guns, all these bombs, all
these renegades. . . wanting to kill people – How can you control those?” I’ll tell you
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how I control them. “Every time there’s an act, I’ll attach the word to it, and then you’ll
know. . . . And they do as I say. And I’ll tell you better than that, it’s a tap. I can turn it
on and I can turn it off.” It proved control over a very large terrorist organization.
By this account, the true value of code words lay in their diplomatic function. Only high levels
of the IRA structure and UK security structure would have understood this. This accounts for the
popular misunderstanding of code words among rank-and-file IRA members, intermediaries who
received warnings, and most of the RUC personnel who responded to warnings.
Taken as a whole, the above discussion lends support to H10, that militants will be less likely
to give hoax warnings if the frequency of non-militant pranks is already high. The IRA and ETA
used codes, intermediaries and multiple warning calls to communicate their messages because
they were concerned about the credibility of their warnings. Prank warnings posed a problem
for these groups, because the pranks might tip the government’s cost/benefit calculation in favor
of not responding when the IRA and ETA tried to warn them about a real bomb. The IRA and
ETA had a fundamental interest in facilitating a police response, so they took steps to reduce the
effective rate of pranks (ω). The IRA and ETA also restrained their own use of hoax tactics, giving
the government further reason to believe any warning it received. IRA interviewees stressed that
although their group did use hoax tactics, they “weren’t used on a regular basis” (John O’Hagan’s
words). ETA refrained from hoaxes entirely to ensure “that the credibility of the organization was
complete” (Antton Etxebeste’s words). By cultivating credibility, ETA sought to deny police any
excuse for ignoring a warning.
These empirical observations support my signaling model’s prediction that high levels of noise
will induce separating signals by the two types of militants. Other studies of noisy signaling have
made similar predictions (Haan and Sloof 2011) but their hypotheses are not borne out in experi-
ments. My study of the IRA and ETA shows that noise may induce separating signals in conflict
settings, despite the strong temptation for militant groups to give false warnings when the level
of background noise is low.
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7 Extensions to State Behavior
Pre-attack warnings are not unique to intrastate conflict or international terrorism. States engage
in warning behavior as well, and often on a grand scale. In this section I extend my discussion
to the warning behavior of state actors. I reinterpret my theory somewhat, seeking to explain the
behavior of a state carrying out bombing attacks on another state or a non-state entity. I exam-
ine three cases in particular: Chinese shelling of the Taiwan Straits islands from 1958-1979, the
United States’ atomic bombing of Japan in 1945, and Israel’s bomb and artillery operations on
Hamas-controlled Gaza. After summarizing the historical background and political incentives in
each case, I assess how well my theory can explain the observed behavior of the attacking state
(warning or not warning). I then give additional predictions as to when we should see warning
or non-warning behavior by other states, based on the three cases analyzed here.
7.1 China’s Alternate-Day Shelling of Quemoy, 1958-1979
The first case I consider is China’s shelling of the Taiwan Straits island of Quemoy from 1958
through 1979. This incident took place in the broader context of China’s militarized dispute with
Taiwan, the Western-leaning island state it regards as a renegade province. Chinese and Taiwanese
forces have clashed repeatedly over Quemoy, situated just two kilometers off of the mainland and
more than two hundred kilometers from Taiwan’s shores. China briefly attacked Taiwanese posi-
tions on Quemoy in 1954, and in August 1958, it launched a second artillery bombardment.
Analysts disagree as to why China initiated this crisis over Quemoy. The obvious possibility is
that China intended to take the island, given its proximity to the mainland. Taiwan had placed
fortifications and artillery on Quemoy, presenting a direct threat to the mainland, but Taiwan also
faced difficulty in resupplying its garrison. If China could blockade the island, it could potentially
starve the Taiwanese garrison out. However, Christensen (1996) notes that the People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA) and Chinese navy were never prepared to land on Quemoy in force. The crisis
was nonetheless useful to Chinese premier Mao Zedong, who invoked militarized patriotism to
rally domestic support for his Great Leap Forward. Christensen contends that Taiwan and the US
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were “useful adversaries” to Mao, at a moment of great political risk. Taking a slightly different
view, Pollack (1996: 237-40) raises the possibility that Mao’s broader plan was to crowd the United
States out of Chinese-Taiwanese affairs. The crisis was initiated by China, and could be stopped
by China at a time of its choosing. A sudden, magnanimous resolution would demonstrate Amer-
ica’s irrelevance to the Chinese-Taiwanese dispute. If, as China contended, the dispute was an
internal affair to be settled by the “one China,” starting and ending a crisis created facts to sup-
port the Chinese view.
China’s incentives for warning or non-warning behavior in this case were as follows. If, as Chris-
tensen argues, Mao instigated the 1958 crisis to unify domestic support for his regime, the benefit
of the shelling (formally theD1 andD2 parameters) was not in the physical damage caused, but in
the consolidation of Chinese patriotism. Granting Pollack (1996)’s interpretation, that Mao started
the crisis to crowd the United States out of the China-Taiwan dispute, the benefit of shelling was
also symbolic. The purpose was to create a crisis that China could stop without US help. There
was little difference between D1 and D2, because the point was to have fired the shells in the first
place – not to have destroyed anything in particular. G was relatively low in this case, because
the only “response” possible was for people on Quemoy to move to protective shelters they had
already built. As such, the difference between the payoff for warning D2 + G and the payoff for
not warning D1 −X was driven by the X parameter, political costs for harming civilians.
Granting Christensen’s view that Mao wanted to consolidate support for the Great Leap Forward,
killing large numbers of people on Quemoy (or achieving a decisive victory there) would have
been counterproductive. Mao’s view was that people on Quemoy were Chinese citizens – albeit
misguided ones who had sided with American imperialism. Killing Chinese citizens (or slowly
starving them via a prolonged siege of the island) was a way to sabotage national unity, not to
promote it. Therefore, the cost of no-warning attacks (X) was high. The interpretation is similar,
granting Pollack’s argument that the purpose of the crisis was to crowd America out of Chinese
affairs. Killing or slowly starving large numbers of people on Quemoy was likely to trigger Amer-
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ica’s defensive alliance obligations to Taiwan. The US would move in to escort Taiwanese relief
convoys to the beleaguered Quemoy garrison. Further no-warning attacks would then risk hit-
ting US escort ships, triggering direct America reprisals against the Chinese mainland. Because
no-warning attacks and civilian casualties created conditions for US military involvement, China’s
political cost for no-warning attacks (X) was high.
Based on either Christensen’s or Pollack’s interpretation of this case, my theory predicts that the
attacking state should give pre-attack warnings. This is precisely what China did – although not
until it had made its initial point by establishing an artillery “blockade” of Quemoy. From the
23rd through the 29th of August 1958, PLA artillery fired roughly 125,000 shells at Quemoy and
the surrounding waters. The bombardment was so intense that it prevented the Taiwanese from
resupplying their garrison. The United States, bound by a 1954 treaty to defend its ally, moved
naval nuclear assets into the Taiwan straits. The US also initiated diplomatic meetings to convince
China to end the shelling. After forty-four days, with the Quemoy garrison beginning to suffer the
effects of deprivation, China surprised the Americans and Taiwanese by announcing a unilateral
ceasefire (Christensen 1996: 194-6).
China’s public announcement on October 6th declared a one week ceasefire, which was renewed
on October 13, provided that the US Navy “not conduct escort operations” for Taiwanese ships
(Halperin 1966: 469-70). The Chinese communiqué cited humanitarian reasons for the ceasefire,
including a desire to allow both food and military supplies to reach the Taiwanese garrison. An
American ship triggered a brief interruption of the ceasefire on October 20th, by straying into Chi-
nese territorial waters, but China renewed the ceasefire on October 25th (Halperin 1966: 471-2).
The text of the October 25 communiqué was addressed from the Chinese defense minister to the
misguided “compatriots” on the islands:
I have already ordered our troops at the Fukien front not to shell the airfield in Que-
moy and the wharf, beach and ships at Liaolo Bay on even days of the calendar, so
that the compatriots, both military and civilian, on the big and small islands ... may
all get sufficient supplies, including food, vegetables, edible oils, fuels and military
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equipment, to facilitate your entrenchment for a long time to come. If you are short
of anything, just say so and we will give it to you. ... Your ships and aircraft should
not come on odd days. We will not necessarily conduct shelling on odd days. But you
should refrain from coming, to avoid possible losses. In this way, half of each month
will be free for transportation, and supplies would not be lacking [sic]. (Quoted in
Halperin 1966, p. 475-7)
True to their word, the People’s Liberation Army refrained from shelling the airfield, wharf, beach
and ships on even days. Soon they ceased all firing on even days. According to RAND Cor-
poration observers, “the on-again, off-again pattern settled down to a regular minuet, with the
Chinese Communists firing no shells at all on the even days and firing regularly and in roughly
the same amounts on the odd days” (Halperin 1966: 476). The shells the PLA did fire were filled
with propaganda leaflets rather than high explosives. From late 1958 until the normalization of
US-China relations in 1979, Chinese and Taiwanese artillery exchanged leaflet shells on odd days
of the month, at regular intervals, so that anyone wanting to avoid injury needed only to stay
indoors during shelling hours (Wong and Yang 2011).
Again recalling Christensen’s and Pollack’s interpretations of Mao’s goals – cultivating “useful
adversaries” and crowding the US out of Chinese-Taiwanese affairs – my theory explains China’s
pre-attack warnings well. The slaughter or starvation of Taiwanese “compatriots” on Quemoy
would have sown division in Chinese politics at precisely the moment when Mao sought national
unity. China’s partial lifting of the artillery blockade, and the Chinese offer to resupply Taiwan’s
hostile garrison, helped to sustain China’s adversaries, whom the Chinese continued to shell (on
a regular schedule and only with propaganda bombs) throughout the Great Leap Forward. The
alternate-day shelling also showed that China and Taiwan, despite their ongoing dispute, had
the ability to resolve their differences without US intervention or butchery.33 No-warning attacks
would have spoiled the diplomatic “minuet,” which China and Taiwan maintained for 21 years.
33The bombardment did further butchery in one important way: The large amount of steel recovered
from China’s exploded propaganda shells provides Quemoy’s knifesmiths with an abundant supply of
raw material. The Kinmen (Quemoy) Knife company makes up to sixty blades from each shell, selling
them at premium prices (Wong and Yang 2011).
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Based on this analysis of Chinese behavior, we should expect to see warning behavior in other
cases where states use violence primarily for diplomatic signaling. When the purpose of a shot or
an explosion is not to destroy, but to communicate, D1−D2 is quite low, and even a moderate po-
litical cost for excessive killing (X) may persuade a state to give warning before shooting. Axelrod
(1984) presents an intriguing study of mutual dereliction in the trenches of the First World War,
which resembles the Taiwan Straits case to a degree. Individual units on the German and British
sides, convinced of the futility of trench warfare, began intentionally to fire shots off-target. By
missing their targets obviously and intentionally, each side communicated its intent not to harm
the other if the other reciprocated this restraint. Warnings – whether by public announcement
or by establishing a predictable pattern – are a way of maintaining restraint and even civility in
an existing conflict situation. States are likely to give warnings when they see high value in the
“minuet” of diplomacy and symbolic violence, with a correspondingly high cost for no-warning
attacks that spoil the rhythm.
7.2 US Leaflet Dropping before the Atomic Bombing of Japan, 1945
The second extension of my theory to state behavior concerns the United States’ atomic bombing
of Japan in 1945, at the end of the Second World War. Prior to dropping atomic bombs on Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki (August 6th and 9th, respectively), the United States’ Office of War Infor-
mation (OWI) dropped thousands of leaflets on Japanese cities. These leaflets contained a warning
message and are sometimes interpreted as evidence that the US tried to warn Japanese civilians
of the atomic bombings. However, a close analysis shows that these leaflets were not intended as
a good-faith warning about the atomic bomb, for reasons explained by my theory.
To put the US leaflets in context, by the summer of 1945 the Japanese military had lost most of
its capability for self-defense and was facing a looming invasion of the Japanese “home islands.”
Japan’s navy was stripped of its capital ships; Japanese garrisons had been dislodged from smaller
islands such as Okinawa; and the Japanese air force was a shadow of its former self – incapable
of stopping waves of US bombers that overflew Japanese cities. These American planes dropped
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thousands of tons of high explosives and incendiary bombs, leveling military and industrial tar-
gets and incinerating residential housing. The civilian toll of these attacks was horrendous. The
March 9 firebombing of Tokyo alone left 100,000 dead and roughly a million homeless (Williams
2007). Three main allied powers – America, Britain, and the Soviet Union – were planning an
even larger operation to invade the main islands of Honshu, Kyushu, and Hokkaido from all
sides. Despite the destruction of population centers and the inevitability of an allied invasion,
Japan’s military leaders planned to resist the allies to the death.
The incentive structure facing US President Harry Truman, in deciding whether or not to give
a warning of the atomic bombings, was as follows. The political cost for indiscriminate attacks on
civilians (X) was low. Despite the massive civilian death toll that could be expected from atomic
attacks on Japanese cities, the US had already carried out similarly destructive attacks, with no
warning, with virtually no domestic political outcry. Bundy (1990: 64) notes that American civilian
and military leaders expressed opposition to “obliteration raids” during the early years of World
War II. However, the American position had shifted by the mid-1940’s, when it became clear that
“precision” attacks on military and industrial targets were difficult and the daylight raids required
for precision bombing were incredibly costly in aircraft lost. As early as 1943, American air strat-
egy was transitioning toward “saturation bombing,” including incendiary attacks on population
centers. US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, previously an opponent of saturation bombing,
now argued in favor of the tactic because it was capable of “shortening the war, in the opinion
of an overwhelming percentage of military authorities” (Bundy 1990: 65). The American public
agreed. Following a protest by British pacifists against the obliteration of German cities, The New
York Times reported “an unusually heavy mail ... The letters run in a proportion of 50 to 1 opposing
this protest”(Beal 1944). By 1945, when attention turned to Japan, the public and press were clam-
oring for the destruction of Japanese cities. Reporting on the March 9th firebombing of Tokyo, The
New York Times neglected entirely to discuss the issue of casualties. However, the Times expressed
hope that “our air aces would soon be weaving the Berlin pattern in the Tokyo sky” – ostensibly
to finish the city off (Rae 1945).
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Given the political climate in America, President Truman’s political cost (X) for killing Japanese
civilians was close to zero. The operational cost of a giving a warning, however would have been
high. Unlike incendiary raids, which could be carried out at night from low altitudes that min-
imized bombers’ vulnerability, the atomic bombing missions required a bomber and a squadron
of spotter planes to overfly the target at high altitude during daylight hours. Bundy (1990: 75-6)
argues that “to the degree that they believed the warning” of an atomic bombing, Japanese air
defense forces would “take extraordinary measures to attack any aircraft that might be its carrier.
... To add any such risk ... to a mission already unusual in its complexity and danger would
have seemed quixotic to the military professionals.” In broader strategic terms, it also appeared
quixotic to General Leslie R. Groves, director of the Manhattan Project. Writing about the atomic
bombings years later, Groves remarked: “It was always difficult for me to understand how any-
one could ignore the importance of the effect on the Japanese people and their government of the
overwhelming surprise of the bomb” (Groves 1962: 266). The full value of the atomic bombings
(D1) was measured not only in damage, which could easily be replicated with incendiary raids,
but also in the novelty and terror of atomic weapons. Given the importance of a mission that relied
on this psychological mechanism, the likelihood that giving warning might spoil the attack, and
the fact that the United States possessed only two atomic bombs, the operational cost of giving
warning (D1 −D2) was very high.
The value of response costs (G – here understood as the cost to the Japanese government of evac-
uating Hiroshima and Nagasaki) would have been small compared to the potential benefit of a
surprise attack (D1). The United States’ Office of War Information (OWI) and the Air Force had
already dropped in excess of fifty million leaflets over Japan in the preceding months, including
leaflets foreshadowing the firebombings of Tokyo and other cities. A history published by the US
Central Intelligence Agency states that Japanese civilians “trusted the accuracy of the leaflets and
many residents of the targeted cities prepared immediately to leave their homes” (Williams 2007).
And yet, previous firebombings and evacuations had failed to induce the type of large-scale social
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and economic dislocation that might have induced a Japanese government surrender. Because the
atomic bombs offered a real chance to end the war, the comparison of payoffs for warning (D2+G)
and not warning (D1 −X) clearly favored not warning.
This is the policy President Truman and his advisors chose. In the months prior to the atomic
bombings, Truman convened an Interim Committee of scientific and military advisors to deter-
mine the best way to use the atomic bomb. Meeting on May 31, 1945, the Committee considered
various options. These included a demonstration explosion on an unpopulated area or a specific
advance warning about the nature of the device, to be communicated along with a set of surren-
der terms that Japan would have to accept to avoid destruction. The Interim Committee reached
a “general agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any warning” (Sherwin 1987: 32). At
a June 18th meeting, Truman’s Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, urged the president to
ignore the Committee’s recommendation, but McCloy was overruled. Bundy (1990: 74) writes
that McCloy and Secretary of War Henry S. Stimson were authorized to draft “an effective mes-
sage of hope and threat to the Japanese” for inclusion with surrender terms. The terms were to be
negotiated by the US, Britain, and Soviet Union at a July 26th meeting in Potsdam Germany. But
“specific advance warning of the bomb was not part of what they [McCloy and Stimson] were free
to work with.” The plan stayed consistent through the August 6th Hiroshima attack:
It was agreed in early June that the bomb would be used when ready. It was agreed
later that month that before such use the Japanese should receive a generally phrased
last-minute warning of total destruction unless they should surrender. It was expected
that such a warning would probably be rejected. ... The last chance warning was given
July 26; it was dismissed by the Japanese; two bombs were dropped (Bundy 1990: 81).
The “generally phrased last-minute warning” is worth discussing because it illustrates the differ-
ence between useful and useless warnings by state actors. In previous sections, I have discussed
both types, as given by non-state actors. Recall, for instance, ETA’s highly specific warnings re-
garding commercial attacks. These messages are very different from ETA’s “warnings” for Guardia
Civíl families to evacuate the casas cuarteles. The former are useful to the recipient; the latter are
useless, except perhaps as political cover for bloodshed the attacker fully expects to cause. The
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United States’ last-minute warnings to Japanese civilians were of the useless variety.
At the July 26th summit in Potsdam Germany, American, British, and Soviet leaders agreed on a
diplomatic communiqué to be issued to Japan, offering the allies’ terms of surrender (full disarma-
ment and abdication of governing authority to an allied occupation government). The declaration
also warned of “prompt and utter destruction” if Japan failed to accept the surrender terms. The
allies transmitted the message to the Japanese government and distributed it to the civilian pop-
ulation by air-dropping three million paper leaflets over Japanese cities (Williams 2007). When
Japan’s military leaders announced their rejection of the offer, the Office of War Information be-
gan printing a new set of leaflets, warning the Japanese public of strategic bombing raids on their
cities. The so-called “LeMay leaflets,” named after Strategic Air Command chief General Curtis
LeMay, were dropped over thirty-five Japanese cities on August 1st. Hiroshima and Nagasaki
were among the thirty-five cities to receive the leaflet, although the text made no mention of the
atomic bomb or a specific threat to Hiroshima or Nagasaki.34 To the Japanese public, the leaflets
seemed to promise more firebombings, like the attacks on Tokyo. The August 1st leaflet read:
Read this carefully as it may save your life or the life of a relative or friend. In the
next few days, some or all of the cities named on the reverse side will be destroyed by
American bombs. These cities contain military installations and workshops or factories
which produce military goods. We are determined to destroy all of the tools of the
military clique which they are using to prolong this useless war. But, unfortunately,
bombs have no eyes. So, in accordance with America’s humanitarian policies, the
American Air Force, which does not wish to injure innocent people, now gives you
warning to evacuate the cities named and save your lives. America is not fighting the
Japanese people but is fighting the military clique which has enslaved the Japanese
people. The peace which America will bring will free the people from the oppression
of the military clique and mean the emergence of a new and better Japan. You can
restore peace by demanding new and good leaders who will end the war. We cannot
promise that only these cities will be among those attacked but some or all of them
will be, so heed this warning and evacuate these cities immediately. (Reproduced in
Williams 2007.)
34In fact, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not the only cities on the list of atomic targets. Each raid was
planned with a primary and two secondary targets, in case weather made it impossible to drop the bomb
on the primary target. Nagasaki was actually a secondary target. Regardless, the leaflets warned far more
cities than were on the atomic targeting list.
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The August 1st leaflets brought the total number of OWI leaflets dropped over Japan to sixty-
three million, none of them mentioning atomic weapons. If the August 1st leaflets induced any
new evacuations, the numbers were too few to avoid humanitarian catastrophe at Hiroshima. Of
the city’s population of 350,000, between 90,000 and 166,000 died as a result of the August 6th
blast (RERF 2007).
After the bombing, US President Harry S. Truman issued a new communiqué to the Japanese pub-
lic, specifically referencing “the awful fact” of Hiroshima’s obliteration by “the most destructive
explosive ever devised.” Truman’s message promised further bombings and encouraged Japanese
civilians to “evacuate your cities” and “petition the Emperor to end the war”(Truman 1945). The
message did not mention Nagasaki or any other city as America’s next target. Even if it had, the
leaflets arrived too late to serve as a warning to city residents. Although Truman and the OWI
drafted the message on August 6th, the text went through at least one revision to include the Au-
gust 9th news that the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan. Five million leaflets bearing the
final version of the text were dropped throughout Japan on August 9th, the day of the Nagasaki
bombing. Between 60,000 and 80,000 of the city’s 270,000 inhabitants were killed (Williams 2007;
RERF 2007).
If the various OWI leaflets were meant to contain no useful warning about the atomic bomb,
why did the United States drop them? The first explanation is organizational: the decision to drop
the atomic bomb, as well as the decision on how to frame the action politically, were the work
of committees. These committees contained key players (John J. McCloy, for instance) who felt
a moral obligation to convey a warning, however vague, to the Japanese. The leaflets contained
the most detailed warning (which is to say a very vague, essentially useless warning) doves like
McCloy were able to get through the committee process. Second, the leaflets were intended to
put pressure on Japan’s civilian government, particularly Emperor Hirohito, to surrender and end
the public’s suffering. As Pape (1996: 109) notes, “Japan was an authoritarian state governed by
an oligarchy,” but public opinion was “one factor to be considered among others by elites.” By
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instructing civilians to “petition the Emperor to end the war,” the OWI leaflets leveraged popular
opinion to whatever extent possible, given Japan’s governing institutions.
To summarize, the operational cost of warning about the atomic bombs (D1 − D2) was high. A
warning risked spoiling a mission that was expected to end the war in the Pacific. The political
cost of failing to warn (X) was relatively low, given Americans’ willingness to tolerate strategic
bombing in general. (The atomic bombings, if they compelled Japanese surrender, would also
save Americans the ordeal of conquering Japan.) The issue of response costs, G , understood as
the cost of evacuating Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was also trivial compared to the destructive and
psychological power of a surprise attack.
Overall, the US leaflet dropping in 1945 is consistent with my theoretical expectations in cases
involving a non-state attacker. The attacker is unlikely to give warning when the operational cost
of warnings is high, the expected political cost of non-warning attacks is low, and little benefit is
expected from the imposition of response costs on the target. Applying that logic to states, my
theory predicts that a country in the United States’ position will give no warning (or no action-
able warning) before carrying out the attack. That is precisely what happened at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. On the other hand, the same theoretical framework would predict warnings if the op-
erational cost of warnings is exceedingly low, or the political cost of warning is very high. This is
structure of state incentives in the third example I discuss, and we see more meaningful warnings
by the state in that case.
7.3 Israeli Pre-Attack Warnings During Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protec-
tive Edge
The third example I discuss is the case of Israel in its bomb and artillery attacks on Gaza during
“Operation Cast Lead” (2008-2009) and “Operation Protective Edge” (2014). In both of these op-
erations, Israeli forces employed air strikes as the primary means of destroying alleged Hamas
weapons, military personnel, and leadership targets located in civilian urban areas. The roots of
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these conflicts lay in the breakdown of an informal ceasefire brokered by the Egyptian government
in June 2008. Despite the ceasefire, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Palestinian militants engaged
in periodic tit-for-tat violence throughout the summer and fall of 2008. Israel also maintained an
economic and military blockade of Gaza, citing concerns that Hamas would use civilian materials
to build weapons that could be fired across the border at Israelis (UNHCR 2009: 59, 62-71). Ten-
sions increased until Israel launched Operation Cast Lead on December 27th.
Israel accused Hamas of deliberately hiding its most effective weapons – artillery rockets – within
civilian structures. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced at the beginning of Operation
Cast Lead that they had no intention of avoiding civilian structures. The results were predictably
bloody. Israeli estimates place the number of Palestinian fatalities in Operation Cast Lead at 1,166.
Palestinian and Western human rights organizations estimate the total at roughly 1,400, including
as many as 1,172 civilians (UNHCR 2009: 89-90). The UN’s estimates after Operation Protective
Edge were 2,192 Gazans killed, including 1,523 civilians (UNOCHA 2014).
Israel’s political situation, going into these conflicts, was precarious. Operations against Hamas
are not controversial within Israel, where 79 percent of the Jewish population “strongly sup-
ported” the 2008-2009 war and 90 percent felt that the 2014 war was morally justified (Ben-Meir
2009; Hermann 2014). However, Israel faces strong criticism internationally for its policies toward
Palestinians, including the economic blockade of Gaza, the construction of Jewish settlements in
the West Bank, and its use of what the UN calls “excessive or lethal force during demonstrations”
by Palestinians (UNHCR 2009: 7, 52).35 From an Israeli perspective, these critiques are especially
worrisome when they influence public opinion in the United States, the country’s most reliable
supporter in a largely hostile international environment. A 2007 BBC poll taken in twenty-seven
nations found that only the American, Nigerian, and Kenyan publics held a favorable view of
Israel. As of 2013, only the American public held a favorable view of Israel (BBC 2007, 2013b). The
US is Israel’s international advocate in venues such as the UN Security Council. It is also Israel’s
35International organizations are also critical of Hamas attacks on Israeli border cities (UNHCR 2009).
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main benefactor, having supplied $ 56 billion in military aid to the country from 1949 through
2008 (Sharp 2015: 29).
Going into the 2008-2009 conflict, it was clear that Israel’s political and military fate depended
in large part on maintaining American support, and this was far from assured. Although a high
percentage of Americans (typically between 55 and 75 percent) view Israel favorably, polls on
foreign aid typically find that between 30 and 40 percent of Americans believe the US gives “too
much” to Israel. Between 40 and 50 percent believe the amount of aid is “about right” and roughly
10 percent believe the amount of aid is “too little”(Newport 2006; Saad 2015). The inauguration of
President Barack Obama in January 2009 introduced new political complications, with the Obama
administration taking a critical line (unusually critical, for an American president) toward Israeli
policies such as the construction of settlements in the West Bank. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu pushed back with unusually strong rhetoric of his own (Oren 2015).
Israeli bombing operations in Gaza risked souring relations with Americans, unless Israel could
justify its actions. The weapons used by Israel in Gaza were American after all, and as we saw in
the IRA case, Americans care (to some degree) whether their weapons are used indiscriminately.
Given the importance of American support and the risk of losing it, Israel’s political cost for in-
discriminate violence (X) was high. At the same time, the operational cost of giving warnings
(D1−D2) was very low. A 2009 UN report on Operation Cast Lead argued that “it is ... difficult to
imagine more propitious circumstances” for a country to give warnings, given Israel’s “complete
domination of Gaza’s airspace,” “the means to use the landlines and mobile telephone networks”
to communicate warnings, and Israel’s “intimate knowledge and sophisticated up-to-date intelli-
gence” on Hamas targets (UNHCR 2009: 128). With the ability to overfly Gaza at will, Israel could
attack Hamas targets at a time and in a manner of its choosing, selecting the means and timing of
each warning to avoid compromising its legitimate actions against Hamas military targets.36 Hu-
man rights organizations with a cynical view of Israeli motives argue that the IDF uses warnings
36Israel typically chose, in keeping with my model’s logic and observed behavior in the IRA and ETA
cases, not to give warnings before assassination-type attacks on Hamas leaders (Erlanger and Akram 2014).
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as a means to “spread confusion and terror” by inducing the “forcible displacement” of civilians
(FIDH 2015: 15). Those who interpret Israel’s military goal as collective punishment (Amnesty In-
ternational 2014) may interpret population dislocations as a type of response cost (G) imposed by
the Israeli warnings. Regardless of Israel’s motives and the value of G, the high political cost for
indiscriminate killing and the low operation a cost of warning satisfied the condition for warning
in this case: X +G > D1 −D2.
The Israeli practice of warning goes back at least as far as 2005, when the Israel Defense Forces ex-
changed air strikes and artillery fire with Palestinian militants in Gaza. Israeli warplanes dropped
leaflets, bearing a message that was part warning, part threat, and part self-exculpation (Cook
2010: 228, bullets original):
• The terrorist actions originating from your areas are forcing the Israel Defense Forces to
respond harshly to those who are subjecting the citizens of the State of Israel to danger.
• We call on the Palestinian Authority to shoulder its responsibility to prevent these criminal
acts.
• We warn you of the danger of remaining in the areas which are being used to launch terrorist
actions and we advise you to leave your homes.
• We are not responsible for the consequences if you ignore our warning.
The Israeli government’s contention is that warnings constitute due effort to reduce civilian ca-
sualties when carrying out military operations in populated areas. The UN and human rights
organizations note that many IDF bombings took place with no warning (Amnesty International
2014). But warnings, when given, have the potential to reduce civilian casualties and bring Is-
raeli military operations into compliance with the Geneva Conventions. States are obliged to give
warnings under Article 57 (c) of Additional Protocol I, which states that “effective advance warn-
ing shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population” (ICRC 1977).37 Israel has
not endorsed Additional Protocol I, citing provisions it claims legitimize terrorist violence, but it
does claim to adhere to relevant international laws governing the treatment of civilians (Lapidot
and Rozenzwieg 2011).
37This protocol was added in 1949, after the effects of WWII strategic bombing were widely known.
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Beyond reducing casualties (certainly a desirable end, from an Israeli public relations perspec-
tive) the IDF’s pre-attack warnings facilitate a narrative that focuses on Israel’s effort to minimize
harm. The same narrative focuses attention on Hamas’s indiscriminate rocket fire. As Prime Min-
ister Benjamin Netanyahu put it: “Israel does not commit war crimes, but Hamas commits war
crimes” (Hezki 2015). Israel gave pre-attack warnings prior to air and artillery strikes during Op-
eration Cast Lead, air-dropping leaflets, placing pre-recorded phone calls to individuals whose
homes were about to be targeted, and “commandeering” frequencies used by Gazan radio and
TV stations to issue IDF warnings in place of the stations’ regular programs (Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2008). Israel’s warnings could be vague, however, recalling the non-specific and
unhelpful American leaflets dropped on Japan in 1945:
To the residents of the Gaza Strip The IDF will act against any movements and el-
ements conducting terrorist activities against the residents of the State of Israel. The
IDF will hit and destroy any building or site containing ammunition and weapons. As
of the publication of this announcement, anyone having ammunition and/or weapons
in his home is risking his life and must leave the place for the safety of his own life and
that of his family. You have been warned.
A second example warned “all residents of the area ... to leave your homes immediately and
move to the city centers” where, ostensibly, the IDF would not conduct bombing operations. A
United Nations report on the 2008-2009 Gaza war criticized this type of warning for “lacking ...
specificity and clarity: people could not be certain that the warnings were directed at them in par-
ticular, since they were being issued as far as they could tell to almost everyone, and they could
not tell when they should leave since there was rarely an indication of when attacks would take
place.” Moreover, because the IDF had previously conducted airstrikes in city centers, “people
could not reasonably be expected to flee to what appeared to be even less safe places on the basis
of such non-specific warnings” (UNHCR 2009: 132).
Not all of the IDF’s messages were vague, however. The 2009 UN report cites the following ex-
ample, given to residents of a neighborhood in Rafah, as potentially compliant with the Geneva
Conventions:
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Because your houses are used by Hamas for military equipment smuggling and stor-
ing, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will attack the areas between Sea Street and till
the Egyptian border. . . All the Residents of the following neighbourhoods: Block O –
al-Barazil neighbourhood – al-Shu’ara’- Keshta- al-Salam neighbourhood should evac-
uate their houses till beyond Sea Street. The evacuation enters into force from now till
tomorrow at 8 a.m. (UNHCR 2009: 130).
As my study of non-state warning behavior shows, warnings must be both specific and credible
if they are to reduce civilian casualties. During the 2009 conflict, Palestinian human rights orga-
nizations complained that dozens of Gaza families were receiving warnings about attacks – and
hundreds more were receiving warnings about attacks that never took place. Some of these cases
may have resulted from the IDF calling off airstrikes when it realized that civilians were too close
to the attack’s intended target. Nonetheless, there was a discrepancy between Israeli airstrikes
threatened and those actually carried out. Palestinian NGOs and Hamas condemned the IDF’s
warnings as a tactic to terrorize Gazan civilians and induce mass population dislocations as a form
of collective punishment (FIDH 2015).38 Just as a high percentage of false warnings can make the
government in my formal model unresponsive, many Palestinian civilians ignored warning mes-
sages they assumed to be false. The UN’s 2009 report cites cases where previous false warnings
led Gazans to ignore subsequent warnings, with tragic consequences when those warnings were
followed by actual bombings (UNHCR 2009: 132).
Aware of this criticism, the IDF also employs a tactic dubbed “roof knocking,” the dropping of
small, supposedly harmless bombs on the roofs of buildings before the buildings are attacked
with conventional high explosives. The IDF touts roof knocking as a credible means of conveying
a warning to building residents, particularly in cases where leaflets and telephone warnings have
failed. The UN and human rights groups raise the obvious objection that small bombs have the
ability to kill (and in some cases have killed) residents of buildings on which they are dropped
(UNHCR 2009: 132). This problem is compounded by the fact that the roof knocking must be
38To avenge the alleged terror of Israeli warnings, Hamas has made threatening phone calls to Israelis
in border towns, promising that “Palestinian resistance missiles” are on their way “and your government
won’t be able to protect you” (Balousha and O’Loughlin 2009). These messages are unambiguously in-
tended to terrify. Even if Hamas intended to give real warnings, its rockets are not accurate enough to land
in the areas that are warned.
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done far enough in advance to allow residents to leave a building, but not so far in advance that
people assume it to be a false warning and return to the building. There is no standard length of
time between the roof knocking and the dropping of the second, high explosive bomb. In some
cases, building residents have been given as little as one minute’s time to flee (BBC 2014).
Despite questions about how many civilian casualties Israel’s warnings actually prevent, the warn-
ings serve as a rhetorical basis for defending Israel’s actions in Gaza. The 2005 IDF leaflet makes
Israel’s point: “We are not responsible for the consequences if you ignore our warning.” By im-
plication, those who perish in Israeli attacks do so because they ignore Israeli warnings, because
Hamas persuades them to stay and act as human shields for military equipment, or because the
stay-behinds are militants themselves.39 The UN disputes Israel’s “inference,” arguing: “The fact
that a warning was issued does not ... relieve a commander or his subordinates from taking all
other feasible measures to distinguish between civilians and combatants” (UNHCR 2009: 129-130).
By the beginning of Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Americans were growing skeptical of
Israeli actions as well. President Obama’s spokesman, Josh Earnest, pronounced Israel’s shelling
of a UN school “disgraceful;” Secretary of State John Kerry remarked that Israeli airstrikes in
Gaza were far from “pinpoint;” and President Obama stated that, given US support for Israel,
civilian deaths in Operation Protective Edge “have to weigh on our conscience” (McGreal 2014).
Evangelical Christian groups, traditionally very supportive of Israel, reportedly worried that the
Jewish state was “losing its grip” on younger evangelicals, who were increasingly “open to the
Palestinian side of the conflict” (Guttman and Forward 2014). Israel’s support also slipped among
American Jews. Of those between the ages of 18 and 29, just 21 percent found Hamas primarily
responsible for the violence in Gaza, compared to 29 percent who believed Israel held the greatest
responsibility (Bell 2014).
39The IDF also claims that it calls off air strikes if it believes civilians have ignored warnings and are
acting as human shields (Israel Defense Forces 2014b). Anonymous IDF whistleblowers dispute this claim,
arguing that once an area has been warned, the IDF operates under the assumption that any remaining
people in the area are Hamas militants (Williams and Balmer 2015).
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To combat this skepticism, the IDF and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs tout Israeli pre-attack
warning tactics on their outward-facing English language websites. The Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs website notes, for instance, that Israel dropped nearly a million leaflets during the first two
weeks of Operation Cast Lead, made 30,000 phone calls, and broke into radio broadcasts at least
three times to warn Gazans “of the IDF’s intent to attack, instructing residents to evacuate the areas
where terrorists or terror infrastructure are to be found.” The website provides audio recordings
of the radio messages and phone calls, as well as the text of leaflets (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2008). The IDF posts the English-language translations of “the content of leaflets dispersed over
the Gaza Strip” (IDF 2014a) along with a detailed webpage containing pictures of leaflets, gun
camera video of aborted attacks, and audio of warning calls made to Gazans. The website is ti-
tled, “How is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?” (IDF 2014b).
These websites provide evidence to support Israeli diplomats as they push back against unusually
strong rebukes by White House officials. In late July, US Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-
FL) and Ted Deutch (D-FL) introduced a resolution endorsing Operation Protective Edge, noting
(in language very similar to IDF press releases) that the IDF “drops leaflets, makes announce-
ments, places phone calls and sends text messages to the Palestinian people in Gaza warning
them in advance that and attack is imminent, and goes to extraordinary lengths to target only
terrorist actors.” The same resolution criticizes Hamas for “using civilian populations as human
shields” and criticizes the United Nations for its “biased commission of inquiry into Israel’s Gaza
operations” (Danziger and Meyer 2014). A similar Senate resolution, approved by unanimous con-
sent, endorsed Israel’s “significant steps to protect civilians in Gaza, including dropping leaflets
in Gaza neighborhoods in advance of Israeli military attacks, calling Palestinians on the phone
urging them to evacuate certain areas before the military strikes targets, and issuing warnings
to civilians in advance of firing on buildings” – all while “Hamas intentionally uses civilians as
human shields” (Reid 2014). Israel’s defenders outside the government tout the IDF’s warnings
as well. The Anti-Defamation League’s website notes that “Israel enacted procedures to warn
civilians though leafleting, phone calls and other methods, that their neighborhoods and build-
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ings were located in the vicinity of military operations ... In response to these warnings, Hamas
advised Gaza residents to ignore ‘Israeli propaganda’ and stay in their homes” (ADL 2014). The
Evangelical group Christian Friends of Israel gave another typical defense of Operation Protective
Edge:
The IDF went to great lengths to warn the innocent people of Gaza ... Not only did the
Air Force drop leaflets over communities warning them to leave the area being targeted
to combat Hamas terrorists, but the army also sent phone calls and text messages as a
warning. If that wasn’t enough, the Air Force then dropped a nonexplosive missile on
the roof of the building ... at a cost of $25,000 USD per instance (McKenzie 2015: 10).
However effective or ineffective Israeli warnings are in reducing harm to Gazans, they are an im-
portant part of Israel’s public relations strategy in the United States. Attacking Gazans with no
warning would carry a high political cost (X) – risking the loss of public support by Israel’s most
important ally. Because of Israel’s technological dominance in Gaza, the operational cost of warn-
ings (D1 − D2) is low. Consistent with my theory’s predictions, Israel gave pre-attack warnings
in Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge. This outcome stands in contrast to the
United States’ behavior prior to the atomic bombings, when the cost of indiscriminate violence
was low and the operational cost of warning was high.
We can draw two forward-looking predictions from these cases. First, warnings do not have to
work (in the sense of sparing civilians) to be worthwhile politically. Critics raise questions about
the effectiveness of Israeli warnings at reducing civilian casualties. Nonetheless, the fact that Israel
did give warnings focuses the debate on how well warnings work, as opposed to the fundamental
morality of bombing civilians. Giving warnings also reframes the fatality count, shifting the focus
from an absolute number to the relative question of how much worse it could have been if the state
had not given warnings. If a state, facing high political costs for indiscriminate attacks, can argue
that warnings reduce casualties to some degree, it is worth trying the gambit.
Second, technological dominance and good intelligence decrease the operational cost of warn-
ing (D1−D2). In the Israeli case, it was easy to give warnings without spoiling operations against
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Hamas. With dominance of the skies and airwaves and an intelligence apparatus capable of track-
ing Hamas targets, Israel could attack at the most advantageous time, giving warnings (by leaflet,
telephone, or roof-knock) that would not substantially reduce the chance of operational success.
If an operation failed or had to be called off for any reason, Israel could re-attempt it later with
little risk of losing aircraft and crews. The United States did not have the same advantages in
1945. Although American bombers could evade Japanese defenses by night, the atomic bombing
missions required a formation of planes to overfly a major city at high altitude during the day. The
formation carried one of only two atomic bombs in the entire world. Given the paramount impor-
tance of the mission and the likelihood of losing bombers (and precious bombs) if the Japanese
learned of the missions in advance, the United States’ operational cost of giving warnings was
prohibitively high. In general, when the attacker has few technological advantages over the de-
fender, the operational cost of warning is high. If the attacker has substantial technological and




In the preceding pages, I presented a theory and a set of empirical tests to explain the phenomenon
of pre-attack warnings in conflicts between state and non-state actors. I also extended my theoret-
ical framework to discuss warning behavior by states. I undertook this project for several reasons.
First, warnings are puzzling at first glance: Why should someone carrying out a violent action
give up the advantage of surprise and risk spoiling the attack? Further, why should the recipient
of a warning believe it to be anything other than a prank or a hoax? If it seems illogical to give
warnings, it seems even more illogical to believe them and act on them.
Warnings are puzzling, but they are also profound. The fact that attackers give up the advan-
tage of surprise, and defenders act on the warning messages, shows that there is an underlying
concordance of interests between the two. The group setting off a bomb is not solely interested in
destruction. The receiver of the warning knows this as well. Militants can give false warnings to
disrupt the economy and draw police into deadly ambushes, but they cannot act on these tempta-
tions too often. Militants and governments accommodate one another.
To understand how this interaction comes about, and why it comes about only in certain cases, I
derived a formal model representing the militant group and the government. “Noise” plays an
important role in this game as well. The model produces the following hypotheses:
• H1: Militants are more likely to give warnings when they pay a high political cost for causing exces-
sive civilian casualties.
• H2: Militants are more likely to give warnings when responding to warnings carries a high cost for
the government.
• H3: Militants are more likely to give warnings when doing so does not greatly reduce the expected
damage from an attack.
• H4: In cases where the government cannot mobilize at all, militants who face any cost for harming
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civilians will warn the government.
• H5: Governments are more likely to mobilize when the damage saved will be high.
• H6: Governments are less likely to mobilize when doing so is costly.
• H7: Governments are more likely to mobilize when key audiences will impose political costs on the
government for ignoring truthful warnings.
• H8: Militants are more likely to give false warnings if mobilizing is costly for the government.
• H9: Militants are less likely to give false warnings if doing so carries a high political cost.
• H10: Militants are less likely to give false warnings if there is already a high probability of prank
warnings.
8.1 Testing Hypotheses 1-4
Hypotheses 1-3 derive from the condition D1 −X ≷ D2 +G (or equivalently, D1 −D2 ≷ X +G).
For a warning to be individually rational, the political cost saved (X) and response cost inflicted
on the government (G) must outweigh the expected reduction in damage relative to what a sur-
prise attack would have caused (D1 − D2). The IRA interviews I present in Chapter 3 strongly
support this portrayal of militants’ costs and benefits. Consistent with H1, my IRA interviewees
described non-warning attacks as “bad politics,” at least when the target was civilian in nature.
No-warning attacks killed indiscriminately, and this type of violence alienated three key support
bases: the IRA’s local supporters, on whom it depended for shelter and operational support; the
Irish American diaspora, on whom the IRA depended for money and guns; and international po-
litical figures, whose support the IRA needed to secure a negotiated settlement with the British
government. By giving warnings, the IRA avoided these political costs (X).
Warnings also imposed extra costs (G) on the British government by forcing it to shut down
commercial zones and send police into potential ambushes. Consistent with H2, IRA members
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described warnings as a “second opportunity” – to inflict costs beyond those of the explosion it-
self. The IRA’s behavior was also consistent with H3, related to the operational cost of warning.
When the target was especially important and the likelihood of spoiling the attack especially high,
the group gave no warning at all. The IRA’s 1984 assassination attempt on British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher – the deliberate implosion of a civilian hotel, without warning – is the best
example.
H4, another hypothesis derived from my model, states that militants with any political cost for
harming civilians will give warnings in cases where the government cannot respond. Consistent
with this hypothesis, police interviewees cited cases where IRA members hand-delivered bombs
with such short fuses that only the bombers themselves could escape. The goal of such warnings,
police argued, is not to allow “anyone else in the shop to get out into the street,” but to allow the
IRA to “manage their own public relations” after the fact, by claiming that in every case, the group
gave a warning. This interview evidence supports H4.
Chapter 3 provides further evidence in support of my theory. In my comparison of ETA and
the Tamil Tigers, interview subjects described two very different political cost frameworks. As an
underground group fighting a relatively non-abusive government (by world standards), ETA had
to maintain a code of “revolutionary ethics.” When it failed to give warnings and civilians were
killed, the Basque political mainstream moved to isolate the group. Tamils in Sri Lanka were not
so eager to sanction the LTTE over its atrocities. The government had already done worse things
to Tamils, and the LTTE was seen by Tamils as “the only force that was able to stand up to the
government.” The LTTE also received state support from India, and it controlled territory where
it could collect taxes and recruit troops. The costs of inhumanity are lower when a group does not
depend entirely on voluntary support from local populations (and local populations themselves
are radicalized).
This is a point that emerged in my second pair of case studies as well. Comparing the MRTA and
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Sendero Luminoso, two Marxist rebel groups that fought the same government at the same time,
it is clear that these groups had very different bases of support. Sendero’s was in Peru’s interior,
where it had spent the better part of a decade organizing among campesino and mestizo people. In
contrast, the MRTA was a militant outgrowth of mainstream labor politics in Lima. When Sendero
Luminoso carried out massive no-warning car bombings in Lima, it had no effect on the group’s
main base of support in places like Ayacucho. Had the MRTA carried out such attacks in Lima,
it would have been politically ruinous for them. Sendero was also building a parallel set of insti-
tutions, assuming that all non-Maoist institutions had to be destroyed. The group’s Manichean
logic and secure bases allowed it to contemplate shocking acts of violence against the revolution’s
enemies. As Abimael Guzmán put it, “we were willing to do anything to gain everything.”
The case studies in Chapter 4 lend further support to H1. Groups who depend on local sup-
port in areas where they fight face higher political costs for indiscriminate killing. Groups also
face higher costs when the government is not engaging in abuses and when the group’s ideology
requires it to reach out to broad sections of society. These factors increase the group’s propensity
to give warnings. At the beginning of Chapter 5, I used these insights to refine H1 and make it
more easily testable with quantitative techniques. The refinements of H1 are:
• H1a: Militants who depend heavily on local support are more likely to give warnings.
• H1b: Militants fighting a non-abusive government are more likely to give warnings.
• H1c: Militants with maximalist goals are less likely to give warnings.
• H1d: Religiously motivated militants are less likely to give warnings.
Refining the hypotheses in this way allowed me to operationalize and measure the political costs
for no-warning, indiscriminate attacks. I compiled a database of bombings and warnings, in-
corporating variables that measured militant autonomy, government political terror, maximalist
goals, and religious motivations. My analysis of that database substantiated some of these refined
hypotheses, and not others.
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Most clearly, my analysis supported H1a. The variable Autonomy, indicating whether a militant
group has state sponsorship, the control of territory, or both, showed a negative association with
pre-attack warnings in all model specifications. The effect was substantively significant and sta-
tistically significant at a 0.05 α-level. The less a group depends on local populations’ voluntary
contributions – shelter, funds, recruits, supplies, etc. – the less likely the group is to give a bomb
warning. My logit regressions also showed some support for H1c. The dummy variable Maximal-
ist was negatively associated with pre-attack warnings, and statistically significant at a 0.1 α-level.
The results were equivocal with regard to H1b. The Political Terror Scale (PTS) variable showed
a negative association with pre-attack warnings once the anomalous case of Spain was omitted.
However, the effect is not statistically significant.
My regression analyses did not show support for H1d, that religious motivations make militant
groups less likely to give pre-attack warnings. In fact, the variable Religion/Islam showed a positive
association with warnings, albeit a statistically insignificant one. On the other hand, the variable
Suicide did show a negative (though not statistically significant) association with pre-attack warn-
ings. Given the role of religion in pushing people toward suicide bombing as a tactic (Bloom 2004),
the one thing we can say in support of H1d is that religion may exert an indirect negative effect
on the probability of warning, by generating recruits for organizations that use suicide tactics.
8.2 Testing Hypotheses 5-10
The remaining hypotheses derived from my theory pertain to militant-government interaction.
I tested these with further interviews of conflict participants in Northern Ireland and Spain. In
keeping with the logic of Hypotheses 5 and 6, Northern Ireland police describe a “graduated re-
sponse” to warnings based on their apparent credibility. The cost of responding (weighted by
the probability of the threat being true) was evaluated against the guaranteed cost of mobilizing
and evacuating the threatened area. Former RUC officers recall that in cases where a warning
sounded “childish” it was only worth doing “a cursory check.” But if a warning sounded like
previous IRA threats that had proved true, police undertook a full and costly mobilization. Police
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in Northern Ireland and Spain responded to bomb warnings because of their felt obligation as
“public servants.” However, based on logic similar to H7, the IRA and ETA reinforced police’s
incentives with public accountability. By routing warning messages through media switchboards
and charity hotlines, the militants ensured that there would be political consequences if police
ignored their warnings.
The prospect of police mobilizations created temptation for the IRA. Consistent with H8 and H9,
the IRA weighed the disruptive value of hoax warnings against the risk of losing credibility. In-
terviewees recalled that false warnings cost the group “10p,” the price of a telephone call, but
they could cost the British government “millions upon millions of pounds” in “disruption to the
economy.” Hoax tactics also risked spoiling the IRA’s credibility, however, making it difficult to
convince police that the threat was real the next time the IRA planted a bomb. The 10p tactic
“wasn’t used on a regular basis, because of that danger.” ETA’s experiences with disastrous police
non-responses convinced the group that it was better never to lie, rather than risk being ignored
again.
My case studies also support H10, that a high frequency of hoax warnings decreases militants’
incentive to give false warnings of their own. In a way, prank callers do the militant group’s work,
disrupting economic life without requiring the militant group to do anything. However, IRA in-
terviewees recalled that prank calls “could result in mayhem” if they interfered with the police
response to real warnings. The IRA and ETA developed various techniques for making their own
warnings stand out from pranks: the cultivation of intermediaries, placing redundant warning
calls, the use of electronic “instruments,” and the use of code words. By making it harder to give
a credible-sounding prank warning, the IRA and ETA decreased the effective rate of pranks. They
also restrained their own use of hoax tactics to ensure that the government always responded
when warned.
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8.3 Insights about Terrorism and Insurgency
My research makes an important contribution by illuminating militant groups’ political thinking.
It explores the conflict between needing to use violence and needing to appear reasonable and eth-
ical (Abrahms 2006). If guerrilla war is “war for the right to govern,” militants must ensure that
their violence does not morally abdicate that right (Lomperis 1996). At the very least, militants
must appear to have minimized harm to the innocent, to whatever extent possible.
But whose opinions should a militant group care about, and when? By explaining variation in
warning behavior, my research identifies specific conditions under which militants become wary
of excessive killing. In doing so, my research unites two disparate theoretical strains within the
terrorism literature. One strain argues that terrorists want “a lot of people watching, not a lot of
people dead” (Jenkins 1975; Arce and Sandler 2009). The other argues (or at least assumes) that
terrorists want a lot of people dead, because more killing amplifies terrorists’ voices (Lapan and
Sandler 1993; Kydd and Walter 2006). My research identifies specific conditions under which each
argument applies. The difference does not come down to “old terrorism” versus “new terrorism
(Hoffman 1997) or religious terrorism versus secular terrorism (Hoffman 2006). The difference is
explained by political factors that enhance militants’ vulnerability, particularly the dependence on
local populations’ voluntary support. When militants lack a territorial stronghold or state spon-
sor, they must rely on local people for shelter, operational assistance, financing, and recruitment.
Militants who live like guests can be thrown out for offending their hosts.
This finding has important implications for the terrorism and insurgency literatures. Sánchez-
Cuenca and de la Calle (2009: 35) argue that terrorists (defined as “underground groups”) have
less incentive to spare civilians. Rebel groups “have to act as a proto-state in the liberated terri-
tories, imposing order and extracting rents;” underground groups “have very superficial contact
with the population, because they cannot act in the open.” I do find a difference between groups
that control territory and groups that do not, but the effect is precisely the opposite: underground
groups are more discriminate in their use of violence, because they cannot extract resources as easily
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as a proto-state can. As one IRA interviewee put it:
[Y]ou depended on the community to give you food, to give you shelter, to give you
transport. ... If there was a really bad operation ...they would say, “No, I don’t want to
support you anymore.”
The contact between underground groups and local people is far from superficial. This is why
they give warnings more frequently than proto-state (insurgent) groups.
This finding speaks to a related debate about classifying militant groups, and whether “terror-
ists” behave differently from “guerrillas” or “insurgents.” Hoffman (2006: 35-36) distinguishes
“terrorists” as actors who “do not function in the open” and “are constrained both numerically
and logistically.” Guerrilla and insurgent groups are “numerically larger” and capable of con-
testing territory (although they may also use violence “to intimidate or coerce”). My research
undermines this framework, which selectively associates underground groups with “terror.” It
also undermines the theoretical rationale for distinguishing militant organizations into these styl-
ized types. Hoffman’s typological discussion is far more sophisticated than most, but it eventually
reverts to using the US State Department’s definition of terrorism because the definition is clearly
stated and the fundamental goal is to salvage a term that everyone is using anyway.
The use of a term should not be confused with usefulness, however. “Terrorist” is what Waltz
(1979: 10-11) calls “a theoretical notion,” a term invented to “enable us to make sense of the data.”
The debate over defining “terrorist” is a manifestation of a classic scientific problem:
The weakness of theories creates uncertainty of meanings ... Movement toward a rem-
edy is impeded by disinclination to treat the question of meaning as a problem that
can be solved only through the articulation and refinement of theories. The tendency
instead is to turn the problem of meaning into the technical one of making terms oper-
ational. ... The technical usability of terms is unfortunately a weak criterion.
Terms should be used if their corresponding theories are useful, and my research shows that the
existing theoretical framework gets important things wrong. “Terrorists,” supposedly, are under-
ground actors who create “propaganda by the deed.” Theories of terrorism posit signaling mech-
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anisms to explain the actors’ behavior (Overgaard 1994; Hoffman and McCormick 2004; Kydd
and Walter 2006; Arce and Sandler 2007). “Insurgents” and “guerrillas,” supposedly, are above-
ground actors who use military-style violence to contest state sovereignty. Theories of insurgency
posit social mechanisms to explain actors’ behavior (Mao 1989; Weinstein 2006; Mampilly 2011).
My study of warnings shows that, contrary to these stylized accounts, underground actors like
the IRA, ETA, and MRTA think and act like guerrillas, choosing tactics based on social theories
(including Mao’s). Above-ground groups that contest and control territory engage in symbolic vi-
olence. Abimael Guzmán described Lima as “a drum to be beaten;” Prabhakaran’s LTTE targeted
civilians to show that there was no “military solution on the ethnic problem.” By the measure of
warning, my regression analysis shows that groups with territorial control and state sponsorship
actually commit more indiscriminate violence than the supposed terrorists. My operationaliza-
tion of indiscriminate violence in terms of warnings shows that the difference is not just a matter
of scale. In each attack, the perpetrator is more likely to choose the indiscriminate tactic of non-
warning if that actor has territory or state sponsorship to free it from local accountability.
If terrorists explain their behavior by citing guerrilla texts and guerrillas explain their behavior
with terrorist logic, there is something wrong with our existing theoretical framework. We can
best understand these actors by de-emphasizing typology and applying all of the available theo-
ries to the behavior of militants in general.
8.4 Insights about Signaling and Cooperation
The interactions between militants and governments, in both my theoretical model and case stud-
ies, can be viewed as a form of cooperation. My study shows that cooperation is possible between
militants and governments within a conflict environment. This differentiates my study from stud-
ies of cooperation among states and studies of cooperation in post-conflict settings (Fortna 2008).
My research shows that non-state and state actors can build cooperation and an associated set of
institutions (phone chains, code words, etc.) more or less from scratch while they continue to fight
one another.
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My research also adds to the literature on signaling between conflict actors. Militants’ and govern-
ments’ interests may not be completely concordant with regard to warnings. The militant group
is not always attacking, and its expected signaling behavior may differ depending on whether
it is attacking or not attacking at the moment. Fundamentally, a warning is a signal of the mili-
tant’s type (attacking or not) and the government must decide whether the militant is telling the
truth. This is the standard formulation in economic signaling games, such as Spence (1973) and
Cho and Kreps (1987). My game theoretic model adds noise to the signal, in the form of prank
warnings. Although noise complicates the government’s inference of the militant’s type, it may
actually make the government better off by causing non-attacking militants to cease their false
warning behavior. Noise increases the government’s uncertainty until it reaches a certain level,
at which it induces separation, making the signal more informative. This result is not unlike Haan
and Sloof (2011)’s finding that separating equilibria may exist only when there are high levels of
noise in the signaling “technology.” That result is not borne out by the authors’ experiments, but
my research shows empirical support for a similar prediction. Another novel finding from my
case studies is that the actors involved, in this case militant groups, may engineer the signaling
technology endogenously. The IRA and ETA developed a set of procedural institutions, making it
more difficult for pranksters to give credible-sounding warnings. By reducing the effective level of
noise, militants enabled the government to respond, and enabled themselves to give a few spec-
tacular hoax warnings from time to time.
The finding that the IRA and ETA engineered the signaling mechanism has another novel im-
plication. The interaction between militants and governments in these cases was not purely co-
operative. It also contained an element of coercion. Like a virus co-opting a host cell’s resources,
the IRA and ETA forced police to participate in an interaction that was destructive to them ad-
vantageous for the militants. It also served to reproduce militant violence in the future, making
it politically feasible for the IRA and ETA to attack civilian targets again and again. The IRA and
ETA worried, not unreasonably, that police might not respond to their warnings. In the long run,
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ignoring one or two warnings might convince the militants to stop bombing, and actually save
lives. In Schelling (1966: 101)’s words, unresponsive police would give would-be bombers “the
‘last clear chance’ to avert disaster.”
However by giving warnings through an intermediary, the IRA and ETA foisted the “last clear
chance” back onto the police. The use of an intermediary meant that the warning became pub-
lic information. The audience cost literature argues that public signals carry more force (Fearon
1994). If leaders signal in public, they structure their own future payoffs so that they must follow
through on promises and threats. Accountability is a source of bargaining leverage for the signal’s
sender. In the cases I examine, militants give warnings publicly to leverage opponents’ accountabil-
ity. By ensuring that the public knows about each warning, militants structure the government’s
future payoffs, ensuring the government’s continued participation in the system.
Whether one views warnings and responses as primarily cooperative or coercive depends on how
charitable we are in our assessment of the players. Would police have answered the warning calls
if they hadn’t arrived through an intermediary? How much good faith do we ascribe to the mil-
itant organization if fires on police who arrive to investigate a threat? In Schelling (1966: 120)’s
words, “Should we describe the game as one in which the players are adversaries, with a mod-
est admixture of common interest? Or should we describe the players as partners, with some
temptation toward doublecross?” Both interpretations are accurate to a degree.
8.5 Directions for Future Research
This research dissertation can be extended in several ways. Empirically, the most intuitive ex-
tension is to continue the same work with the addition of more data and groups for analysis.
My analyses of the existing dataset produced some satisfying results and some perplexing ones.
For instance, the role of religion was not what prevailing wisdom would lead us to expect. The
findings as they are suggest that scholars have been framing the role of religion the wrong way.
Hoffman (2006: 89), for instance, highlights a particular causal pathway:
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[R]eligious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving
but as “outsiders” seeking fundamental changes ... This sense of alienation ... enables
the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist
operations.
This is almost certainly true, but it does not mean that religion makes people more violent than
secular ideologies could make them. By definition, all of the militant groups in my analysis are
“outsiders seeking fundamental changes” to the rules of governance. My case study of Sendero
Luminoso shows that secular groups can also harness the “sense of alienation” and portray “any-
one who is not a member” as an enemy. Looking at the attacks in my database, Sendero Luminoso
carried out 255 bombings, only one of them with a pre-attack warning. Sendero’s rate of warning
(0.4 percent) is slightly lower than that of Al Qa’ida in Iraq (0.8 percent) and substantially lower
than that of Boko Haram (16 percent). It is absolutely true that religion can push people toward
radical acts of brutality. But focusing only on what religion can do misses the equally important
question of what secular ideologies can do. Some of the religious groups in my dataset behaved
very badly. By the measure of warnings, the secular groups were worse, though not by a statisti-
cally significant margin.
Expanding the dataset to cover new years may change these results. My data set covers only the
years 1970 through 2012. The Global Terrorism Database, which provides my basic case universe,
includes roughly ten thousand new bombings of civilian, non-utility, non-telecommunication tar-
gets from the years 2013 and 2014. Not all of these attacks will meet my requirement that the per-
petrator have carried out at least 100 bombings, but many will. In fact, the new data will elevate
some groups, including the Islamic State, above the 100 bombing threshold for the first time. As
new groups enter the data set, the frequency of group-level variables will change, because many
of the groups in my existing data set are no longer active. The most immediate effect of including
the new data points will be to increase the number of attacks by Islamist groups, including groups
that carry out many suicide tactics and control territory. Without detailed knowledge of how
many warnings the Islamic State gives, it is hard to say whether adding these attacks to the data
will increase the frequency of warnings overall or alter the existing correlations between warnings
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the independent variables in my logit models. Adding the Islamic State will definitely necessitate
some rethinking of variables, such as the human rights measure of the target state (PTS, which did
not have statistically significant effects in my model). A group like the Islamic State lacks a single
target state. If governments’ human rights abuses influence the Islamic State’s behavior, which
states matter? Does the answer to that question change depending on the location of the attack?
These questions did not come up previously because groups that controlled territory (the Taliban,
for instance) did not transcend as many borders or attract the simultaneous military attention of
so many Westphalian states.
Lowering the number of attacks required for inclusion is another approach to expanding the anal-
ysis and increasing our confidence in its findings. Setting the threshold at a particular level may
affect the findings if, for instance, the size or age of a militant group determines its propensity to
give warnings. I take issue with Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009)’s claim that underground
groups have superficial contact with the population. However, the underground groups in my
analysis are fairly sophisticated, long-lived organizations. There are many more underground
organizations that do not carry out the 100 attacks required for inclusion in my dataset, either
because they do not survive for very long or because they are simply less prolific. A small group
might not need as much contact with the local population. Shapiro (2013) notes, for instance,
that militant groups like Al Qa’ida in Iraq develop bureaucratic procedures much like businesses.
Smaller businesses (technology startups come to mind) can operate out of one person’s basement
until they reach a certain size and require public investment. At some intermediate size between
the lone wolf jihadist and Al Qa’ida in Iraq, an underground organization requires public invest-
ment, in the sense of local people offering their homes, food, money, and children to the group’s
cause. Organizations below that threshold of investment may have a more superficial relationship
with the public, and they may be free to use more indiscriminate tactics. If so, setting a 100 attack
threshold for inclusion might obscure part of an inverse U-shaped relationship between autonomy
(or organizational size) and warning. Small groups that can self-fund through direct personal con-
nections might be unlikely to give warnings. Underground groups of a larger size are dependent
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on many local people supporting them, and must use more discriminate tactics. But groups with
territory or state sponsorship are less dependent and may revert to indiscriminate tactics, like the
very small groups can. This is conjecture, however. Reducing the number of attacks required for
inclusion may have no effect other than to increase the number of observations in the dataset.
On a more theoretical level, my study of warnings shows the importance of speech acts as com-
ponents of the physical attack. By determining who is present at the scene when a bomb goes
of, the warning given by the perpetrating group has very real physical consequences. In general,
however, our discussion of “attacks” focuses on the planting and explosion of bombs. This is not
how the perpetrators think about attacks. Groups that give warnings are sophisticated in their
management of a clumsy and dangerous weapon. There is no smart bomb available to these ac-
tors, so they must be especially careful about using the devices they have. The high-level RUC
intelligence specialist recalled the level of discipline imposed on IRA cell members with regard to
this issue:
If these guys went and planted a commercial bomb and then went away and didn’t
give a warning, they would have been subject to discipline which could have cost the
their lives ... That’s how brutal it was.
The warning call – and how it is made, and when, and through which intermediary – is just as
important in the planning of the attack as the planting of the bomb. It is also just as important
in determining the bomb’s effects. In extreme cases, giving a warning can turn a bomb attack
into something that may not fit the definition of terrorism. This applies in both state and non-
state violence (and in the Israeli case examined earlier, the issue of who can be called a terrorist
is very important politically). One natural extension of my research on state warnings would be
to examine other cases where states find themselves fighting non-state actors. Do states engage in
pre-attack warning behavior in similar cases, specifically to clarify who is a terrorist and who is
not?
My research also shows the potential importance of studying false threats. There is a fine dis-
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tinction between threats and warnings, but we can distinguish them by their levels of detail and
immediacy. Warnings inform the recipient that a specific attack is imminent or underway. Threats
inform the recipient that an attack of some kind will take place, possibly during a time window or
possibly contingent on the recipient failing to offer some concession. We have an extensive litera-
ture on states’ use of contingent threats to deter or coerce, particularly during crises. My study of
warnings shows that militants use these speech acts to impose economic costs on the state. False
warnings create terror and social disruption “on the cheap,” without the issuer having to take any
physical action at all. Threats can accomplish the same thing – and perhaps more, because they are
less time dependent and harder to prove false. If a militant group gives a warning, the security
alert may last several hours. But if the group issues a vague threat, when does it expire? Such
a threat may be more useful to the militant group. On the other hand, it may affect the group’s
credibility in the future. My study of warnings provides examples of militant groups preoccupied
with maintaining their credibility so that future warnings will be believed. What do we make of
groups that threaten attacks or call for attacks publicly, but fail to deliver on the threat? Did they
ever intend to follow through? Were the attacks thwarted? Were the issuers simply clamoring for
attention? Or were they publicly suggesting actions for local cells to take on their own? Given the




8.6 Equilibrium Analysis of the Signaling Model
Having presented the model’s most interesting results in Chapter 6, I provide a full analysis of the
model’s equilibrium here, along with proofs of the model’s propositions. I describe the model’s
equilibrium in four sections, based on the four strategic scenarios discussed in Chapter 6.. Those
scenarios are defined by the inequality:
D1 −D2 −G+ Z ≷ 0 ≷ D1 −D2 −G−X
This inequality contains the Government’s condition for mobilizing when warned (on the left size
of zero) and the attacking Militant’s condition for warning a Government that will mobilize (on
the right side of zero). The ordering of the inequality creates four strategic scenarios. First, for
0 > D1−D2−G+Z > D1−D2−G−X , the Government’s payoffs make mobilization impossible,
even though attacking Militants prefer to give warnings and induce Government mobilizations.
Second, for D1 −D2 −G+ Z > D1 −D2 −G−X > 0, the Government would mobilize if warned
truthfully, but attacking Militants prefer not to warn a Government that would mobilize. Third, for
D1 −D2 − G + Z > 0 > D1 −D2 − G −X , attacking Militants prefer to give warnings to induce
a Government mobilization, and the Government prefers to mobilize when it receives a truthful
warning. Fourth, for D1 −D2 −G−X > 0 > D1 −D2 −G+ Z, attacking Militants prefer not to
warn a Government that will mobilize, and the Government can never afford to mobilize anyway.
However, as noted in Section 2.1, this condition is impossible to achieve without specifying Z =
X = 0, replacing the strict inequalities with loose inequalities, settingD1−D2 = G, and specifying
the Government’s and attacking Militant’s behavior when indifferent so that the Militant does not
warn and the Government does not mobilize. The straining of assumptions in the fourth strategic
scenario leaves little to discuss, other than to note the implausibility of both the Militant and
the Government prefering a non-cooperative outcome. As such, when we observe an empirical
pattern of non-warnings and non-responses, it most likely represents a missed opportunity. One
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or more of the actors would have preferred cooperation to reduce casualties, but the preferences
of the other player or the high frequency of false warnings (from the non-attacking Militant or
pranksters) placed such cooperation out of reach.
Strategic Scenario 1: Pure Strategies With Truthful But Useless Warnings I begin the equi-
librium analysis with a discussion of the first strategic scenario, where the Government’s payoffs
make mobilization impossible even though attacking Militants prefer to give warnings and in-
duce mobilizations (formally, 0 > D1 −D2 −G+Z > D1 −D2 −G−X). Given the Government’s
payoff structure, the fractions in its conditions for response to warnings and to non-warnings are
improper (1 < GD1−D2+Z and 1 <
G
D1−D2 , respectively). For any defined probability θW and θ¬W ,
it follows that θW < GD1−D2+Z and θ¬W <
G
D1−D2 . The Government will never mobilize, regardless
of the signal and its resulting beliefs about the probability of an attack. Both types of Militant
face a choice between warning or not warning an unresponsive Government. The attacking-type
warns the Government because D1 > D1 − X for X > 0 (and we specify, with no loss of gener-
ality, warning at indifference if X = 0). The non-attacking Militant receives zero for warning or
not warning the Government, and with no loss of generality, we specify non-attacking Militants do
not warn when indifferent. The Government’s belief upon receiving a warning is θW = αα+ω(1−α) ,
and upon receiving no warning, θ¬W = α. Thus, attacking Militants give pre-attack warnings that
are self-exculpatory but useless, because all players know that the Government cannot mobilize in
response.
Strategic Scenario 2: Pure Strategies With Non-Warnings and Truthful But Useless Warnings
In this scenario,D1−D2−G+Z > D1−D2−G−X > 0, such that the Government would mobilize if
warned truthfully, but attacking Militants prefer not to warn a Government that would mobilize. To
maximize its payoffs, the Government must consider every possible strategy, including strategies
that involve responding to non-warnings (which the attacking Militant may well give) and also to
warnings, because it is possible to receive a prank warning that happens to coincide with a no-
warning attack. The Government’s possible strategies include always mobilizing, mobilizing only
when warned, never mobilizing, and mobilizing only when not warned.
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Given a choice between warning and inducing a mobilization, versus not warning and attacking
a non-mobilized Government, the attacking Militant will choose not to warn because D2 − G <
D1−X . The attacking Militant will be indifferent between warning and not-warning a Government
that always mobilizes (the payoff is D2 −G for warning or not warning), and we will specify the
Militant’s behavior when indifferent. The attacking Militant will warn a Government that never
mobilizes, becauseX > 0 givesD1 > D1−X and forX = 0 we will specify that attacking Militants
warn when indifferent. The attacking-type Militant will warn a Government that responds only to
non-warnings because D1 > D2 +G.
For its part, the non-attacking Militant will warn a Government that responds selectively to warn-
ings if (1 − ω)G > Y . For Y > 0, the non-attacking Militant will not warn an always-mobilizing
Government because G > G− Y (and for Y = 0 we will specify non-warning at indifference). The
non-attacking Militant is indifferent between warning and not warning a never-responding Gov-
ernment (the payoff is zero in either case) and we will specify behaviors as necessary to keep the
equilibrium stable. The non-attacking Militant will never warn a Government that is responding
selectively to non-warnings, because 0 < (1−ω)G for ω > 1 and for ω = 1 we will specify warning
non-warning at indifference.
Given these fundamentals, it is possible to sustain an equilibrium in pure strategies with the Gov-
ernment always mobilizing, mobilizing selectively when warned, or never mobilizing at all. First,
assume (1−ω)G < Y , such that non-attacking Militants will not warn a Government that mobilizes
only when warned. If the Government is always mobilizing, attacking Militants will be indiffer-
ent about warning and we will specify that they do not warn. Non-attacking Militants will not
warn. The signals of both Militant types pool and the Government cannot update its beliefs, giv-
ing θW = θ¬W = α. The Government will mobilize in response to non-warnings if α > GD1−D2 ,
which implies that α > GD1−D2+Z . The Government will also respond to warnings and the always-
mobilizing strategy is sustained. Because the condition for responding to non-warnings is more
stringent, there is also a possibility that GD1−D2 > α >
G
D1−D2+Z and the Government may mobilize
selectively in response to warnings. This strategy is sustainable within this range of α because
both types of Militant follow the same strategy of non-warning and the pooling of signals gives
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θW = θ¬W = α, GD1−D2 > θ¬W , and θW >
G
D1−D2+Z . Finally, in ranges where
G
D1−D2+Z > α, the
Government will never mobilize regardless of the signal received. With a never-mobilizing Govern-
ment, attacking Militants begin to warn becauseD1 > D1−X . (We assume warning at indifference
for X = 0.) The non-attacking Militant begins to warn as well, because the Government’s strategy
makes the non-attacking type indifferent (the payoff is zero for warning or not warning) and we
assume warning when indifferent. Because Militants’ signals pool, the Government’s beliefs are
still θW = θ¬W = α < GD1−D2+Z .
Consider, however, what happens if we specify that (1 − ω) > Y , such that non-attacking Mili-
tants prefer to give warnings to a Government that mobilizes in response to warnings. Both Militant
types would warn an always-responding Government. This strategy profile is sustainable provided
that α > GD1−D2 . However, for
G
D1−D2 > α >
G
D1−D2+Z , the Government will selectively mobilize
in response to warnings, but not non-warnings. The attacking Militant will prefer not to warn,
but the non-attacking type will give warnings. If the non-attacking type gives warnings, the at-
tacking Militant is the only source of non-warnings and the Government’s belief upon receiving a
non-warning is θ¬W = 1. The Government will then find it possible to respond to non-warnings,
rendering both Militant types indifferent, inducing both to warn and returning the Government
beliefs to θW = θ¬W = α, which as before were not sufficient to sustain an always-mobilize Gov-
ernment strategy. This circular logic renders equilibrium impossible for GD1−D2 > α >
G
D1−D2+Z ,
except in mixed strategies (discussed below). However, it is possible to sustain an equilibrium if
α < GD1−D2+Z , such that pooled signals cannot justify a Government mobilization in response to
any signal. Signals will, in fact, pool when the Government is never mobilizing. Attacking Mili-
tants will warn because D1 > D1 −X (and we specify warning when indifferent). Non-attacking
Militants will warn because they receive zero for warning or not warning and we will specify
warning when indifferent. As such, θW = θ¬W = α < GD1−D2+Z and Government non-mobilization
is sustained.
Thus, in strategic scenario two, the attacking Militant gives no warning when the warning would
mobilize the Government; it gives warnings only when it knows those warnings will be useless
to the Government. Empirically, one might see this logic playing out when militants attack very
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high-value targets. If the high-value target is in a remote area or a crowded slum that cannot
easily be navigated by emergency services, or if the target is too difficult to evacuate, an attacker
knows that the government cannot mobilize. It will give warnings specifically because it knows those
warnings are useless. But in cases where a high-value target can be evacuated, the militant will not
give warnings. It will not give warnings specifically because it knows those warnings would be useful
to the government and the value of the target justifies the political cost of harming civilians.
Strategic Scenario 3: Pure Strategies With Truthful Warnings and Casualty-Reducing Mobiliza-
tions Here we consider cases where D1 − D2 − G + Z > 0 > D1 − D2 − G − X . Under these
conditions, attacking Militants prefer to give warnings when such warnings can induce a Govern-
ment mobilization. The Government prefers to mobilize when it knows it has received a truthful
warning. Given the concordance of the players’ preferences, cooperation may be possible so that
civilians can be moved out of harm’s way. The outcome depends in part on the frequency of prank
warnings (ω) and the behavior of the non-attacking Militant. The non-attacking Militant will warn
a Government that mobilizes only when warned if G − Y > ωG – i.e. if (1 − ω)G > Y . Given a
sufficiently high Y penalty for non-attacking Militants who give warnings, the non-attacking type
will remain silent and Militants’ signals will separate to a degree. (Full separation is impossible
because of the non-zero probability of false warnings – noise that can never be fully eliminated
from the signal.)
Assuming semi-separation, the Government’s updated belief upon receiving a warning signal is
that with probability θW = Pr(A|W ) = (1)(α)(1)(α)+(ω)(1−α) =
α
α(1−ω)+ω , the Militant is of the attacking
type. The Government’s condition for mobilizing in response to a warning, expressed in terms of α
is: α > GωD1−D2+Z−G(1−ω) . Because attacking Militants never give warnings, the Government knows,
upon receiving no warning, that the probability of an attack is zero. The Government will never
mobilize in response to non-warnings, because the condition for mobilizing, 0 > GD1−D2 cannot be
met.
Now consider Militants’ strategies. Assuming that the Government is mobilizing in response to
warnings and not to non-warnings, an attacking Militant gives a warning because of our assump-
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tion that X > D1 − D2 − G. A non-attacking Militant does not give warnings because of our
assumption Y > (1− ω)G. We must also consider the Militant’s behavior if the Government is not
able to mobilize in response to warnings. If this is the case, an attacking Militant gives a warning,
because D1 > D1 −X for X > 0 (and we assume warning when X = 0 and an attacking Militant
is indifferent). Non-attacking Militants do not give warnings because the payoff for warning or
not warning is zero and we assume non-warning when non-attacking Militants are indifferent.
Because both Militant types are signaling truthfully, the Government is able to update its beliefs.
θW =
α
α(1−ω)+ω giving a condition of α >
Gω
D1−D2+Z−G(1−ω) for the Government to mobilize when
warned. Because the attacking Militant always sends warnings, θ¬W = 0 and the Government
never mobilizes upon receiving non-warnings.
We must also consider cases where (1 − ω)G > Y such that non-attacking Militants give warn-
ings to a Government that mobilizes selectively in response to them. Under these circumstances,
attacking Militants always warn. This is because for X > 0, D2 − G > D1 −X (if the Government
is responding) and D1 > D1 −X (if the Government is not responding), and we assume warning
when X = 0 and the attacking Militant is indifferent. A non-attacking Militant always gives warn-
ings because of our assumption that (1− ω)G > Y and we assume warning when the Government
is not responding and the non-attacking Militant is indifferent between warning and not warn-
ing (the payoff is zero for either strategy). If both types of Militants gives warnings, the signal
S contains no useful information and the Government cannot update its prior belief α about the
probability of an attack. The condition for mobilization in response to warnings is α > GD1−D2+Z .
Under signal pooling, we must also specify Government behavior when the Government receives
an off-equilibrium signal (in this case, a non-warning). Specifying that the Government does not
mobilize when not warned sustains the equilibrium.
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium In addition to the pure strategy solutions discussed above, a mixed
strategy equilibrium solution exists. In this solution, the Government responds to warnings and to
non-warnings with probabilities ρ and η, respectively; attacking Militants warn the Government
with probability delta; and non-attacking militants warn the Government with probability ε. The
203
requirements for this solution are as follows:
First, in order to play a mixed strategy of warning and not warning, the attacking Militant must
be indifferent between warning and not warning, given the Government’s strategy. With ρ and η
denoting the Government’s probability of responding to a warning or a non-warning signal, the
A-type militant requires the following condition for indifference:
ρ(D2 +G) + (1− ρ)D1 = ω(ρ(D2 +G) + (1− ρ)D1) + (1− ω)(η(D2 +G) + (1− η)(D1 −X))
The left side of this equality represents the payoff from warning and the right side represents the
payoff from not warning (given the probability, ω, that even if the Militant does not warn, the






It follows that ρ > η or the A-type cannot be indifferent. η < ρ would produce a negative value
on the left side of the equality, requiring G > D1 − D2 for a negative value on the right side.
This would make it impossible to satisfy the Government’s minimum condition for responding
to non-warnings, θ¬W > GD1−D2 , with any defined probability. The attacking Militant therefore
requires that the Government respond to warnings with a higher probability than that with which
it responds to non-warnings, in order to satisfy the condition for indifference.
Assuming that this condition is met, the Government’s strategy depends upon the attacking Mil-
itant’s mixing probability δ and the behavior of the non-attacking Militant. Allowing that the
non-attacking militant may give warnings with probability ε, Bayes’ Rule gives the Government’s
beliefs upon receiving a warning as:
θW =
αω + δα(1− ω)
ω + δα(1− ω) + ε(1− α)(1− ω)
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And upon receiving a non-warning:
θ¬W =
α(1− δ)
1− αδ + ε(1− α)
For the Government to mix responses in response to warnings, we require:
αω + δα(1− ω)
ω + δα(1− ω) + ε(1− α)(1− ω)
=
G
D1 −D2 + Z
giving a condition on the attacking militant’s mixing probability, δ:
δ =
αω(D1 −D2 + Z)−G(ω + ε(1− ω)(1− α))
α(1− ω)(G− (D1 −D2 + Z))
For the Government to mix responses in response to non-warnings, we require:
α(1− δ)




giving a second condition on the attacking Militant’s mixing probability:
δ =
α(D1 −D2)−G(1− ε(1− α))
α(D1 −D2 −G)
Setting the two expressions for δ equal to one another and solving for the non-attacking Militant’s
mixing probability ε gives a final condition to sustain the mixed strategy equilibrium:
ε =
ω(D1 −D2 −G)(α(D1 −D2 + Z)−G)− (1− ω)(G− (D1 −D2 + Z))(α(D1 −D2)−G)
(1− α)(1− ω)(G− (D1 −D2 + Z) +G(D1 −D2 −G))
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We can now show that a mixed strategy solution exists for a situation mentioned above, under
strategic scenario two (D1−D2−G+Z > D1−D2−G−X > 0, such that the Government would
mobilize if warned truthfully, but attacking Militants prefer not to warn and induce mobilizations).
Recalling that scenario, a situation exists where a pure strategy solution is not possible. The situ-
ation arises when (1− ω) > Y , such that non-attacking Militants prefer to warn a Government that
responds only to warnings. If the Government can mobilize in response to both warnings and non-
warnings, both types of Militant are indifferent, and we assume that they warn. Given the pooling
of signals, θW = θ¬W = α, and for α > GD1−D2 , the Government can sustain an always-mobilize
strategy.
However, for GD1−D2 > α >
G
D1−D2+Z , the Government will selectively mobilize in response to
warnings, but not non-warnings. The attacking Militant will prefer not to warn, but the non-
attacking type will give warnings. The attacking Militant is then the only source of non-warnings
and the Government’s belief upon receiving a non-warning is θ¬W = 1. The Government will find it
possible to respond to non-warnings, rendering both Militant types indifferent (and we specified,
by assumption that indifferent Militants warn). The Government beliefs are once again θW = θ¬W =
α, which as before was not sufficient to sustain an always-mobilize strategy. Such contradictions
are avoided when we solve for mixed strategies, as above. Restated, the conditions only for a
mixed strategy equilibrium are:







• δ = α(D1−D2)−G(1−ε(1−α))α(D1−D2−G) =
αω(D1−D2+Z)−G(ω+ε(1−ω)(1−α))
α(1−ω)(G−(D1−D2+Z))
• δ > ε > 0
• ε > ω(α(D1−D2+Z)−G)G(1−ω)(1−α)
• ε > G−α(D1−D2)G(1−α)
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• Gω(D1−D2−G)+G > α >
G
D1−D2+Z
These are all compatible with the conditions that produced the contradiction in pure strategies:
• D1 −D2 −G+ Z > D1 −D2 −G−X > 0
• (1− ω) > Y
• GD1−D2 > α >
G
D1−D2+Z
Equilibrium can be sustained in mixed strategies under these conditions, even though a pure
strategy solution is not possible.

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Proof of Proposition 1 The proof of Proposition 1 is simple, given the full equilibrium analysis
presented above. To review, the proposition is that an attacking Militant’s incentive to warn:
1. Increases as the political cost for harming civilians (X) increases
2. Increases as the Government’s cost of mobilizing (G) increases (assuming the Government will
mobilize when warned)
3. Decreases as the expected damage sacrificed (D1 − D2) increases (assuming the Government
will mobilize when warned)
4. Depends only on whether X > 0 in cases where the Government will never mobilize.
Recall that if the Government never mobilizes, the attacking Militant receives D1 for warning and
D1 −X for not warning. The value of D1 is irrelevant, and for any X > 0, the attacking Militant
will warn. (Behavior when indifferent may be specified as necessary, including in the case where
the Government always mobilizes and the attacking Militant receives D2+G regardless of whether
it warns.) In cases where the Government is expected to mobilize only when warned, the attacking
Militant’s choice of strategy depends on the following inequality, where the left side represents the
utility of warning and the right side represents the utility of not warning:
D2 +G ≷ (1− ω)(D1 −X) + ω(D2 +G)
ω appears in this expression because a prank warning could induce the Government to mobilize
even if the attacking Militant does not warn. However, the condition for warning can be rewritten
as (1 − ω)(D2 + G) ≷ (1 − ω)(D1 − X), simplifying to X ≷ D1 − D2 − G. If the left side of
the expression is greater, the attacking Militant will warn. This condition is easier to satisfy as X
increases, as G increases, and as (D1 −D2) decreases. ω does not play a role.

Proof of Proposition 2 Proposition 2 states that, assuming that attacking Militants warn, the
Government’s incentive to mobilize when warned:
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1. Decreases as the Government’s cost of mobilizing (G) increases
2. Increases as the expected damage saved (D1 −D2) increases
3. Increases as the political cost for ignoring truthful warnings (Z) increases
Assuming that attacking Militants warn, there two possible pure strategy behavioral profiles: Both
types of Militants warn, or only attacking Militants warn. If both types warn,t he Government’s con-
dition for mobilizing when warned is α > GD1−D2+Z If only attacking types warn, the Government’s
condition for mobilizing when warned is α > GωD1−D2+Z−G(1−ω) . In both expressions, increases in
(D1 − D2) and Z drive the denominator up, making the condition easier to satisfy. Increases in
G drive the numerator up (and in the semiseparating case, drive the denominator down) making
the condition harder to satisfy.

Note that Proposition 2 applies to pure strategy solutions only. “Assuming that attacking Militants
warn” takes on a different meaning when attacking Militants are known to warn probabilistically.
So does the Government’s “incentive to mobilize,” given that we are solving for conditions of in-
difference by all players. In fact, the reverse of the proposition holds true in mixed strategies. This
is because the Government’s probability of responding to warnings (ρ) comes from the attacking
Militant’s condition for indifference: ρ−η1−η =
X
D1−D2−G , simplifying to: ρ =
X+η(D1−D2−G−X)
D1−D2−G . The
expressionD1−D2−G appears in both the numerator and the denominator, but in the numerator
it is weighted by η, the Government’s probability of responding to non-warnings. Definitionally,
0 < η < 1, so increasing (D1 − D2) drives the denominator up relative to the numerator, and in-
creasing G drives the denominator down relative to the numerator. These changes will drive the
value of the fraction (and ρ downward). Intuitively, an increase in the expression, D1−D2, makes
warning less appealing to the attacking Militant, so the Government must respond less often to
warnings to keep the attacker indifferent. Increasing G makes warning more appealing, so again,
the Government must respond less often to warnings to keep the attacker indifferent.
Proof of Proposition 3 Proposition 3 states that, given the non-attacking Militant’s condition to
refrain from false warnings, Y > (1− ω)G, the incentive to warn falsely:
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1. Decreases as the probability of prank warnings (ω) increases
2. Decreases as the political cost for giving false warnings (Y ) increases
3. Increases as the Government’s cost of mobilizing (G) increases
Obviously, increasing Y or decreasing G pushes the value of the left side of the inequality up and
the right side down , respectively. Increasing ω decreases the value of the right side, given that G
is being weighted by 1− ω.

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Table 5: Marginal Effects
Probability of Warning Europe Non-Europe All Cases
PTS 0.1697 -0.0141 0.0079
(fixed at 3) (0.13) (0.02) (0.01)
Autonomy -0.3784∗∗∗ -0.0624∗∗ -0.0435∗
(fixed at 0) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03)
Maximalist -0.0363 -0.0582∗ -0.0274∗
(0.10) (0.03) (0.02)
Religion/Islam † 0.0442 -0.0035
† (0.05) (0.03)
Suicide † 0.0662∗ -0.0297
† (0.04) (0.02)
PrivateCitizens 0.1723 -0.0840∗∗∗ 0.0005
(0.12) (0.03) (0.02)
Business 0.1640∗ -0.0420 0.0131
(0.10) (0.04) (0.02)
CivilSociety 0.3061∗∗∗ 0.0326 0.0944∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
Infrastructure 0.4185∗∗∗ 0.0153 0.0943∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.05)




N 561 2579 3152
Predicted Probability of Warning 0.40 0.11 0.05
dy/dx for dummies is for discrete change (0 to 1); †variable dropped by Stata
211
Table 6: Logit Results with Dummy Variables TerrStrong and Statespond
Probability of Warning Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
PTS -0.7398∗∗∗ -0.3696∗ -0.1050 0.2212 0.2269 0.1878
(0.20) (0.21) (0.37) (0.33) (0.33) (0.30)
TerrStrong -0.7954 -0.7106 -0.7217 -0.2136 -0.2362 -0.4145
(0.67) (0.62) (0.54) (0.52) (0.54) (0.49)
Statespond -1.372∗∗∗ -1.755∗∗∗ -2.076∗∗ -1.461∗∗∗ -1.415∗∗∗ -1.469∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.59) (0.95) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46)
Maximalist -1.557∗∗ -1.909∗∗ -1.179∗∗ -1.183∗∗ -0.9355∗∗
(0.70) (0.95) (0.54) (0.54) (0.47)
Religion/Islam -0.9778 -0.0359 0.0224 0.0663
(0.80) (0.51) (0.54) (0.50)














Constant -0.0453 -0.2655 -0.4376 -2.983∗∗∗ -2.986∗∗∗ -3.400∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.43) (0.41) (0.85) (0.88) (1.1)
N 3,223 3,223 3,223 3,223 3,223 3,152
Log Likelihood -729.185 -703.139 -694.660 -669.289 -668.879 -623.146
Wald χ2 50.61 41.45 38.09 54.63 54.99 719.90
Pseudo R2 0.2591 0.2855 0.2941 0.3199 0.3203 0.3455
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Standard errors clustered on perpetrator group
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Table 7: Codings of Militant Groups
Group Target Mean PTS Autonomy Maximalist Religion/Islam
Abu Sayyaf Philippines 3.77 1 0 1
African National Congress S. Africa 3.98 2 1 0
Al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) Iraq 4.40 0 1 1
AQAP Yemen 3.77 0 1 1
AQLIM Algeria 3.42 1 1 1
Al-Shabaab Somalia 5 2 1 1
ASALA Turkey 4 1 0 0
ETA Spain 2.23 0 0 0
Boko Haram Nigeria 4 0 0 1
CPI - Maoist India 3.98 1 1 0
FLNC France 1.95 0 0 0
FLNC Historic Channel France 1.86 0 0 0
Dev Sol Turkey 4.0 0 1 0
FMLN El Salvador 4.21 2 1 0
GRAPO Spain 1.96 0 1 0
FALN USA 1 0 0 0
Hamas Israel 4.45 2 0 1
Hizballah Israel 3.60 2 0 1
IRA UK 1.66 0 0 0
PKK Turkey 3.76 1 0 0
LTTE Sri Lanka 4.44 2 0 0
M-19 Colombia 4.76 0 1 0
FPMR Chile 3.53 0 1 0
MILF Philippines 3.94 1 0 1
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Table 8: Codings of Militant Groups
Group Target Mean PTS Autonomy Maximalist Religion/Islam
MIR Chile 4.11 1 1 0
ELN Colombia 4.88 2 1 0
UNITA Angola 4.09 1 1 0
New People’s Army Philippines 3.87 2 1 0
FDN (Contras) Nicaragua 3.2 2 1 0
PLO Israel 3.0 2 0 0
Palestinian Islamic Jihad Israel 4.35 1 0 1
FARC Colombia 4.86 1 1 0
Sendero Luminoso Peru 4.53 1 1 0
Taliban Afghanistan 4.72 2 1 1
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan Pakistan 4.90 2 1 1
MRTA Peru 4.67 0 1 0
ULFA India 3.67 1 0 0
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Figure 17: Effect of Maximalism: Europe vs. Non-Europe Cases (PTS=2, Autonomy=0, Religion/Islam=0,
Suicide=0)
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